

THE

AMERICAN

PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL  
REVIEW.

EDITORS:

HENRY B. SMITH AND J. M. SHERWOOD..

*Associate Editors:*

ALBERT BARNES, Philadelphia.

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APRIL, 1867.

NEW YORK:

WILLIAM SHERWOOD, No. 654 BROADWAY,

(At the Book Store of CHARLES SCRIBNER & Co.)

PHILADELPHIA:

PRESBYTERIAN BOOKSTORE, 1334 CHESTNUT STREET.

BOSTON: A. WILLIAMS & CO.

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NEW SERIES. No. XVIII.—APRIL, 1867.

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ART. I.—HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AS AFFECTED BY  
TIME.\*

By REV. ALBERT BARNES, Philadelphia.

Historical criticism is comparatively a modern science. For the introduction and establishment of this science we are undoubtedly, mainly indebted to the Germans, who, to whatever extent they may have carried it into Rationalism in theology, or scepticism in the classics, have unquestionably laid down, among much that is false, the true principles that are to be applied to the writings of the ancients.

Niebuhr, in the Preface to his History of Rome, says : "The History of Rome was treated, during the first two centuries after the revival of letters, with the same prostration of the understanding and judgment to the written letter that had been handed down, and the same fearfulness of going beyond it, which prevailed in all the other branches of knowledge. If any one had pretended to examine into the credibility of the ancient writers, and the value of their testimony, an outcry would have been raised against such atrocious presumption. The object aimed at was, in spite of every

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\* The following article is one (the second) of a course of Lectures on the Evidence of Christianity recently delivered by the Author, by appointment, before the Union Theological Seminary.—EDITORS.

thing like internal evidence, to combine what they related. At the utmost, one authority was made to give way in some particular instance to another; and this was done as mildly as possible, and without leading to any further results. Here and there, indeed, a man of an independent mind, like Plæranus, broke through this fence; but inevitably a sentence of condemnation was forthwith pronounced against him. Besides, the persons who did so were not the most learned: and these bold attempts were not carried with consistency throughout. In this department, as in others, men of splendid abilities and the most copious learning conformed to the narrow spirit of their age."

Wolff had, indeed, applied a spirit of unsparing criticism to the writings of Homer; Bentley had continued the application of these principles; Glanvil, who has been termed by a modern critic, "the first English writer who had thrown scepticism into a definite form,"\* had applied these principles to the prevailing belief in his time in sorcery and witchcraft; Bayle carried this principle to almost universal scepticism; Niebuhr applied these principles to the Roman History.

Glanvil, in order to test the historical evidence in regard to the miracles of the New Testament, proposed to make the trial on the belief in witchcraft in his time, as being contemporary, and as making it peculiarly easy to test the credibility of the supernatural; "for," said he, "things remote or long past are either not believed or forgotten; whereas, those being fresh and new, and attended with all the circumstances of credibility, it should be expected that they would have most success upon the obstinacy of unbelievers."†

The general grounds on which this criticism is founded are such as the following: That the witnesses for ancient facts lived in a remote and uncritical age; that they were not, when they lived, subjected to a cross-examination; that they have long since died and can not now be examined; that it was for the interest and attractiveness of their story to relate the mar-

\* *Biographie Universelle*.

† Lecky. *History of Rationalism*, I. 133.

velous, since most of their historic productions were recited in public, and none were allowed to contradict them; that there were few contemporary historical documents with which they could be compared; that there was a love of the marvelous, and a prevailing belief in the supernatural, which was to be gratified; that time has affected changes in the public mind in most or all these respects; and that now, in a more critical age, and on the coolness of calm reflection, and with tests to separate the marvelous from the real, it is proper to apply to *all* ancient writings the principles of criticism suggested by the present advanced position of the world.

Time *has* made changes affecting historical testimony. All is not now believed that has been believed in former ages—nor should it be; all is not believed that is recorded—nor should it be. The world is less credulous than it once was; it is more disposed to examine what is proposed for belief; it has advantages which it once had not for this; it demands evidence which it did not once demand; it applies an unsparing criticism to what was once accredited as undoubted truth. It has learned that many false records have come down to us from the past; that there have been errors in transcribing ancient documents; that many of those documents have been corrupted by design, if an object was to be gained by it—if the glory of a nation or a hero was to be exalted, if the claims of a religion were to be established, if the interest of a party in the state, or in philosophy, was to be promoted; and it has learned that many of the documents which have come down to us from ancient times are forged documents; that there have been myths, legends, and fables wrought into history; that there have been fancied records of dynasties and heroes stretching back an almost illimitable number of years; that there have been details of unreal battles, of imaginary dynasties, and of fancied wonders; that there have been apocryphal histories and apocryphal gospels.

Especially there has been a change on the whole subject of the supernatural. In the early ages of the world the relation of a supernatural event did nothing to impair the general

credit of the history, and the record of such an event was received with as little scepticism as a statement in regard to the ordinary events of the world. It does not appear that the statements of Livy respecting the marvelous events attending the foundation of Rome and its early history, impaired the general credit of his history, or lessened the public faith in his statements in regard to things occurring under the operation of natural causes. It may be presumed, on the contrary, that such statements of the marvelous commended his history to a stronger credence, as being in accordance with the common belief respecting the foundation of empires, and as indicating the special favor of the gods toward the nation—a nation started on a loftier career, and under better auspices which could refer to special divine interpositions in its behalf; which could prove that even the gods were present when the foundations of its walls and of its capitol were laid.

All this has passed away. An unsparing criticism has swept all those marvels from the early history of Rome, and in doing this, it demands that all the records of marvels in the early history of nations should be regarded as fabulous. To such an extent has the principle been carried, in fact, that the claim that 'miracles' or marvels have occurred in any period of the history of the world is to be regarded as proof that the entire history, and all that is dependent on it, is false. Renan, in his 'Life of Jesus,' (p. 17.) says of the Gospels: "Let the gospels be in part legendary:—that is evident since they are full of *miracles* and the *supernatural*:"—that is, the fact that 'miracles' and the 'supernatural' are recounted there is to be regarded as undoubted proof that they are in a great degree 'legendary'—on the same level with the first portion of the history of Livy, or with the early records of Egypt.

So, again, in a passage apparently approved by the Westminster Review\* as a just principle, he says, "It is an absolute rule of criticism not to admit into history any narrative of miraculous incidents. This is not the result of any meta-

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\*Quoted in the Westminster Review, Oct., 1866.



physical system ; it is simply a fact of observation. No such facts have ever been established, and all alleged miracles resolve themselves into illusion and imposture. All miracles that may be made the subject of examination vanish away."

The demand is now a demand which this age is to consider—for it affects every question about a revelation, and is vital in its bearings on Christianity—that this shall be regarded as a universal rule in history ; or, that the claim that a miracle has been wrought shall at once set aside all the evidences adduced in favor of the truth of any historic record.

To nothing have the principles of a stern historical criticism been more rigorously applied than to the books of the New Testament. All that has been said about legends, and marvels, and interpolated manuscripts, and forged documents, and unknown authorships, has been said about those books. All that has been said about statements being contradictory to each other, or to independent contemporaneous statements ; about time as affecting the credit of testimony ; about witnesses as incompetent to give testimony, or as not cross-examined, or as long since dead ; about the ability of a more advanced age of the world to judge of a record that has come down from the mists, and through the mists, of the past—all this has been said of what is affirmed as fact in the New Testament. A more unsparing criticism has been employed *because* the events referred to are of a religious nature ; and a portion of the scientific and historic world—a portion not small—is hastening to the conclusion, as a universal canon of criticism, that the fact that any pretended history records a 'miracle' is full demonstration that the history is false.

The question suggested by these criticisms is a *fair* question ; a question which men have a right to ask ; a question which the believer in miracles may be held to answer. The value of evidence *is* affected by time. One age may be much more competent to examine the credibility of testimony than another. A subsequent generation may be much better qualified to examine such testimony than that in which the event was said to have occurred. It may be easier to ascertain the

exact truth in regard to an event at a subsequent period than when it occurred, as the movements and positions of forces engaged in a battle can be best understood and explained when the smoke of the battle has cleared away. Statements apparently contradictory may be explained and reconciled; different accounts may be sifted and compared; and the result of all credible testimony may be combined in one. It is ever to be remembered that *the historic statement of an event is what it is reported to be by all who witnessed it, and who have made a record in regard to it; not the statement of an individual.* The historic statement in respect to the Decline and Fall of the Roman empire is what it is reported to have been by the great multitude of authors and writers whom Mr. Gibbon had before him in composing his history. His task was to select, compare, reconcile, arrange, and combine into that *one* harmonious and magnificent history which he has given to mankind, all that was credible in that multitude of writers as bearing on the events of this history:—not to reproduce merely the statement of any *one* of those authors. The scripture narrative of an event is what it is reported to have been by *all* the sacred writers, and the task of an expositor of the Bible is to compare, reconcile, arrange, and combine these also into one harmonious whole. The real narrative in regard to the life of the Redeemer is not what it is reported to be by Matthew, or Mark, or Luke, or John:—it is the statement of all of them combined.

It is also a very pertinent question—a question which we may be held to answer—in what manner a religion urging its claims now on the ground of the evidence on which Christianity advanced *its* claims, and on which it undoubtedly made its way in the world eighteen hundred years ago, would be met in this age—in this nineteenth century? Would it now, if the same evidences of its divine origin were urged, be received as a religion from God? Would it make its way in the world in this age as it did then? Would the evidences of its miracles be received in this scientific and critical age as they were in that comparatively uncritical, unscientific, and credu-

lous age—an age when men were disposed to believe in the marvelous, and when the belief in the supernatural interposition of the gods in human affairs was the common belief of men? Was the evidence of the miracles ever thus subjected to such test as they would be now, or as they ought to have been; would they convince men now as they did then? If it be admitted that the religion was propagated and embraced then on evidence that seemed to be satisfactory to mankind, would it be embraced, and could it be propagated now, on the same evidence? Would not that evidence be subjected to a more rigid and just scrutiny, and would it not, *therefore*, be rejected? If so, should it not be rejected now?

“Let a thaumaturgist,” says Renan,\* “present himself to-morrow with testimony sufficiently important to merit our attention; let him announce that he is able, I will suppose, to raise the dead; what would be done? A commission composed of physiologists, physicians, chemists, persons experienced in historical criticism, would be appointed. This commission would choose the corpse, make it certain that death was real, designate the hall in which the experiment should be made, and regulate the whole system of precautions necessary to leave no room for doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection should be performed, a probability almost equal to certainty would be attained. However, as an experiment ought always to be capable of being repeated; as one ought to be capable of doing again what one has done once, and as in the matter of miracles there can be no question of easy or difficult, the thaumaturgist would be invited to reproduce his marvelous acts under other circumstances, upon other bodies, in another medium. If the miracle succeeds each time, two things would be proven: first, that supernatural acts do come to pass in the world; second, that the power to perform them belongs or is delegated to certain persons. But who does not see that no miracle was ever performed under such conditions; that always hitherto the thaumaturgist has

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\* *Life of Jesus*, pp. 44, 45.

chosen the subject of the experiment, chosen the means, chosen the public; that, moreover, it is, in most cases, the people themselves who, from the undeniable need which they feel of seeing in great events and great men, something divine, create the marvelous legends afterward."

It may be added, as illustrating this feeling, that the world is beginning to demand an altogether different class of evidences of Christianity from what satisfied the generations that preceded us, and although the authors, some of them at least, who satisfied those generations of the truth of the Bible, have scarcely passed away, yet that Grotius de Veritate, and Paley's Evidences, and Lardner's Credibility, and Chalmers' Evidences of Christianity, are beginning to be regarded as books pertaining to the past—books that performed their work well enough in their own time, but which are soon to be reckoned with the obsolete defenses of Christianity in the times of Porphyry, Celsus, and Julian, or in the times of the British deists of the seventeenth century. Whatever might have been the value of that evidence, and that mode of argumentation, in a former age, and however such arguments may have convinced the world in former times, it is now held that we are not at liberty to demand that the same credit shall be given to the arguments in this age. 'Let the thaumaturgist,' Renan would say, 'work over the miracle in *our* times, in such a manner as to satisfy an age far different from that when the miracles were pretended to have been wrought.'

It becomes, therefore, very important to inquire whether on the alleged facts on which Christianity was first propagated, and which were regarded eighteen hundred years ago as sufficient evidence to prove that the religion was from God, and under which the religion actually spread over the world, it may be commended to mankind now. Or has time so rectified the judgment of mankind on the subject of testimony, as to show that the evidence was valueless then, and should be regarded as valueless now, and that the religion was in fact propagated under a delusion?

This is a fair question. This introduces the subject of this Lecture. It will be illustrated under two heads :

The general principles on the subject.

The application of those principles to the Christian testimony.

The general subject to be illustrated is, **EVIDENCE AS AFFECTED BY TIME.**

Evidence as bearing on things to be believed—which is its proper province—must pertain to subjects as mathematical, as legal, as scientific, as moral, as historical.

No one would pretend that on these subjects precisely the same kind of testimony would be demanded ; no one would maintain that the evidence to be satisfactory to the mind must be precisely the same ; no one would affirm that all would be equally affected by time, or that the same rules are to be applied in estimating their value.

In mathematics, time makes no change in the force and value of the evidence by which a proposition is established. If it be granted that shorter methods may be used, or that new methods of demonstration may be discovered, as the Algebraic process, or Logarithms, or Fluxions, or the Differential Calculus, yet these do not demonstrate that the former evidence was false, or unreliable as far as it went, or that that for which it was employed as a demonstration was false. It must be—it cannot be otherwise—that Euclid believed that in a right angled triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two sides, on the same evidence on which we believe it, and the proof on which he relied, as far as it was proof, is as forcible now as it was then. Time does nothing to affect that evidence. It neither confirms nor impairs it. The evidence is to us precisely what it was to the human mind eighteen hundred years ago, and it will be the same to the end of the world. We believe it not because Euclid believed it ; or because there is evidence that it *was* believed then ; or because the truth of the proposition was propagated on the ground of the evidence then employed, but because the proof to our minds is precisely, neither more

nor less, what it was to the first mind on which the truth of the "forty-seventh" proposition dawned. The proof cannot be added to or diminished ; and that proof will go down to the end of the world, whatever changes may occur in the laws of criticism, or in any advances which may be made in the capability of judging of evidence. Many new truths may be discovered and added to this, but time does not change the faith of mankind in this.

In legal matters, time does not necessarily or materially affect evidence. It affects the manner of arriving at it ; the question as to what is legal testimony ; the determination about the credibility of witnesses ; the question how far interest in the case, or relationship to the parties, shall affect their credibility ; the mode of examination, in open court, or in secret ; the credit due to the young, to those of feeble mind, or to those who may be partially insane ; the competency of witnesses in general ; but the evidence itself is not affected by time. The evidence that Titus killed Gaius, in the time of Augustus, and that he was properly convicted and punished, is not modified by the lapse of eighteen hundred years, and by all the changes which have occurred in the world in that time. If the evidence then relied on established the fact so that, under the laws, Titus was justly punished, it establishes it now, so that it ought to go into history, and to be believed in all coming time ; to become one of the cases of precedents establishing the principles on which justice is to be administered in every future age.

In scientific matters, the principles are the same. Testimony or evidence is not likely to be affected in any way on these subjects ; for, in general, we do not believe the facts of science on the evidence of testimony. Although it is true that the mass of men credit the facts of science—in astronomy, geology, chemistry, and in the kindred sciences—so far as they come before them at all for belief, on the ground of testimony, yet it is also true that these great truths and facts can be subjected to experiment and observation by any one that chooses. Galileo *testified* that there were moons apper-



taining to Jupiter. That he did so testify can be easily established by history ; that there are moons revolving around the planet is a matter, however, not depending on the credibility of his testimony, or on the historical records of that time, but can be verified by any one by looking through a telescope.

Time sets aside, indeed, many things in science which were once assuredly believed. But it is not done because the testimony is doubtful ; it is because the observations were not accurately made ; or because there were false theories ; or because more accurate instruments, and a more varied and prolonged observation, have shown exactly what the facts were and are. But time, for example, has not affected the evidence in regard to the facts connected with the celebrated "Eclipse of Thales," on which so much has been written, and which has been the subject of so much discussion among astronomers : either the fact in regard to the *effect* of that eclipse as stated by Herodotus, or the fact that Thales predicted it. Herodotus says (Book I, Ch. LXXIV,) that there was a war between the Lydians and the Medes, and that after various turns of fortune, "in the sixth year a conflict took place ; and on the battle being joined, it happened that the day suddenly became night. And this change," says he, "Thales of Miletus had predicted to them, definitely naming the year in which the event took place. The Lydians and the Medes, when they saw day turned into night, ceased from fighting ; and both sides were desirous of peace."<sup>\*</sup>

Time, in regard to this event, has undoubtedly shown that the *theory* which Thales held in regard to astronomy was a false theory ; that the prediction implied no *very* accurate knowledge of the heavens ; that probably *all* his knowledge on the subject was derived from the observation of the periodical times when eclipses occur ; and that probably also *all* that he predicted was the *year* when this eclipse would take place, not the hour, the day, nor even the month : but time has not

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\* Whewell's History of the Industrial Sciences. Vol. 1, 509.

set aside the evidence in regard to the *fact*. Thus time may establish the truth of a scientific event, but not the cause of it; the fact may be demonstrated by testimony to the end of the world, but the testimony does nothing to establish the *causes* of it. On this point, however, time may do this:—While the testimony as to the fact is unaffected, it *may* do much to show what was, or was not the cause of the event. Time may show that what was regarded as miraculous and supernatural when it happened, took place in the ordinary operations of nature, and the “dim eclipse” which, at the time of its occurrence, “with fear of change perplexed monarchs” may take its place among ordinary events, to be explained in accordance with ordinary and well-understood laws. The fact existed as recorded; time has changed the views of men in regard to the cause, and reduced it from a marvelous to an ordinary operation of nature. What armies would now be stayed in battle by an eclipse of the sun? Of ancient facts now as reported to us in history, we give credit to the facts as reported; we explain them as we choose. The facts we admit. Here we pause. All in regard to the explanation is as much under our control as it was under the control of those who have reported the facts to us.

In regard to moral subjects—to philosophy—the same remark is to be made. We receive the statement that certain opinions in morals, in philosophy, in religion were held; we embrace those opinions or not as we choose; we explain and defend them in our own way. It can not be denied as a matter of historic verity that Plato in the *Gorgias* argues in favor of the immortality of the soul. The fact that he at times *seems* to hold this is not to be set aside. But no one of us believes the doctrine *because* he thus testified to it; and no one believes it on the ground of the *proof* or *evidence* which he adduces in favor of it. Time holds on to the fact that such opinions were held; it sets aside, it may be, all the arguments on which the opinion was held, or reverses entirely the faith in the doctrine itself. That the schoolmen held certain opinions we do not doubt; that they were defended by great prolixity and by

marvelous subtilty of argument, any one may have evidence of who chooses to look into the ponderous tomes that so calmly now repose in dust in the alcoves of our great libraries, like ancient knights encased in armor in old cathedrals; but who feels bound to believe their opinions; who feels bound to make himself acquainted even with the terms of their logic—the weapons with which they dealt their heavy blows?

There remains the question as to the bearing of these remarks on historic records: the records of *facts* pertaining to ancient times. This point will lead to a matter of much interest, and one which specially pertains to us, the question about the *facts* in regard to the miracles of the New Testament.

It is this kind of evidence which is mainly affected by time; this which leads into the whole region of historical criticism.

The manner in which this evidence is affected by time, and the reasons why there is occasion for the modern science of historical criticism, will be made plain by a few remarks.

The following things, then, are to be taken into the account in estimating the value of ancient historical testimony: (a) The imperfect observation in regard to the facts that are recorded. (b) The disposition for the marvelous in the early periods of history. (c) The character of the witnesses for competency, veracity, credibility, candor, honesty, freedom from selfish ends. (d) National vanity; not a few histories being in fact designed to exalt the glory of one nation over its rivals. (e) The nature of the subject: for on some subjects men are much more honest and credible than on others. Such are, or may be, for example, the views which men have on the subject of religion, that no reliance almost could be placed on their testimony in regard to the facts that pertain to it. The narrative would be certain to be colored by the views entertained on the subject, and the largest allowance would be necessary in estimating the value of the historical record. (f) The voluntary corruption of records for national, private, or party purposes. (g) The slow accumulation of errors in the process of transcription of records—small at first, and few in

number, yet unavoidably perpetuated and multiplied by time. (h) The number of false or apocryphal histories that may be written for various purposes : as the long imaginary histories of the Dynasties of Egypt and India, or the apocryphal Gospels.

Time affects all these things, and the work of historical criticism when the world becomes sensible that these have accumulated, and that the true should be separated from the false, becomes a work so vast as to be properly dignified with the name of *science*. Nothing demands more learning, patience, acuteness, sagacity, candor and impartiality, than such a work, and he who, in history, contributes any thing to separate the true from the false, and to give the world a correct record of the past, is to be classed among the benefactors of mankind.

In looking at these things, and contemplating the uncertainties and the corruptions of history, it becomes a question whether *any* facts pertaining to the past can be placed on the same level with those which are occurring in our own time, and which come under our own observation, or the observation of our contemporaries ; or whether all the alleged facts of ancient history are to be classed among myths and legends ; or where, *if* there is true history, the region of legend ends, and that of history begins ; and *if* legend, myth, and fable reign at all in the past, what is the *extent* of the dominion ? Does it terminate with the legends of Livy ? Does it cease with the stories of the interventions of the gods in battle, and in the foundation of cities and empires ? Or does it embrace also the account of the Creation and Fall in Genesis ; the record of the deluge ; of the overthrow of Sodom ; of the wonders of Egypt ; of the wandering of the Hebrews in the desert ; of the miracles of Gideon and Sampson : the records of the Gospels, and of the acts of the apostles ?

Is there *any thing* that can be *known* of the past ?

There is a limit to scepticism in regard to the events of the past, as there is a limit to scepticism on all subjects. Valuable in its place, and valuable as an attribute of the human mind, yet there is a boundary which the Author of that mind

has fixed, beyond which it is not allowed permanently to pass, and the world, sooner or later, works itself right on this subject as it does on all others.

There are facts which historical criticism can not affect, and to which scepticism, even that of the most destructive nature, can not be applied. There are facts which Mr. Hume and Mr. Gibbon found in the past, and which Niebuhr found, and which are never henceforward to be called in question. The question in secular history is, what is their limit? The great question in religion, a question which Strauss, and Renan, and Lepsius, and Bishop Colenso, and the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," and the writers in the Westminster Review, are endeavoring to help us to solve, is whether the proper limit will exclude the facts in the Life of Jesus, and the miracles of the Old and New Testaments?

Let us now inquire for a moment what principles are to be applied to the solution of the historical question.

The world has settled down into a general view on the subject as to what is necessary to establish *faith* in an ancient fact, and when those things are found, the faith of the world is, from the constitution of the human mind, as firm as it is in well-established contemporaneous events—it may be said as firm as when an event occurs under our own eyes; for we no more doubt that Cæsar fell by the hands of assassins in the Senate-House; or that Xerxes crossed the Hellespont; or that the Persians were defeated at Marathon and Salamis, than that Washington fought at Trenton, or that Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, or that the tide of rebel invasion was turned back at Gettysburg, or that the rebel General Lee surrendered to General Grant.

Such things occur on entering into history, in such cases, as the following:

(a) When the witnesses are competent, and have a proper opportunity of observing the facts: that is, where the facts are the proper subject of testimony *as facts*, or as actual occurrences, and not as matters of *fancy* and opinion.

(b) When the witnesses concur in the general statement of

the fact, though they may vary in the circumstances or details.

(c) When there is no motive for deception or imposture. We do not see, for example, that Tacitus had any motive for either, and hence, almost no part of his narrative has ever been called in question.

(d) When the facts recorded are strongly against the religious faith of the narrator, or when he would *wish* that the facts were otherwise. It is this which gives such value to the statement of Mr. Hume that "England owes whatever of civil liberty it enjoys to the influence of the Puritans:" a fact which we are morally certain he would have wished to be otherwise, and which he would have kept back if he could have done it as an honest historian; and this it is, with other things, which gives so great value to the "History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," for many of the facts recorded by Mr. Gibbon were undoubtedly such as a sceptic in religion would have wished to have been otherwise; in respect to many of those stated, Mr. Gibbon could not but see that the world would regard them as furnishing proof that the religion was of Divine origin; of many of those stated, therefore, it required all his great talents to explain them on the supposition that the religion was false. Yet he recorded them, without suppressing what was true, or interpolating what was false, or perverting what had occurred, leaving it to himself and to other sceptics to explain them as they could.

(e) When the facts referred to, and which are said to have occurred, furnish the most easy and natural explanation of the existing state of things, or go into existing events as the cause does into the effect, and are indispensable to the solution of what actually exists in the world. There are, undoubtedly, numerous things existing in the world—in the civilization, the arts, the laws, the religion—for which alleged facts in history are the most natural explanation, and which are, in fact, indispensable to the explanation. The main facts which are said to have occurred in the life of Mohammed, furnish the best explanation of the opinions, the laws, the customs, the



religious belief, of an hundred and sixty millions of the human family, nor can those opinions, laws, and customs, be explained except on the supposition that those facts actually occurred.

(*f*) When those facts are commemorated, and the knowledge of them is perpetuated by monuments, coins, medals, games, festivals, processions, and celebrations from age to age; when without the supposition of those facts, all those things would be unmeaning, or would be wholly inexplicable. The annual observance of the fourth day of July in this country is founded on the Declaration of Independence, and can not be explained except on the belief of the facts as history states them. The division of the lands in England is founded on the fact that there was a 'Doomsday Book,' and that the lands were apportioned in accordance with that. The establishment of the Feudal System in England; the form of the government for ages; the tenure by which land is held; and the distinction of ranks, is founded on the fact that William the Norman was victorious at the battle of Hastings, and that the country was apportioned among his barons: nor can the laws, in regard to real estate in England, for eight hundred years, be explained except on that supposition. The boundaries of the old thirteen States of the Union can be explained only on the supposition, which history states, that charters were granted to the Colonies by the Crown, fixing those boundaries—for there are no natural boundaries between Massachusetts and New Hampshire; between Connecticut and Massachusetts; between Pennsylvania and New York; between Virginia and North Carolina. The Tower of London can be explained only by a belief in the great facts of history as recorded in the books. What mean those standards taken in war, those old suits of armor, shields, and bows, and battle-axes, but that the nation once was as history represents it to have been? How came they there? Who invented them? Who had power to persuade the nation that all these had been used in wars and conquests? And what mean those blocks made as if for beheading men, and those axes, unless it

were true that Lord Russell, and Sir Walter Raleigh, and Algernon Sidney were actually beheaded? Who placed them there? Who has been able to persuade the nation that they represent bloody realities?

Thus facts come to us about which the world does not doubt; reports of ancient things which can not be explained except on the supposition that the main facts as alleged by history are true. So the fossil remains of the earth—the coal beds—the extinct remains of races swept off in times far remote—preserved in enduring rocks, and laid far below the surface of the earth—are like these old pieces of armor in the Tower of London, memorials of what the history of our world has been. The geologist, a laborious and most useful historian, is performing, by toil and sorrow, what the conductor through the Tower of London does, in explaining the history of the past.

Things, therefore, may be, and are made true in regard to the past. No man has any more doubt that Cæsar was assassinated than he has that Mr. Lincoln was.

It remains to consider the application of these principles to the particular subject of Christianity:—the question whether time has so affected the evidence in regard to the facts on which Christianity is based as to render these facts unworthy of belief.

I have already remarked that a more unsparing criticism has been applied to the historic records of Christianity than to any other records pertaining to the past. All that has been alleged against any other history has been urged against the books of the New Testament; all the charges which have been elsewhere alleged of incompetency on the part of witnesses; of defective observation; of personal interest; of corrupted manuscripts; of Apocryphal writings; of inconsistencies and contradictions; of uncertain authorship; of improbability in regard to the events; of mistakes and errors, have been and are alleged in regard to the Evangelists.

To the ordinary difficulties in regard to ancient records, there is, in reference to the New Testament, this additional

difficulty, greatly augmented by the change in the views of the world on the subject of the supernatural and the marvelous, that the narrative requires us to believe in miracles ; not merely that Jesus lived, and taught, and was a good man, and founded Christianity, as Strauss and Renan admit, but that he cast out devils ; that he healed diseases, by a word ; that he raised the dead ; that he raised himself from the grave and ascended to heaven—as the difficulty of believing the record of Livy in regard to the foundation of Rome, would be greatly augmented if we were required to believe his legends about Romulus and Remus, or the miracle when a yawning chasm appeared in the city threatening its very existence, and the closing of the chasm by the self-sacrifice of the gallant Curtius, throwing himself, into it, clad in full armor. No one can be required, it would be said, in this sharp, keen, searching, scientific age to believe what men readily believed in the fabulous periods of history, when the belief in the supernatural prevailed every where ; when eclipses were portents and prodigies ; when in ignorance of the laws of nature it was believed that the heavenly bodies were moved by angels ; that all atmospheric changes were affected by angels ; that a special angel was assigned to every star and every element ; when it was believed that comets were precursors of calamity, and that a special comet, ominous of evil, preceded the death of such men as Cæsar, or Constantine ; or that such a comet appeared before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, before the Peloponnesian war, before the civil war of Cæsar and Pompey, before the fall of Jerusalem, before the invasion of Attila, and before the coming of famine and pestilence.\* A more relentless criticism by far has been applied to the New Testament than was applied by Wolff to the *Iliad*, or by Niebuhr to the *History of Rome*. And what strange, unhistorical theories are held in regard to the four Evangelists ! Those Evangelists contain indeed fragments of truth. There is enough of truth in them to account for the origin of Christ.

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\* Lecky. *Hist. of Rationalism*, I. 289, 290.

ianity. But they are without order or arrangement. They are of uncertain date and authorship. They are to be rearranged and reconstructed. The portions added are to be eliminated ; the deficiencies are to be made up by sagacity ; the improbable parts are to be discarded ; all that is miraculous is to be regarded as fabulous and legendary. The system of Christianity is a "myth" having for its basis a very uncertain personage, of sufficient reality to suggest the mythical actions ascribed to him, as in Strauss ; or Jesus was a real personage, the real founder of Christianity, a young man of vast originality, of wonderful genius, slowly made conscious of his own powers, wrought up to enthusiasm unexpectedly to himself, to believe that he was to change and reform the world, and acting on the borders of insanity, as in the romance of Renan.

What, then, is to be believed ? What are the principles, as matters of history, which are to guide us ?

Christianity, as we shall see in a subsequent Lecture, *has* a history, as marked and definite as any other : an origin ; a development ; a progress ; an array of facts that belong to it alone. England has a history : its institutions ; its judicial arrangements ; its trial by jury ; its writ of Habeas Corpus ; its government by King, Lords, and Commons. Mohammedism has a history. There is that which is *real* which has gone into the religion of Islam ; which makes it what it is ; that without the knowledge of which its facts can not be explained. So has Christianity.

The principles which are to be applied to this subject, as connected with the train of thought in this Lecture, must now be stated in few words.

(1) The same principles of historical criticism must be applied to the books of the New Testament as other books : no sharper, no more lax ; no more severe, no more indulgent. No favor should be shown to them because they claim to be sacred books ; nor should they be approached with any prejudice, or any suspicion on that account. The question is not what the book *is about* ; it is whether it *is true*. It is possible,

in the nature of things, that a book *may* record correctly the account of the healing of a blind man, or the raising of a man from the dead ; and, if such events have actually occurred, it is not to be *assumed* that a correct record can not be made of them ; for such a record is as possible as the record of a battle, or a record of travels. And, on the other hand, it should not be claimed that such a record, even when it describes the resurrection of the Redeemer from the grave, laying the foundation of the hope of immortal life for man, is to be exempt from the profane hands of criticism, or that a man is guilty of presumption, profaneness, or blasphemy, who approaches such a record as he does the writings of Livy or Tacitus. Perhaps it should be said that the very importance of the subject, and the very sacredness of the subject, and the vastness of the interests at stake, should make the search into the genuineness and the accuracy of the narrative more keen and sceptical—as the claim of a title to a peerage or a vast estate would be examined more carefully than the title to the office of a justice of the peace or to a few acres of ground ; or, as one would examine more carefully the evidence that a ship was so constructed as to bear him safely across the ocean, than he would the capability of a skiff to sport with on a pond.

That there has been a delusion on this subject, on both sides, there can be no doubt. The facts that the books of the New Testament are regarded as sacred ; that they pertain to religion ; that faith in them has been for ages imbedded in the hearts of men ; that the hopes of men are founded on them ; that the consequences of finding that they are false would be terrible—leaving man without hope—darkening the world, dark enough at any rate, by the gloom of absolute despair—these facts, it can not be denied have influenced many in regard to the manner in which they should approach those books. To them, too, it seems to be an act of profaneness—a crucifying again of the Lord of glory—to approach the account of the sufferings, the death, and the resurrection of the Redeemer with the same rules with which we approach the ac-

count of the Plague in Athens by Thucydides, and to apply the same rules to the one which we apply to the others. Despite every effort to the contrary, we can not but have a different feeling, apart from any thing in the spirit and design of the men toward Strauss and Renan, from what we have toward Wolff and Niebuhr; for we can hardly help feeling that *they* have profanely, like Uzzah, touched the ark of God. In the one case, we feel that no great interests are at stake, whether the narrative is true or false; in the other, is involved all that is dear and sacred to the souls of men.

Yet the sacrifice must be made; the feeling that this is irreverence and profaneness must be overcome. Every man has a right to approach the most sacred records of the Bible with the same severe and stern rules of criticism with which the love of truth would impel him to approach any ancient records whatever. Nay, every man is bound to do it; for higher interests than any which are involved in an inquiry into the title to a peerage or an estate, or any involved in recorded facts in regard to the rise and fall of empires, are at stake. It is to be remarked, indeed, that it is not inconsistent with historical candor, that a man should approach the records of the New Testament with the *hope* that they may be found to be true:—just as a man may approach the examination of the evidence that the title to his farm is good; or of the news which he has received of the safety of a son that he had supposed was lost at sea; or as he may look on the evidence that his slandered wife is chaste, with the *hope* that the evidence will be found to be true. It is not, it can not, be wrong in me to *desire* to find evidence that there is a God and a Savior; that, I am to exist forever; that a way of redemption has been provided for sinners; and that there is a world of glory and purity beyond the grave. Nor is such a desire incompatible with candor in the examination of the evidence:—for the very greatness of the hope, and of the interest at stake, should, and naturally will, make the mind calm and candid.

(2) The great facts of Christianity are indisputably established; and this has been done by the ordinary methods of



historic evidence. Those facts have gone into history as all other ancient facts have done, and the history of the world can not be explained or understood without admitting their reality. The condition of the world as it is now has grown out of those facts; and that condition can no more be explained without the admission of the truth of those facts than the Constitution and Laws of England can be explained without admitting the truth that Alfred reigned, or that William the Conqueror conquered at Hastings and divided the kingdom among his followers, or that from John great concessions were obtained by his barons at Runnymede.

The facts to which I now advert in regard to Christianity as established by evidence, are such as the following: (a) That it had an origin far within the limits of well-established history. It has not always been upon the earth. There have been centuries—many centuries—in the history of the world in which it had no existence, and when no germ existed from which it could have been developed. We can go back to the times of which Berosus, Thucydides, Livy make mention, and we can be certain that it did not then, either in germ or in development, exist upon the earth. (b) The time *when* it appeared, or when it was originated, is also a matter of history. The disputed passage in Josephus, if that is genuine, demonstrates it. The *undisputed* passage in Tacitus proves it beyond a question. The fact that the time of its origin is not made a question with Celsus, Porphyry, or Julian, confirms this. The record of Mr. Gibbon puts the matter beyond all doubt. It was a necessity in his historical purpose that he should trace the history of Christianity from its origin: and he has done it. (c) The main facts of the birth, the life, the character, and the death of the Founder of Christianity are matters of history. Strauss does not deny the reality of the existence of Jesus, though the things ascribed to him are 'mythical;' Renan does not deny his existence, or the main facts of his history, though he has his own way of telling the story. The whole of his romance is founded on the admission of the main facts of his life. Jesus was an historical person. There is the

most marked distinction between him and Mars, and Apollo, and Minerva; between him and king Arthur, and Lear. The fact of his having lived is as clearly established as that of Alexander; the fact of his death, and the manner of his death, as that of Cæsar. (d) The fact that Christianity was *propagated*, or was spread through the world, from small beginnings, is established by history. Its progress from land to land can be traced; the steps of its movement can be marked on a map from the time of its humble beginning till it mounted the throne of the Cæsars. Nothing is more definite and certain in history than the facts about its origin, and its propagation in the world. Mr. Gibbon has traced it as clearly and as heartily as he has the career of his favorite Julian; and the facts have gone into the undisputed history of nations. (e) History has established the fact that the religion was propagated on the ground of the belief in the miracles which were alleged to have been wrought in attestation of its truth, and especially on the belief that its Author, having been put to death on a cross, rose again from the dead. Whatever may be the truth in regard to those miracles, and the fact of that resurrection, no one can doubt that these things were put forward; that the belief of them was made essential to the reception of the system; and that its propagation is to be explained on the ground that these things were believed to be true; and that it can not be explained on any other ground. No one, not Mr. Gibbon, or Renan, or Strauss, has attempted to explain the fact of the propagation of Christianity on the ground that no claim was set up in regard to the resurrection of Jesus, or on the ground that the claim thus set up was false. Assuredly the people of the Roman empire, when they embraced Christianity, did it in the belief that its Author had been raised from the dead, and the belief of this was vital to the reception and extension of the system. The religion could not have been propagated had it not been for this belief, and it is equally clear that the account of this *could* not have been inserted in the narrative respecting the founder of the system afterward; that is, if it should be supposed that the

religion had been propagated *without* this belief, it would have been impossible to make this an article of faith afterward. How could it be inserted in the original records? How could men be made to believe that a doctrine never adverted to in the propagation of a system, had been in fact the main thing in commending it to the world? (*f*) Once more: These points are not affected materially by the questions whether miracles were wrought, or whether Jesus was actually raised from the dead. The point which I am making is, that the religion was propagated on the *belief* of those things; not on the ground of their *truth*. How far the fact that the world *believed* in the reality of the miracles, and that great multitudes of all classes abandoned their ancient systems of religion, and embraced Christianity as true, on that belief, *proves* that the miracles were real, is another point which it is proper to argue with an infidel in its proper place. But that is not the point now before us.

(3) In looking at the question how far the evidence of ancient facts is affected by time, I adverted, under the general inquiry, to these circumstances: when the witnesses are competent, and have a proper opportunity of observing the facts; when there is no motive for deception or imposture; when the facts narrated are against the religious faith of the narrator; when the facts referred to furnish the most easy and natural explanation of existing things; and when these facts are commemorated and perpetuated by monuments, coins, medals, games, festivals, processions and celebrations; that is, when they go into the very structure of society, and when it is no more easy to *detach* them from existing things, than it was to *detach* the name of Phidias from the statue of Minerva without destroying the image. You cannot explain the history of the world without the supposition that Cæsar was put to death by the hand of assassins.

It remains only to apply this principle, in few words, to Christianity.

Suppose, then, it were *false* that Cæsar was put to death; suppose that the facts which I have adverted to in regard to

Christianity in its history, are false. What follows? What is to be done then? What is the proper work of the man who does not believe this?

On the principles now laid down, we have the same confirmation of the main facts of the history of Christianity which we have of the death of Cæsar, the life of Alfred, and the conquest of England by William the Norman, though on a wider scale, and affecting more deeply the course of history and the condition of the world; for, in the existing state of things on the earth, for one such thing that goes to establish those secular facts, and to make the supposition of their reality indispensable to the explanation of existing things, there are ten, at least, that in like manner go to confirm the truth of the main facts of the New Testament. Hard is the task of the sceptic who denies the reality of the death of Cæsar in the Senate House, or of the existence of Alfred, or of the conquest of William the Norman; harder by far the task of the sceptic who denies the realities of the life and death of Jesus. For, in this case, he must suppose that all history, secular and sacred, has been corrupted and is unreliable; he must suppose that Christianity sprang up without any adequate cause, and at a time unknown; he must suppose that it made its way in the world on what was known to be falsehood; he must suppose that men everywhere embraced the system manifestly against their own interests, and with nothing to satisfy them of its truth; he must leave unexplained the conduct of thousands of martyrs, many of them of no mean name in philosophy, and in social rank; he must explain how it was that acute and subtle enemies, like Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian did not make short work of the argument by denying the truth of the main facts of the Christian history; he must explain the origin of the numerous monuments in the world which have been reared on the supposition of the truth of the great facts of Christian history—the ancient temples, whose ruins are scattered everywhere, the tombs and inscriptions in the catacombs at Rome, the sculptures and paintings which have called forth the highest efforts of genius in the early and the mediæval ages,

and the books that have been written on the supposition that the religion had the origin ascribed to it in the New Testament ; he must explain the observance of the first day of the week in so many lands, and for so many ages, in commemoration of the belief that Christ rose from the dead ; he must explain the observance of the day which is supposed to commemorate the birth of the Redeemer, as one would have to explain the observance of the birth-day of Washington, on the supposition that Washington was a 'myth,' and the observance of the fourth day of July on the supposition that what has been regarded as a history of the American Revolution was a romance ; he must explain the ordinance kept up in memory of his death for nearly two thousand years on the supposition that the death of Christ never occurred on the cross at all ; he must explain the honor and the homage done to the cross everywhere—as a standard in war, as an emblem of faith, as a charm or an amulet, as an ornament worn by beauty and piety, as reared on high to mark the place where God is worshiped, as an emblem of self-sacrifice, of love, of unsullied purity—the cross in itself more ignominious than the guillotine or the gibbet—for why should men do such things with a gibbet if all is imaginary ; and he must explain all those coins, and medals, and memorials which crowd palaces, and cabinets, and churches, and private dwellings, and which are found beneath decayed and ruined cities, on the supposition that all these are based on falsehood, and that in all history there has been nothing to correspond to them or to suggest them. Can the fossil remains of the old world, the ferns in coal-beds, and the forms of fishes imbedded in the rocks, and the bones of mammoths, and the skeletons of the Ichthyosaurian and Plesiosaurian races, be explained on the supposition that such vegetables, and such land and marine monsters never lived ? Will the geologist who happens to be an infidel in religion, allow us to urge this in regard to those apparent records of the former history of the world ? Will he then demand that all in history ; in monuments ; medals ; tombs ; inscriptions ; customs ; laws ; sacred festivals ; religious rites that *seem* to be founded on the

truth of the great facts of Christianity, shall be explained on the supposition that no such facts ever occurred? That all this is myth, and fable, and delusion?

Hard would be the task of the infidel if he were to undertake this. It was too much for Mr. Gibbon, and he therefore set himself to the work of showing how, *on the admission of these main facts*, the propagation of the religion could be explained on the supposition that it had *not* a divine origin; it was too much for Strauss, and he, therefore, set himself to the task of showing how, on the supposition that Jesus lived, the system of Christianity could be made to grow around a few central truths, representing in imagined action the idea of deceivers and impostors; it was too much for Renan, who, admitting the main facts in the New Testament, and attributing to the founder of the system unequalled genius, and a power of which he became slowly conscious, accompanied with much self-delusion, attempted to show how he originated a system designed to overturn all existing systems, and a system that did accomplish it. Each and all of these things go to confirm the position which I have endeavored to establish in this Lecture, that Time does not materially affect the evidence of the great facts of History; that what was properly believed at the time when the events occurred, may be properly believed now; that if the historic records were lost, we could reproduce many of the leading events of the history of the world. In particular, if the New Testament were destroyed, we could reproduce, from other sources, the main facts pertaining to the life and death of the Founder of Christianity, on which the religion was propagated and received, and the great features of the system as it was first propounded to the world.

How far the principles laid down in this Lecture bear on the subject of miracles, and how far it is necessary to assume the correctness of the records of miraculous events in the New Testament, to explain the fact that the religion was propagated in the world, and has been continued to the nineteenth century, will be considered in the application of these principles, in the subsequent Lectures.

## ART. II.—HODGSON ON TIME AND SPACE.\*

BY GEORGE S. MORRIS, Norwich, Vt.

THIS book is one product of that increasing metaphysical activity which has expressed itself in England, within the last two years, in the publication of many philosophical works. Though not written, like most of these treatises, in the professed personal interest of either of those two great parties, whose strife has of late mainly occupied the energies of English philosophers, it is easy to assign it its place with reference to the subject of that strife. It contains, in fact, sensationalism, newly worded and newly formalized. Its intellectual parentage is, however, not so much to be traced to such men as Hume and Helvetius as to Bacon and Locke. It is not designed to teach scepticism, though it restricts to excess the sphere of knowledge, denying to it an absolute character. Nor is its author an atheist, whatever may be thought of the incongruity of combining sensationalism and theism in a common theory, or however imperfect his theism may be. It expresses the intellectual tendency of Locke, in a theoretic form, improved by that careful systematization and deduction of doctrines demanded by the more scientific character and wider knowledge of our times.

If the remark of M. Taine, the French critic, on Mr. Mill, that "he has described the English mind, while thinking to describe the human mind," is a fair criticism, we think it would be still more *à propos* to a work like this of Mr. Hodgson's. As an empiricist, he represents that phase of character which makes an Englishman delight above all other things in facts of experience. As a theist and Christian, he marks the sturdy adherence of this nation, proud of its material prosperity, to at least the traditions of its religion. It is such a combination of elements rationally unallied and even repugnant to one another as can hardly be found anywhere but in

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\* Time and Space; a Metaphysical Essay, by Shadworth H. Hodgson. London; Longmans, 1865. pp. 587.



England. Theology, however, is not the main theme of this work of which we purpose to give some account.

1. The relevancy of the title, "Time and Space," will appear further on, when we shall see those quantities, on the author's theory, to be universal and constitutive elements of human knowledge. The book is not, as one might suppose from its name, merely a discussion of the theories of time and space; nor is it solely the development of a new theory of them. Indeed other theories are not at all discussed, nor is even a history or table of them given. The book is a "Metaphysical Essay," in the course of which the cognitions of time and space are deduced, invested with the character above named, and hence made an indispensable organism in the whole doctrine of philosophy.

It will be wise and pertinent to imitate Mr. Hodgson in first seeking to determine what "metaphysic" is. We shall do this however in terms of Mr. Hodgson's choosing, showing that he has two conceptions of the subject, one tolerably correct, though expressed in language savoring of the other which is incorrect, and with which he has worked.

We read, page 6: "Metaphysic takes its stand at the point of junction between the mind, which knows, and the world which is known, and deals with the relations which obtain between them so far as these relations are necessary and universal. Metaphysic may therefore be approached from the side of psychology, or the laws of consciousness and the organ of consciousness, and from that of physical science or the laws of external phenomena." And p. 7: "Following the route of either of these groups of sciences, we come to ground which is common to it with the other group. . . . This common ground of psychology and physic, phenomena in their most abstract shape, is the proper field of metaphysic." Again, p. 6: "The true opposite of the term metaphysic is empiric." "Metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions" of the data of experience. The last two sentences are the only ones among those quoted above, which may fairly be taken to indicate that metaphysic is not, like psychology and physics, an

empirical science. Those "relations" which are "necessary and universal," are after all, in Mr. Hodgson's view, empirical. But the express statement that metaphysic and empiric are opposites, the former treating of the conditions of the latter; this statement taken with others which we shall quote later, strongly intimate that our author had, at least for a moment, such a notion of the opposition between metaphysic and all other sciences which depend on it, such a notion, too, of its absolute and inutilitarian character, as would have kept him from scientific shipwreck, if he had held true to it. Such a notion is manifestly valid. These "other sciences" of mental and natural phenomena depend on an observation and record of facts occurring in and expressly related to time and space, and an arrangement of them in bodies of knowledge, according to their laws of sequence and co-existence. Metaphysic, on the contrary, deals with the foundations and possibilities of knowledge regarded as a qualitative product, wholly unrelated in nature to the conditions of material existence. It analyzes the principles of rationality, of which all manifest uniformities and laws are but expressions. It is also constructive in the manipulation of its principles; that is, in enabling itself through analysis to comprehend these principles in their synthesis and forceful vitality; and so it gives us an ontology. Its own principles are strictly necessary and universal, whatever may be the character of those relations with which on its practical side it is mostly conversant. It is related to that philosophy of Aristotle which he declares concerns itself with eternal truth, in opposition to dialectic, running, as he supposes this to do, after opinion. But it is not to such a notion of metaphysic that Mr. Hodgson adheres. It is rather with him what Aristotle understood by dialectic, a science of opinion. After identifying metaphysic with philosophy, and discriminating it from religion and ontology, affirming the reality of religion according to his definition of it, and with almost scornful derision rejecting ontology; and after separating metaphysic in some sense from psychology and physical science (the paths which lead to it), he yet makes it of the same nature as these

two classes of sciences, by assigning it for its subject their relations "so far as these are necessary and universal," and then defining necessity by universality. The whole investigation is empirical. It is directed to a question, not of essential nature, but of material and formal constitution. The mistress of the sciences is reduced to the task of groping in the *dust* of experience—a work not only not dishonorable in itself, but most useful; yet which belongs only to the subordinate sciences above named.

It is obvious that Mr. Hodgson's identification, by correlation, of the necessary and universal, is a radical error. It places him at once in the ranks of what Mr. Mill prefers to call 'experientialists.' It shows him to be rather a counter than a thinker. We may liken him to a tree sprung up in a valley into which a river's current has been turned, that, only because it is rooted in the firm earth beneath, is able to breast the current, and arrest the straws floating on its surface. For so it goes with every empiricist whose formula is: Necessity=Universality, and no more. By his own acknowledgment, if we fairly interpret the formula, he can only catch at disconnected straws of phenomena, and enumerate them, and measure them, and, after recording his estimates throw them aside for others it may be to reject and disgrace, or to modify and confirm—every thing being a product in which uncertain sense is one of the factors; while if he could but know it, it is only by his being rooted in his intellectual nature in the solid ground of rationality and *real* necessity, that he is able to accomplish the least of his labors. Empiricism has no bottom. It can not be consistent and live. On its own principles it can affirm nothing. It may not even affirm the contingent except contingently, and that again only contingently, and so on *in absurdum*. All is opinion; and even to that, its supreme treasure, it has no right, for it does not acknowledge, as absolutely necessary, those grounds of thought and knowledge which make opinion possible. It defies refutation, for it recognizes no principles of consistency.

Mr. Hodgson's identification of the necessary and uni-

versal is explicit and in the following terms, pp. 9, 10: "Now with reference to the doctrine that the cognitions which are the object matter of metaphysic are necessary as well as universal, it must be remarked that the term necessary is but the correlate of the term universal; what the latter is in the world of objects, that the former is in the world of consciousness. Whatever is necessary in thought exists also without exception in the object of thought; and whatever exists always without exception in the object of thought is necessary in thought." "Like the terms subject and object themselves, the terms necessity and universality are but two aspects, inseparable from each other, of the same phenomenon." Thus necessity is measured by universality, and the latter term "is objective, not referring however to existence per se, but to objective existence for us." It is something found in and drawn only from arbitrary experience, and can not possibly be more than relative. (We do not intend to imply by the expression "arbitrary experience" that any experience is possible to man apart from intellectual conditions which are absolutely necessary, or objective conditions which are, as matter of fact, universal. We allude only to that aspect of experience, in which it is a variable and special revelation of outward phenomena to the "individual consciousness"—the source with Mr. H., of that "objective existence" whose universality is supposed to be the measure of necessity.) If now, necessity means no more than universality—and it is on this theory that the whole of Mr. Hodgson's book is written—we ask not, what is the consequence to the fundamental principles of logic and ontology, and to the stability of faith—this is apparent—but what becomes of his own firm though brief exaltation of metaphysic above empiric? Instead of being, as he claims, philosophy dealing with the rational conditions of phenomena (i. e. with consciousness and the nature and purport of its deliverances,) and having its end in itself, it is but an empirical investigation prior to the consideration of the real questions of philosophy. This he contradicts himself, by

expressly allowing. Let us read passages in section five of his book, standing on successive pages :

First, p. 13 : "Metaphysic is, properly speaking, not a science but a philosophy ; that is, it is a science whose end is in itself, in the gratification and education of the minds which carry it on," etc. "Philosophy is a pleasurable and noble emotion no less than knowledge." "Philosophy is carried on for the sake of the knowing and learning which it involves." Metaphysic deals with the ultimate grounds and ends of life, knowledge and being, lying beyond experience, as he approvingly quotes from Kant. It deals with the last questions man can propose, such as "whence [man] and the world came ; whither they go ; what is the meaning of the whole scene of existence," etc. But Mr. H. proceeds to declare (p. 14) that "the very condition of prosecuting the inquiry is metaphysic" (the condition of metaphysic is metaphysic!) "that is the analysis of the phenomena whose *history* (!) and import is [are] to be studied." From this we learn that metaphysic, expressly or impliedly alleged to be the final science based on the necessities of things, unriddling and setting forth the rationale of thought and the universe, is after all but a compendium of the universal in experience as a *sine qua non* to the inquiries proper to metaphysic!

Of course we quarrel with that notion of metaphysic (we follow his example in dropping *s* from the word) with which Mr. Hodgson has worked. After seeming to give it a double province made up of parts mutually exclusive and irreducible to the same science, he has chosen the second and least worthy part, forgetting, apparently, that he had had a glimpse of any other. It is with him wholly empirical, related at every step of his inquiry to the conditions of organic physical existence. He seems to have been influenced by his indignation at that notorious and frivolous distinction between things and things-in-themselves, which has played so prominent a rôle with many philosophers. Dropping things-in-themselves for deserved reasons, which he details, he concludes that nothing remains knowable or conceivable, except what is revealed to

passive experience. But the true doctrine, as we conceive it, allows—though the confession is trivial—that all actual knowledge arises *in* experience (i. e. in the course of a life conditioned on a physical organization in time and space), but is, among other things, and this by its very nature, of the everlasting conditions of being and knowledge—is so perfect that we may make important affirmations with absolute assurance—reveals categories of thought and existence within which all is disjunctive and indifferent—asserts, not that the sheep must be white or the stone black, or, in general, that the material universe *must* have its present constitution by eternal necessity, but that there are known laws and limits of actual, intellectual and moral existence which may not and can not be transgressed. This implies no “transformation of abstractions into complete objects or complete existences,” which Mr. Hodgson alleges as the essence and defect of ontology.

The theme of “Time and Space,” is then metaphysic physiologized, an incongruity in terms which yet, as we believe, fairly expresses the author’s fundamental misconception at the starting point. No doubt, as an aspirant after consistency, he would demand that those passages to which we have given a more favorable meaning, should be interpreted in accordance with his working doctrine. But as he modestly proposes in his Introduction only to produce the contents of his “individual consciousness,” and as it is notorious that the “individual consciousness” often fails signally to deliver itself of clear and consistent conceptions, it seemed just to give Mr. H. the credit of at least a half conscious and momentary notion of the true sphere of metaphysic; however opposed it might be to his conscious and intentional one: besides, it was important to point out a source of confusion or illusion to cursory readers of his book, and to indicate, though only in outline, the true doctrine as discriminated from the false.

2. Mr. Hodgson’s theory is prefaced by the statement, that it is to be entirely the product of analysis. Analysis is alleged to be the only instrument and the whole province of metaphysic. Analysis is our author’s method. We conceive that

method, though adequate to his own, to be incompetent to any real or proper metaphysic. All metaphysic employs analysis to this extent, that by its use it brushes away mental rubbish and arrives at clear ideas. Beyond this all is synthesis. Mr. Hodgson is aware of this, and the larger fraction of his work treats of such syntheses as laws of thought, doctrines of will and causation, and beliefs in religion and God. The difference between him and genuine metaphysicians is that he finds all synthesis to be a natural spontaneous product of the physiologico-mental nature; while the latter find in it an essentially rational product to which they are forced with an imperative more or less absolute, according to the perspicuity of their ideas, and the normal development of their rational activity. The difference is that between a mode of proceeding wholly statical, by which term Mr. H. describes his own, and one partly statical but characteristically dynamical. In the one case, the subjects of philosophy are so far as possible described as phenomena, and for the rest, set aside; in the other they are regarded as facts of which reason is the legislator. The parties who employ each of these methods profess to be engaged in the research of truth—a statical object. But the one party regards truth only in its physical relations, and expects with the dissecting-knife and glass of analysis to separate and magnify the parts of the subject of research, in such manner as to discern these in their actual connections. The other party considers truth in its ideal aspect, and doubts not the symmetry and absolute stability of its eternal proportions; but does not expect to reach the perfect view of these proportions except by the constructive use of rational principles necessary to the mind. If analysis enables us to state (synthesis) what is, it also shows us laws which drive us to state what must be. It is synthesis which puts the laws that govern even the most empirical phenomena, as Mr. Hodgson's own example abundantly illustrates. "It is to learn to read that one familiarizes himself with the letters of an alphabet."\*

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\* "A quoi servirait-il d'accumuler, de provoquer les expériences, si l'on ne devait les résumer dans quelque vaste synthèse? quel sens auraient les classi-



Let us see what the alphabet of our author is. It is to be well borne in mind that he refuses the notion of efficient agency—the Aristotelic *wherefore*, constitutive element of genuine knowledge—and hence that no problem of productive dynamics can be considered, but only what palpably is, what appears, what states or conditions invariably or generally attend phenomena, and what are the elements of phenomena.

Now every thing known is phenomenal, not in the sense of *seeming*, but as coming to knowledge: and *vice versa* all phenomena are functions of consciousness, because known only in consciousness. If there is anything that is not a phenomenon, it is the elemental constituents of phenomena, which, as inseparable from each other and from that which they constitute, can not be regarded as distinct objects. But this exception is rather technical than substantial.

Phenomena being every thing known or possible to knowledge, another name for the sum of things, Mr. H. says they may be considered under a double aspect, subjective and objective, under the former of which they are consciousness, under the latter, existence or the universe. This is called "the most general and ultimate distinction at which we can arrive in all knowledge." We quote the author's reason for the above statement, and his grounds for adopting the distinction alluded to, in preference to any other—as of "Inner and Outer, or of Form and Matter," pp. 8, 9: "From such a point of view, states of consciousness themselves would be classed as what indeed they are, special modes of existence; and perhaps under the first distinction, as outward manifestations of an inward spirit; or, under the second distinction, as forms into which the matter of the external world is cast and

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fications, si une pensée générale n'en traçait les cadres? C'est pour apprendre à lire qu'on se familiarise avec les lettres d'un alphabet. Ce que je poursuis dans les cornues des laboratoires, derrière les vitrines des musées, sur les feuilles des herbiers, dans les jardins zoologiques, ce sont des idées. Dans tout ce qui m'entoure, dans ce que je vois, ce que je sens, dans les spectacles d'un monde impassible comme dans les agitations passionnées de ma propre nature, je cherche un sens, une raison. Devant la pensée scientifique, il faut que le monde s'idéalise et prenne pour ainsi dire une âme." M. Auguste Langel, "Les Problèmes de la Nature." Introduction, pp. 9, 10.

moulded." Why should not one of these points of view be adopted? By reason of "this only consideration, so far as can be at present evident, namely: that it adopts a single term or category into which to introduce its distinctions, a category unexplained, unconnected, meaningless; that it leaves vague and undetermined, because out of relation to any thing else, the totality of the phenomena which it proposes to classify, and thus in fact starts with assuming an absolute. Of such a single non-relative existence, it must be admitted, that it has no meaning and no predicates, that it is pure nonentity and *merum nihil*. If, however, it should be replied that by existence is meant relative existence, such existence as is relative to us and our capacities, this is only to admit in other words the greater validity of the distinction between subject and object. For by a relative existence is meant an objective existence, an existence the correlate of consciousness, the only existence which we can conceive or imagine. (!) Let this objective existence be divided or distinguished as it may, it will still be one aspect only of the ultimate distinction into subject and object, or rather it will involve its opposite, the subjective aspect; and the further distinctions introduced into it will be distinctions of the object of consciousness only, and not of an absolute existence apart from consciousness."

We interrupt our account of Mr. Hodgson's theory to remark briefly on the above quotations. That he should object to such points of view as posit or imply an absolute is easily comprehensible, when we consider his own, which is of a nature to lead him to deride and deny the notion of an absolute. But what shall we say of his argument? He is unwilling that we should unify the sum of things in a single category. Why? Because such a category as "unexplained, unconnected" would be "meaningless." But does that lack explanation or meaning, in like rank to which there stands nothing else? If there were only one plum in the world, it might indeed be a delicious rarity, but would not lack explanation and connection, i. e. a rationale, so long as it contained

a sweet and juicy pulp and a seed, and while there existed men with unperverted palates for the pulp, and sense to plant the seed. "No indeed," Mr. Hodgson would reply, "not while the sensitive and perceptive subject is present; and in like manner existence is not inexplicable, while correlated to consciousness." We willingly admit that the last analysis of the sum of things, including consciousness, must, likely enough, be expressed in a duality, as of thought and force—the former dominating the latter. But these terms are equally objective, distinct from each other and separate from human consciousness. Of Mr. H's correlatives, the subjective and objective aspects of phenomena, the one is individual consciousness, and the two are substantially identical. We hesitate not further to affirm as absolute the union of thought and force—not their parity or commensurability—in the synthesis of existence. We believe all sound rational activity to be driven to this result. Mr. H., on the contrary, pretends to avoid this step, though in fact we know not what he means by the term phenomena, unless it be a single category to express the whole of consciousness and the universe. To use the term phenomena, instead of existence, is to employ an exactly equivalent synonym, unless it be desired to contest the reality of every thing testified in consciousness, in which case we leave him to the enjoyment of his doubts. We know Mr. H. pretends that phenomena mean more than existence, but we shall soon see how little that more is. But were even this pretension valid, it would still hold good, that our author's own practice illustrates the view, that philosophy must start from and end in a single term, whether that term expresses something supposed or real.

For our part, we do not think it necessary to inquire over-scrupulously into the history of one coming to the possession of intellectual property, more than in the case of material goods, if so be we are sure that no violence has been done to truth and honesty. That we come to knowledge by the narrow way of personal consciousness, does not impair our sure possession of it when once acquired, nor its absolute and inviolable value in certain of its branches. If I have journeyed from

Boston to New York, the question as to the line by which I traveled is wholly impertinent with reference to the *fact* of my being in New York. We do not, like Mr. Hodgson, make our own consciousness, in so far as individual and fallible, the mistress of truth. We strive rather that it should do obeisance to the supremacy of truth revealed by its own rational splendor in its immutable character.

We return to our example of the single plum, and add, that of the "single category of existence," it is indeed true that it stands alone to express the totality of things, and that from the nature of the case there can be only one such category. It lacks not however for explanation and meaning in its own contents, and it is sufficiently determinate and positive to subsist without connection with any thing else of like rank. As an ultimate fact it is quite as intelligible in its unity as when regarded as a shield with double face; and as we have seen, it does not seem that our author has himself been able to overcome the impulse toward unification which he condemns in others. He has only given his unity a name significant of the doubtful actuality of its contents. His chosen and exclusive process of analysis demanded a unit to be analyzed. The objections raised to the distinctions he rejects lie equally against his own. Besides, the progress of the discussion leads him by degrees completely to swamp his subjective aspect—one term of his distinction—in the objective—consciousness being made what it manifestly is, a mode of existence—as much as merely animal or vegetable life. This at last brings him to define the "subject," in the only way by which an absolute correlative for existence could possibly be constituted. What this subject is, we shall state more fully further on. It is however related to existence as potentiality to actuality, or as nonentity to entity. As potentiality it is only the material conditions of consciousness *without time* for their development into an actual product. This subject, to be entitled to the least regard, ought to have some share in being. So far as it is, it is a part of existence, not a second term by which to upriddle it; so far as it is not, why, it is not, and "there's the

end on't." If such an airy nothing and mere name, can serve any one in the philosophical investigation of the great problem of existence, we shall be glad to know it.

We proceed with our account of Mr. Hodgson's analysis. As before stated, by consciousness and existence, he denominates two aspects of the same thing, viz: phenomena, either of those terms being used convertibly with the latter. Choosing the subjective name for phenomena, consciousness—the subjective aspect again of phenomena as consciousness, is the "empirical Ego;" the objective is the world of things. Any state of consciousness as subjective, is feeling, as objective, quality. Every state of consciousness, further, with its double face of feeling and quality, has two elements—a material and a formal. The former is some feeling, either through one of "the five special senses which have defined organs," or one of those "feelings which have as yet no specially defined organs;" or, lastly, of those "feelings which arise only in reintegration of feelings of the first two classes." The latter, the formal element, is time alone, or time and space together. The material element may have one of a million different hues; the formal is confined to the definite quantities named above. The two elements are inseparable. No feeling without time and space (one or both), no time or space without feeling. Time and space are therefore universal, and hence necessary elements of consciousness. They lie at the root of all other necessity and universality. The infinity of time and space gives character to all other infinity. Time and space as the formal element of consciousness, are the beginning of "all philosophy." They are this because they furnish the nearest approximation to a strictly necessary datum.

The infinity of time and space consists in their inexhaustibility. The apprehension of this inexhaustibility is explained by a distinction between voluntary and involuntary processes in consciousness. Attempting to consider time and space as wholes, we necessarily fix upon them a limit; but that limit once set, is involuntarily and instantaneously passed, the mind discovers a more beyond. Further, "no question can

arise about the origin of time and space, because the notion of origin is derived from the notion of time, and can be conceived to exist only within time." The deduction and description of time and space scarcely involve any thing new to students of the subject. The expression "formal element" will remind them of the opinion of Kant. Mr. Hodgson's theory is so much worse than that of the great German philosopher, as it makes time and space the indispensable forms of all consciousness, while the latter confined them to the province of sciences whose conceptions are construed *a priori* in the mind, that is, the mathematical sciences—conceptions in the most general sense of the term; and the doctrine about them was relegated to metaphysic proper, to the region of pure reason, where judgments were rendered, which, though in Kant's opinion far short of absolute, were yet quite independent of time and space.

We have mentioned above that the "empirical ego," is in the theory now considered, an aspect of consciousness—the subjective—"the correlate of all existence." That certainly is no proper Ego, and our author has another, the logical, which is called the proper "subject." The empirical Ego, as defined, and consciousness, as a function of the body, are no real I. They belong to the world of existence, as distinct from the real, individual, self-identical, immaterial subject, which habitually, and of course consciously, relates the whole world to itself, and regards the world as the plenum of existence except itself, though never dreaming of denying its own existence. This is not the "subject" of Mr. Hodgson. In his eyes it may not belong to the realm of existence—hence may not be conscious. It can, therefore, only be logical—of the nature of products of the mind, wholly wanting in actuality. It is defined, p. 189, "indeterminate feeling in incomplete moments of time." By this is meant the physiological conditions of sensation without time for their actualization—the "material element" above defined, which, separated from the formal, i. e., from time and space, has no reality—is but a potentiality. This is the second term by which Mr. Hodgson would explain

existence—that category otherwise “unconnected” and “meaningless.”

Such is the alphabet of Mr. Hodgson's theory—a theory constituting, if the expression may be suffered to pass, a sort of extreme physiological subjectivism. *En résumé*, consciousness and existence have been made different aspects of an identical subject, phenonema. Then the material conditions of consciousness are regarded as those of all existence—but a material factor, sterile until fructified by the formal generative element of time and space. Consciousness is analyzed. Every state of it is found to contain a feeling. This feeling is its substantial content, and is some sort of sensation. Moreover, every sensation is found to be conditioned on the existence of time alone, or of time and space together. Sensation is variable, time and space alone are necessary and universal. Other elements than those named, consciousness has not. Existence is only another name for consciousness.

The guarantee of this theory is the “individual consciousness” of the author. He has given his testimony, we doubt not honestly, on fundamental problems in philosophy. He lays no claim to infallibility. He has merely contributed his witness to the elucidation of a part of science which he regards as not yet fixed, and which must be decided according to the general consciousness of the reflective portion of the race. For one, we think he has egregiously erred, by persistently regarding consciousness in its physical dependencies, to the exclusion of its more important rational contents. This latter element seems to us so clearly unrelated to any of the sensible conditions of life, as to be only an associate of such life, not at all identical with it. If Mr. Hodgson's analysis were as complete as he desires and believes it to be, all phenomena, rational or sensible, could be explained upon it. But no phenomena of rationality have been found in the supposed exhaustive analysis of consciousness—and as that is the only source of knowledge and existence, it only remains to show for what sensible phenomena, facts of rationality have been mistaken. This, however, will remain impossible until it can be shown



that quality and quantity are not two categories, but one, and that two objects may be absolutely identical. When this shall have been done, the prediction of Mr. Hodgson's exordium will have been realized, and "what is called mind, and what are called existences, and that which Kant calls *der transcendente Gegenstand*, will have melted into phenomena, out of which they indeed originally grew." p. 59. Then will

"Men have lost their reason."

3. What is now the fruit of the preceding doctrine? Mostly negative, one would say, though what he destroys with one hand, our author pretends to build up again with the other—with what result, one may judge from the wretched *débris* of consciousness he uses for material. Does one imagine that activity implies agency? But sensation in time and space, discloses to Mr. H. nothing of the kind—it reveals only the objective, irrational, ultimate facts of internal anatomy; hence, "the term causation is best restricted to express relations between objects in time as preceding and succeeding." p. 494. Does the intricate and mysterious process of thought suggest an immaterial subject adequate to account for it? All is resolved into spontaneous and voluntary processes of consciousness, by which sensitive perceptions are combined or separated according to a law of "interest"; that is, according to the feeling of pleasure to be secured or pain to be avoided. Has not, however, a point been yielded in speaking of "voluntary processes," which might upset the whole theory? No; for "volition is the sense of effort fixed to an object with pleasure or pain," and "the sense of effort may be included in all cases of spontaneous reintegration." But are not the laws of thought absolutely imperative—the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle—do they not bind the logical process to certain forms with a necessity non-derivable from any observed universality? The analysis of consciousness warrants no belief of the sort. Feeling in time and space contains nothing nearer to necessity than the universality of the latter or formal factors, and this universality is the basis

and sole guaranty of the validity of the laws above named. Indeed, "they are in their ultimate nature practical rather than theoretical laws, inasmuch as they emerge, as logical principles, only in a voluntary process of consciousness, as part and parcel of every instance of reasoning, and thus are laws of volition, that is, are postulates rather than simply laws." p. 359. The logical laws are "laws of intuition. The intuitional principles, the cognitions of time and space, are forms both of intuition, or perception in all its branches, and of reasoning." "There is besides no place left for a faculty such as that which Kant calls the Reason." "There is no such faculty of reason commanding us to assume an unconditioned." p. 495. Intuition, that is, consciousness as defined and analyzed, is the whole source of truth.

In sections 20 and 21 of his book, Mr. Hodgson argues successively against "theories of a soul," which posit an immaterial substance," and "theories of an ego," which assume an "immaterial activity." (By the way, how would a *material* activity be defined?) In section 22 he expresses his adhesion to the "physiological theory," which refers all phenomena usually ascribed to the soul, or Ego, to the nervous center in the brain. This is consistent, for consciousness under this analysis, and received as the complete measure of existence, affirms nothing more. The best arguments of his opponents he sets aside by his empirical doctrine of causation, of which he says again, in redarguing the theory of a soul: "all that can be said of the causation of one phenomenon by another, is,—after A, B." p. 157. Personality is a product of association and habit. "In the brain, are stored up impressions, qualities, or modes of operation, the causes of memory, which are communicated to and then preserved by every fresh particle of matter which is taken up into the brain" etc. See p. 161.

"Animula, vagula, blandula,  
Hospes comesque corporis,  
Quae nunc abibis in loca,  
Pallidula, rigida, medula".....?

"What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Leav-

ing out the religious relations of eternity, the loss of the soul evacuates all noble human sentiment of meaning, and hence annihilates it. Who does not remember how Diogenes Laertius, in a fit of vehement and honorable indignation at the brutality of the tyrant by whose orders Zeno, the Eleatic philosopher, was pounded to death in a mortar, apostrophises the latter in verse, and, after recounting the mode of his death, exclaims:

*"Τί Τοῦτο λέγω; σῶμα γάρ, οὐχὶ δέ σε."*

"Why do I say this? For 'twas thy body, but not thyself," that they maltreated. That heathen historian of philosophy had not been favored with the light which shines from the pages of this apparently Christian philosopher. For however much the whole previous development of his theory may have led the reader to anticipate quite the reverse, Mr. Hodgson sugar-coats it, at the end, by a development of the logical idea of God—an optimistic but brief discussion of the problem of evil, and a tribute of admiration to Christianity. As to the idea of God, take the following:

Ideas "belong to the kingdom of possible existences, but not all possible existences are ideas. Those only are ideas which are possible as infinite; . . . which are assumed as existing in infinite time and space, and not in those portions of time and space which are within our ken." "Infinite motion, infinite power, infinite knowledge, infinite happiness, infinite pain, infinite virtue, the perfect globe, the perfect circle, and so on, are ideas. These all depend on the two modes of the infinite, time and space," pp. 565, 566. "When [the ideas of the good, power and truth] are considered as united in one subject, as modes of its consciousness, they form an ideal person, and this ideal person is God," p. 574. "God is the object of the religious consciousness, and man is by his nature religious," p. 585. "Religion is a personal matter, an emotion of a person toward a person," p. 586.

In regard to the above, we remark, (1) that while it is indeed true that there is a religious consciousness, that "man is by his nature religious," and that religion "is an emotion of a person towards a person," these facts are not in harmony with

Mr. Hodgson's analysis, and are only illusions and not facts, if that analysis is exhaustive. The religious consciousness is inseparable from the personal, and the same method which reduces the latter to organic, material sensation in time and space does by the same act quite as much for the former.

"Religion is an emotion," and an emotion is, according to Mr. H., like every other conscious state, the product of feeling through one or more of the bodily senses, and time and space. Love, the emotion preëminently religious, is, by such anatomy, evaporated; at the most, it can be only an animal instinct; and how far is it from loving the Lord our God with all the heart, mind and soul!

Religion is also an emotion "of a person towards a person." Of what person? In Mr. H's. dissolving view of consciousness, the sentiment of human personality has melted into functional products of consciousness regarded in its material aspect, bound together by association, habit and hereditary transmission of habits. And towards what person? Has any one dreamed, how could even Mr. Hodgson dream, through the whole progress of his analysis, of evolving any other personality than that of the phenomenally human—out of the weak residuum of consciousness which he makes the measure of all existence? If such an evolution were possible, what sort of a God would that be, the only authentication of whose existence was organic physiological action, i. e. feeling in time and space? In short, Mr. H's analysis denies and excludes the genuine religious consciousness, and if it did not, it would still be impossible for him really to justify the idea of God, except on a doctrine of causation which he rejects. He has been guilty of that for which he expressly reproaches Ontologists, the "transformation of abstractions into complete objects or complete existences." This is creditable to his heart, and bears witness to the power of necessary principles in those who formally deny them. But the true God has no scientific place in his system.

(2) The infinity with which Mr. Hodgson invests his God, is inconceivable and absurd. The qualities united and objecti-

fied in the ideal Supreme Being are goodness, power and truth. The infinity of these qualities constitutes the infinity of the subject to whom they are attributed. But this infinity, as analyzed by Mr. Hodgson, is no infinity. He expressly states that it depends on the infinity of time and space. Now time and space are quantities; goodness, power and truth are qualities, of which the second only is capable of the most remote quantitative comparison, or measurement. It is plain that the quantitative inexhaustibility of time and space, bears no more pertinent relation to the qualitative perfection of goodness and truth, than a minute or a square inch bears to those qualities in their most imperfect human exemplification. Goodness and truth have no other connection with time and space than this, that they are qualities recognized, and in incomplete measure possessed, by those whose bodily existence is in time and space.

The infinite qualities, therefore, which our author unites in his God, in his conception of their infinity, really repugn all conceivability. They therefore constitute no idea of God nor of any thing else.

(3) Even if there were place for God in Mr. Hodgson's theory, and if his notion of God was not defective in the manner indicated above, it would still fail of meeting the demand of sound religious philosophy, on account of his denial of an absolute. That this denial robs God of a fundamental constitutive attribute, we have here no occasion to show. We shall trespass on our space, only sufficiently to remark briefly on our author's objection to the doctrine in question.

It is alleged, against the postulation of an absolute and the ascription of existence to it, that this course labors "under the fallacy of *obscurum per obscurius*." Is it not possible that Mr. H. misunderstands here those whom he combats? Those who call existence a mode of the absolute, do not necessarily "add to the phenomena of existence another imagined phenomenon which needs to be explained." They rather find existence to be the absolute, all-inclusive category, cover-

ing therefore the ground of the absolute—hence also of the relative, which depends on it. Making existence the mode of the absolute, is therefore no new creation of a second existence, but a statement of that within the category of existence, of which this genuine term is, with preëminent propriety, predicated. The absolute is not a super-additive existence, invented to explain existence. It is rather something which exists and is known to exist, not merely through the categorical fact of existence, but also on other and decisive grounds. It is *the fact in existence*, most supremely demanded and authenticated by our rational nature, leaving aside objective proofs.

Thus much for the God of Mr. Hodgson. We would commend to him the remark of M. Littré in a recent article in the *Révue des Deux Mondes*, defending the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte against the criticisms of John Stuart Mill. He observes that it is impossible to serve two masters, the relative and the absolute. This is in so far true, that if the former be made supreme, the latter is annihilated; if the latter, the former still exists, but takes its natural position of dependence. Mr. Hodgson has chosen the first alternative and scourged the absolute from his synagogue. One might therefore suspect that his theology was intended as a blind or a bait.

Several pages in "Time and Space" are devoted to a "retrospect of metaphysical philosophy" and "other domains of the reason," the object of this examination being to show how, historically, the advance of philosophy and science has been accompanied by a substitution of the subjective point of view for the objective. It is because Christianity favored this revolution that it receives his admiration.

We have little more to say of the book. We have mentioned that the author's intellectual tendency is that of Locke. It is also that of modern English empiricism. It differs from the more pronounced materialism of the Continent, in starting from psychology, while the latter sets out from experience in the positive sciences, and refuses, in its Comte and Büchner, to take human consciousness for more than an insignificant

portion of a material realm. The psychological point of view is less removed from the spiritualistic, and is, in appearance, more favorable than the positivistic, to the union of respect for national, religious and social beliefs with the doctrines of empiricism; though, as developed by such thinkers as Mr. Hodgson, all such beliefs are in scientific rigor excluded from it. As to the advance of Mr. H. on Locke, it is in the direction of more decided sensationalism. Locke distinguished sensation and reflection as the work of external and internal senses respectively. Mr. Hodgson expresses operations of the mind in terms of sensation alone. Locke suggested that the soul might be material. Mr. H. says it *is* material. The former argued the existence of God from the supposed non-eternity of the world, and by the application of a law of causation, which though, with Locke, genetically empirical, was applied absolutely; the latter denies to this law a truly causative application, and makes God a product of human sensitive consciousness.

Mr. Hodgson has given much space to the refutation and criticism of many distinctions made by German philosophers. He is far from being deficient in dialectical skill and philosophical accomplishment. His book deserves careful study by those who are interested to know the character of a prominent tendency of modern thought. It will also repay the perusal of those who like, on its own account, a volume given to the studious elaboration of a theory, though from insufficient data. Of course it contains much truth, but, as we think, also egregious error.

If it were only given out for metaphysic on its phenomenal side, and not for a complete metaphysic, it might deserve more commendation. But since, and in so far as, its author declares he sees and has described the whole truth, his metaphysical sin remaineth.



## ART. III.—IRENÆUS AND INFANT BAPTISM.

BY REV. WILLIAM R. POWERS, Lysander, N. Y.

THE argument for Infant Baptism, drawn from its early traces in the church, is strenuously contested. As the history of our Christianity is little more than the details of its controversies, it can not be supposed that matters which, in the nature of the case, occasioned no disputes, would appear in its records. The few incidents sketched by Luke, which are called the Acts of the Apostles, only carry the history of Christian propagandism to some thirty years subsequent to the death of our Lord. The change which substituted the Eucharist for the Passover, and added the *initiatory* Purification for that which washed away the blood from the proselyte, excited no controversy; since it was the nature of the Jewish formalism to be pleased with operose ceremonies. And these fell in with the ideas of the new converts. The great struggle was with the rites of sacrifice and circumcision; and the caution with which the Apostles dealt with Jewish prejudices, shows how gradually they were to be overcome. Says an able Antipedobaptist writer: "There were many reasons existing why the Jewish converts did not at once forsake their old ritual. Under the circumstances this was hardly to be expected. The Apostles themselves were full of Jewish prejudices when they began their work, and it was not without much instruction of the Holy Spirit, added to much study and observation, that they were able to surmount them; could their converts, without those advantages, be expected at once to rise above such prejudices?" . . . "The truth is, we are not to consider that the Jewish dispensation continued in full force up to a certain time, then suddenly ceased, and the full day of the Gospel dispensation at once succeeded it. They overlap each other somewhat."<sup>1</sup>

Even some eighteen years after the day of Pentecost,

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1 J. T. Smith, on Baptism, p. 91.

the Judaizers declared, "Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses, ye can not be saved."<sup>1</sup> From such a declaration on the one hand, and that of our Lord to Nicodemus, on the other—"Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter the kingdom of God," we need not wonder that there was no question in regard to infants. For, it is evident that, as circumcision could not be maintained as a saving ordinance, it must give way to baptism, which was deemed necessary to that end. The whole weight of argument was against circumcision. Hence we witness this so frequently in Justin Martyr, Tertullian and Cyprian.

In these arguments against the old burdensome rite there was one consideration of especial importance. The language of Paul to the Colossians was received as teaching that baptism was circumcision; a circumcision of far nobler power and efficacy; it washed away native sins, and conveyed the Holy Ghost to the penitent soul. This is the "circumcision without hands."

But here we are met with opposition. The evidence of Infant Baptism would be irresistible, if this point were yielded. Hence, Antipedobaptists assert that the reference in the Fathers, when they speak of Christian circumcision, is, to a change in the heart before baptism. But this is a clear mistake; for we shall see that they held baptism to be necessary in order to be perfected. Justin Martyr says to Trypho, the Jew: "God thus commands you to wash in this laver,<sup>2</sup> and to be circumcised with the true circumcision." He had just cited the words of Isaiah: "Wash ye, make you clean; even now, put away the evil of your doings from your souls." What can this mean, if not that he terms baptism the circumcision of Christ? He is not engaged in any discussion of abstract principles, of mental or moral changes in men, but presses the Jew with arguments such as he can easily understand; such things as pertain to rites and ceremonies. Thus, in continua-

<sup>1</sup> Acts, xv, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Trypho, 18. λούσασθαι ὑμῖν τοῦτο τὸ λουτρὸν κελεύει ὁ Θεός.

tion, he tells Trypho that his "baptism of cisterns" was useless and had no "relation to the baptism of life," that the Jews had forsaken the "fountain of living waters and hewed out broken cisterns, that could hold no water," and then adds, as a conclusion: "You who are circumcised in the flesh, require our circumcision."<sup>1</sup> Holding his words before us, it is impossible not to see, that he is continually contrasting baptism with circumcision. In another place, he says: "We have not received that carnal circumcision, but the spiritual one, which Enoch and those like him observed. And we have received it by baptism,"<sup>2</sup> etc. What can be plainer than this? If this circumcision is by baptism, it will require some casuistry to distinguish, in the language and theology of Justin, between the ordinance, and that which it accomplishes. He does sometimes, like all writers, use language figuratively; but knowing his doctrine, we are at no loss to interpret him. He calls the circumcising of Israel a second time with sharp stones, a figure of—"that circumcision by which Jesus Christ himself has circumcised us from the service of stones and other idols."<sup>3</sup> But this could not *exclude* baptism, because, as we shall see, this rite was given for the "forgiveness of sins and *regeneration*," according to his principles. And he explains all this with sufficient clearness. He says: "And it is declared by the Prophet Isaiah, as I have already written, in what way those who have sinned, and who repent, shall escape their sins; it is said as follows: "Wash ye, make you clean," etc. On completing this quotation, he proceeds to state the reasons received from the Apostles for this baptismal washing; but, as we shall advert to this passage again, it need not be cited in this place. Now, compare this language with the following: "And the commandment of circumcision, by which you were strictly commanded to circumcise your children on the eighth day, was a type of that true circumcision by which we have been circumcised from sin and error, through him who rose from the dead on the first day of the week, Jesus Christ our Lord."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Trypho, sec. 19.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. sec. 43.<sup>3</sup> Ibid. sec. 43.<sup>4</sup> Ibid. sec. 43.

We shall see that it is baptism, which gives remission of sins, that is here called circumcision.

But Dr. Gale would evade the force of this evidence: he says: "What is more evident than that he does not say, baptism is the Christian circumcision, but only that Christians receive the spiritual circumcision, whatever it is, by baptism."<sup>1</sup> If we receive the spiritual circumcision *by baptism*, does not Christ spiritually circumcise us in that rite? How far is this, therefore, from saying that baptism is spiritual circumcision? But why could not Dr. Gale see so plain a thing? The answer is, that he, like all Antipedobaptists, would try the Fathers by *his own views*; ignoring the doctrines which gave rise to their language, entirely. Hear him in this case. He says: "Remission of sins is by baptism, but how absurd it would be, therefore, to say, remission of sins is nothing else but baptism." Indeed, how could it be but absurd, to one who holds that baptism is "plunging the flesh into water?"<sup>2</sup> Such was not the doctrine of Justin, nor any of the fathers. With them, baptism was the new birth taught in John iii, 5.

In the light of what has been said, we can see what Irenæus means when he says: *Secundum carnem circumcisio circumcissionem præfigurabat spiritalem*.<sup>3</sup> "The circumcision in the flesh prefigured the spiritual circumcision." And we might say the same of Tertullian as has been said of Justin Martyr; we can not mistake his meaning, if we compare his own words. In his book against the Jews, he frequently speaks of the old and the new circumcision, in refuting their doctrine, that circumcision was necessary to salvation. Thus: *Sicut ergo circumcisio carnalis, quæ temporalis erat, tributa est in signum populo contumaci, its spiritalis data est in salutem populo obaudienti, etc.* "As therefore the carnal circumcision, which was temporal, was bestowed as a sign to a contumacious people, so the spiritual one was given for salvation to an obedient people."<sup>4</sup> Now, as Tertullian shows, beyond all con-

<sup>1</sup> Wall. Vol. iii, p. 466.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 470.

<sup>3</sup> Iren. Hæc. iv, 30.

<sup>4</sup> Tertull. Adv. Jud. 3.

troversy, that with him, baptism was necessary to salvation, how could the "new circumcision" exclude it? But his language explains his views. At the end of this same chapter, he says; "Et ideo nos, qui non populus dei retro, facti sumus populus ejus accipiendo novam legem supra dictam et novam circumcisionem ante prædictam." "And therefore we, who were formerly not the people of God, have been made his people by receiving the new law above spoken of, and the new circumcision before predicted." But observe; although by following him, his meaning becomes apparent, yet there is no pointed and positive assertion, that he considered baptism to be the "new," the "spiritual circumcision." Thus, near the close of the sixth chapter, he calls Christ "the *Purifier* of the new circumcision."<sup>1</sup> That is, Christ is the Remitter of sins in baptism, for He is the Baptizer, not man. This thought is expressed frequently in Tertullian. He has the same idea as that of Origen, where that Father is speaking of "baptism as being performed in connection with the renewing of the Spirit, which, as it is from God, even now moves upon the water."<sup>2</sup> He considers the waters as the "seat of God's Spirit" and more grateful to Him than the other elements.<sup>3</sup>

Again, before leaving this part of his subject he speaks of the Spirit of God, which, "in the beginning, was borne above the waters," and affirms that He "will still abide upon the waters as the Baptizer."<sup>4</sup>

We see, therefore, that this Father's principles would not only permit him to term Christ a Baptizer—but the "Purifier of the new circumcision" while he has reference entirely to the rite. For Christ is the Baptizer and not man.

It can not be supposed, that Cyprian, the accomplished Bishop of Carthage, some thirty years subsequent to Tertul-

<sup>1</sup> Novæ circumcisionis purgator.

<sup>2</sup> Origen. T. vi, 17, as given—Christ. Review, 1854, p. 181.

<sup>3</sup> Habes homo imprimis etatem venerari aquarum, quod divini spiritus sedes gratior scilicet ceteris tunc elementis. De Bapt. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Dei Spiritum, qui ab initio supervectabatur super aques, intictorem. De Bapt. 4. Others read: intinctos reformaturum: but this is not so correct.

lian's death, would be ignorant of the *usus loquendi* of his own age. The questions that now agitate us, he knew nothing of. He delighted in the power and genius of Tertullian, and is said never to have passed a day without reading him. In his writings, the evidence is plain, that baptism was esteemed as the circumcision of the Christian dispensation, "spiritual circumcision." The College of sixty-six Bishops, in the various provinces of Africa, sent a letter by the pen of Cyprian to a bishop who had inquired about the age at which a new-born child should be baptized; being in doubt whether it was virtually clean<sup>1</sup> before the eighth day. This letter, from the circumstance of the controversy concerning infant baptism, has become famous, and subject to much misrepresentation. But in regard to the point now under discussion, it is concise and satisfactory. It shows the views and language of the Christians of that age. The Bishops decided, that there need be no delay in baptizing the infant, that the grace to be thereby conveyed should not be impeded, "nor should the *Spiritual Circumcision* be impeded by the carnal circumcision," [*nec spiritalem circumcisionem impediri carnali circumcissione debere.*] That is, no law delaying the ancient circumcision, should operate so as to deprive children younger than that age, of the grace of baptism. This is the third time the phrase "spiritual circumcision" is mentioned in this short letter; one of which speaks expressly of this circumcision as coming in the stead of the old one prefiguring it. But this is not all. Firmilianus, whose letter to Cyprian is published among those of that Bishop, was a distinguished writer and controversialist of the Eastern or Greek church. Now, in this letter he is discussing the subject of baptism by heretics:—*utrum carnale sit eorum baptisma an spiritale*—"whether their baptism were carnal or spiritual" . . . *Sin autem spiritale est, quo modo apud illos esse baptisma spiritale potest, apud quos spiritus sanctus non est.* "But if it be spiritual,

<sup>1</sup>The Christians held such notions as late as the age of the Sixth book of the Apostolic Constitutions. Those who sneer at the ignorant African Bishop, can read Lib. vi, cap. 30.

how can there be a spiritual baptism among those with whom there is no Holy Spirit?"<sup>1</sup> Here the external rite is intended, and yet it is called "spiritual baptism," because the doctrine then was, that perfect sanctification took place in the reception of the rite, when the adult was a true penitent. So this writer in this Epistle (sec. viii) holds with Tertullian, that the baptism of John was not spiritual, because it did not give the spirit.<sup>2</sup> The conclusion is unavoidable; the external rite being called "*spiritual baptism*," it is with equal propriety called "*spiritual circumcision*." The acuteness of Dr. Carson saw this, and he therefore acknowledges, that Justin Martyr "sometimes also speaks of circumcision as baptism."<sup>3</sup>

Should we descend to the times of Lactantius, and Gregory Nazianzen, other evidences might be adduced. Dr. Gale cites the former, [De Verit. Sapient. iv, 17] to prove that the "*new circumcision*" is of the heart, and must therefore be different from baptism; which, we are to suppose, is but a carnal ordinance! But this would prolong our discussion, already full of evidence which ought to be satisfactory.

We may, therefore, through the foregoing induction of facts, showing the early manner of Christian thought and speech in reference to baptism, and its relations to circumcision, perceive an adequate reason why no controversy arose in the Apostolic church in respect to baptizing infants, if, indeed, such was the practice. The Christians did not believe, that circumcision was necessary to salvation, though there must have been a very early belief that baptism was; since the first writings of uninspired men hold the words of the Lord to Nicodemus as positively requiring it.

From the date of the last inspired writers, if we except John, about A. D. 66, to that of Justin Martyr, the first to give an intelligible account concerning baptism, A. D. 140, there are some seventy-four years. The death of John is placed at about, A. D. 101. There were six Fathers who wrote between forty, and one hundred and fifty-eight years

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<sup>1</sup> Cyprian, Epist. 75, 13.<sup>2</sup> Tertull. De Bapt. 10.<sup>3</sup> Carson, p. 381.



subsequent to the death of the Revelator. Justin Martyr must have been cotemporary with Irenæus some twenty-eight years, in active Christian life : being put to death, A. D. 168, some thirty-four years before the death of the latter, A. D. 202. Irenæus must also have been cotemporary with Clement of Alexandria, the learned predecessor of Origen, in the school at that celebrated city, some ten years; and Tertullian, converted to Christianity A. D. 196, had not gone over to Montanism, when Irenæus died, and he lived till some eighteen years afterward, until A. D. 220. Clement, converted in A. D. 193, died the same year with Tertullian; and, as Origen, born A. D. 185, of Christian ancestry, his own father being martyr, was appointed instructor of believers in Alexandria, when only eighteen years of age, he must have been cotemporary with the former, some twenty-seven, and with the latter, some thirty years; for it is altogether likely that Clement knew Origen before he was converted. Cyprian was not converted till some twenty-six years after Clement's death; yet he was cotemporary with Origen six or eight years, when he fell at Carthage, A. D. 258. Four years after, Origen died at Tyre, from the effects of the same cruel hand that destroyed Cyprian. The age of Origen and Cyprian was, therefore, that of the author of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions.<sup>1</sup>

We can thus survey the field of our history, in ascertaining the *usus loquendi*, in respect to the term in dispute, contained in the writings of Irenæus. The term, the meaning of which is in dispute, is found in the SECOND of the Five Books against heretics. All the remaining works of this distinguished man it is to be regretted, are now lost. He was educated in Asia, in the Greek church, and was extensively known, having been created bishop of Lyons, in France, A. D. 170. Having been a disciple of Polycarp, the companion of St. John, he was, no doubt, well instructed in respect to Infant Baptism, and the use of terms relating to Baptism in general.

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<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Chase's note, *Christ. Review* 1854, p. 192.

## IRENÆUS : THE QUESTION AT ISSUE.

He is speaking of Christ in his incarnation, and thus says : 'Therefore, as he was Master, he had also the age of a Master. Not disdaining, nor going a way above human nature ; nor breaking in his own person the law which he had set for mankind : *but sanctifying every several age by the likeness that it has to Him. For he came to save all persons by himself : all I say, who by Him ARE REGENERATED UNTO GOD : infants and little ones, and children and youth and older persons.* Therefore, He went through the several ages : for infants being made an infant, sanctifying infants : to little ones, he was made a little one, sanctifying those of that age : and also giving them an example of godliness, justice and dutifulness ; to youths He was a youth,"<sup>1</sup> etc.

Looking at the doctrine of Irenæus in respect to baptism, comparing that doctrine with the views of the Fathers above mentioned, and the language they used to designate the rite and its power, Pedobaptists have not hesitated to believe and maintain, that the author of this passage was contemplating the "washing of regeneration," and that in the words—"RE-  
NASCUNTUR IN DEUM," *baptism* is necessarily included. The writer of the sixth book of the Apostolical Constitutions thus renders John, iii, 5 : "For the Lord says, except any one *be baptized of water and of the Spirit*,<sup>2</sup> he can not enter the kingdom of God." Christ's words were, "*born of water and of the*

1 Sed omnem ætatem sanctificans per illam quæ ad ipsum erat similitudinem. Omnes enim venit per semet ipsum salvare : Omnes inquam qui per eum renascuntur in Deum : infantes, et pueros, et juvenes, et seniores. Irenæus. Hær. Lib. ii. c. 39.

It should be noted, that Dr. Gale has employed many pages in an attempt to prove this passage spurious. The translator who turned Irenæus into Latin was not competent to the work ; and there are a few mistakes as to dates, etc., of no importance whatever. No one will undertake to impeach a worthless witness ; and Gale's failure makes strongly against him. Failing in this, he attempts to show, that the word "*infans*," may be applied to children *ten years old*. If this be true, the Latin as well as the English language, is destitute of a word to denote that tender age. But the argument is only a quibble. Irenæus is not speaking of *infants in law language*. And here that pretense has its beginning and end.

2 βαπτισθῆναι ἐν ὕδατι καὶ πνεύματι, etc. Cap. 15.

spirit;"<sup>1</sup> and this was explaining what he meant by being "born from above," (ἀνωθεν.) Why, then, could not Irenæus mean the same thing by *renascuntur*?"

But, as this interpretation would make the Father teach infant baptism, Antipedobaptists deny this sense, and have not been very scrupulous in their arguments on the subject. Says Dr. Richard Fuller: "The whole plea founded on the above quotation is this: Baptismal regeneration had at this time begun to be received as a tenet, and when Irenæus uses the words 'born again,' (*renascuntur*), he may mean baptized. This is the argument; but it is easily refuted."<sup>2</sup> The "very learned Dr. Gale" was unfortunate in not having this writer's genius, for he employed some forty octavo pages in an attempted refutation, and then did not succeed. Dr. Fuller plainly shows that he never investigated the Fathers for himself. Dr. Sears also, many years since, gave a labored examination of this passage to the public. If all merely dogmatic assertions are deducted from his article, there will be little of value left. He understands the Father to mean by "*renascuntur* in Deum," "a general recovery of man through Christ's incarnation and redemption." If now, the atonement made to the Father Almighty was viewed by Irenæus as "*regenerating*" men "*unto God*," he must have been a long way on the road to universalism, if he had not quite arrived there. Are men, then, by Christ's incarnation, "*reborn into God*" so as to exclude all further means? Then, Christ was astonishing Nicodemus to no purpose; for he there represents the new birth as not *quite over in some cases*. The question *how* Christ *regenerates*, as it existed in the mind of Irenæus, this writer has not entirely "settled."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> γεννηθῆ ἐκ ὕδατος, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Fuller on Baptism, p. 192.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Fuller speaks of Dr. Sears thus turgidly: "Prof. Sears has settled forever this matter by an elaborate investigation of the works of Irenæus." His settlement, however, did not last more than *ten years*; for in 1849, Dr. Chase took the matter in hand, for a *resettlement*—"forever." Dr. Fuller has a short method of settling this controversy. He says: "Indeed, the passage itself shows that the words do not refer to baptism; for what nonsense to talk of persons being 'baptized by Christ unto God.'" p. 193. To be baptized *into* or *unto* Christ, is N. T. phrase—to be baptized "by Christ,"

But Dr. Chase has a far more candid review of the subject matter. His examination leads him to the conclusion that Irenæus' meaning is this: "Christ in becoming incarnate, and thus assuming his mediatorial work, brought the human family into a new relation, under himself, and placed them in a condition in which they can be saved. In this sense he is the Saviour of all. He restored them, or summed them up anew, in himself. Through him they are *regenerated* unto God; *per eum renascuntur* in Deum!" But here is no definition, no exposition of the Latin word *renascor* in this passage. He leaves it just where he finds it, only covering the ground over with words. What does *regenerate* mean? Does it mean "*sum up*"—to put in a *salvable* condition? Christ is the Regenerator of mankind, but Irenæus, we think, believed that He accomplished it by baptism. Dr. Chase does not attempt to discuss this point by a study of patristic usage. We do not discover any thing like such an effort in what he has done.

Now, without understanding the doctrine of Irenæus respecting the *nature* of baptism, we can not get at his meaning here. Does any one suppose, that in the view of Irenæus, "*regeneration unto God*" could be perfect without baptism, when he expressly says, that "*regeneration is through baptism*," for Christ gave it to the blind man thus?<sup>1</sup> And our critic himself confesses: "With baptism he associated the decisive reception of our true Christian faith, and transition from the world into the Church, from a state of bondage to a state of redemption, from spiritual death to spiritual life."<sup>2</sup> Although this is a wordy circumlocution, it does not hide the evident acknowledgment, that, with Irenæus, baptism conferred all these benefits.

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is, as such a man ought to know, to receive His baptism. Christ baptized, because in *His* baptism, the subject received the Spirit when the body was washed. "The meaning clearly is," he says, "born again, or converted unto God." Then we have "unconscious babes" "converted unto God!" That is in *advance* of Infant Baptism. Dr. Fuller's "refutation" is "easy," but it does not go far; it is, at most, not "forever."

<sup>1</sup> See below, the passage given.

<sup>2</sup> Baptism. Tracts for the Times, p. 84.

With Dr. Chase's criticism,<sup>1</sup> by which he would translate "qui" "*since*," we need spend but a few words. No man who understands Latin will make such blunders. In order for such English, we should require *qui . . . renati sint*.<sup>2</sup> Besides, this translation is discarded by writers in his own school. Again the author sees fit also to say: "It is by Him, and not by baptism, that they are here said to be renewed, born anew, or regenerated." But does not Christ work by means? *How* does he regenerate the *infant*, if, as Dr. Chase's school contend, regeneration, with Irenæus, meant *conversion*? The Father's meaning is, Christ *regenerates* these various classes under due circumstances and conditions, by his Spirit in the ordinance of baptism. In discussing a subject like the present, the writer should not ignore the theology of those whose words he attempts to explain. There can be little doubt that Tertullian and Irenæus held the same views as to baptism. The former says: "Water first brought forth that which had life, so that there might be no wonder, if in baptism the waters should be able to give life. For even the work of forming man himself was accomplished by the waters joining their aid."<sup>3</sup>

Having noticed sufficiently, perhaps, the issue before us, we may now more clearly survey our own position, and formally proceed to produce the testimony that has been adduced in this discussion. For clearness, we shall examine the usage of the other Fathers above mentioned, before taking up passages of Irenæus to exhibit his manner of speaking in respect to baptism.

ORIGEN. "Like many of the early Fathers," says Dr. Chase, "for example, like Clement his learned and ingenious predecessor in the Catechetical School, at Alexandria—he" (Origen,) "conceived of Christian baptism as having a miraculous renew-

<sup>1</sup> Making it read, "*Since . . . they are regenerated*," etc.

<sup>2</sup> See Zumpt, 564, 567.

<sup>3</sup> *Primus liquor quod viveret edidit, ne mirum sit in baptismo, si aque animare noverunt. Nam ipsius quoque hominis figurandi opus sociantibus aquis absolutum est. Tertull. De Bap. 3.*

ing efficacy on those who were already converted, penitent, and believing, or as we should say, already renewed."<sup>1</sup> What, then, remained for baptism? It is evident the "efficacy" he supposed, was the reception of the Holy Spirit, producing, or consummating the *regeneration* which Christ signified in his conversation with Nicodemus, according to all the Fathers. Dr. Chase himself quotes several places of Origen which show this. Thus, after speaking of the "*washing by water*"<sup>2</sup> as being a symbol of the soul's purification, he says it is the "source and fountain of divine gifts, on account of the power of invocation of the adorable Trinity." In urging the catechumen to their duties, he would have them make a *worthy preparation and come to baptism, that they might be purified unto Salvation.*"<sup>3</sup> Adults were to exercise repentance, and come to Christ for pardon. In baptism, they were *regenerated* and received the Holy Ghost.

Take the following clear explanation. This Father is speaking of the *generation* of death by Adam. It was in two ways; *first*, by *his own nature*; second, by his *parental teaching*. Christ, however, has exactly paralleled these. He has substituted a *regeneration* for the *generation* of death—and a *TEACHING* for the *parental teaching* of Adam. It was thus: "For, sending forth his disciples to this work, he said not merely, 'Go baptize all nations,' but 'Go teach all nations,' etc. Knowing therefore, that each" [*nature, and parental teaching,*] "is in fault, he gave a remedy for each, that the mortal generation might be changed by the regeneration of baptism, and that the teaching of piety might exclude the teachings of impiety."<sup>4</sup> He had just been saying, as we have

<sup>1</sup> Christ. Rev. 1854, p. 180.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος λουρπὸν. Origen, T. vi, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Hom. xxi, on Luke. Ut veniat ad lavacrum, et lavemini in salutem.

<sup>4</sup> Et sicut generationi substituit regenerationem, ita et doctrinæ substituit aliam doctrinam. Mittens enim ad hoc opus discipulos suos, non dixit tantum, Ite, baptizate omnes gentes; sed ait, ite, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii, et Spiritus sancti. Sciens igitur utrumque esse in culpa, utrique remedium dedit, generatio mortalis regeneratione baptismi mutaretur, et impietatis doctrinam doctrina pietatis excluderet. Origen, in Rom. v, 2.

indicated above, "for the Lord Jesus Christ, when he came to repair what had rashly been done, since the first nativity which came from Adam would generate unto death, introduced a second nativity, which he has called not so much generation as *regeneration*, through which, doubtless, he would abolish the fault of the first nativity; and as he substituted regeneration for generation, so also he substituted another teaching for former teaching."<sup>1</sup> Then comes the passage just quoted. Here we have the whole doctrine of Irenæus set forth by Origen, in a clear light. Christ "came to *repair* (emendare) what had rashly been done." In order to do this, "he introduced a *second nativity* (secundam nativitatem) which he" (Christ) "called not so much generation as *regeneration*" (regenerationem). The *regeneration*, which is accomplished by baptism, is to remove the *generation* of Adam's nature; i. e. *native depravity*; the teaching and doctrines are to remove the evil precepts of this life. How plainly do we see, that Dr. Chase and Dr. Sears are mistaken! They do not interpret the anthropology of the Fathers at all. Dr. Chase uses this indefinite mode of speech; "He (Origen) had the most exalted idea of the efficacy of baptism."<sup>2</sup> We see the whole extent of the efficacy advocated by Origen. When this writer would inflame the superstitious imagination in favor of *immersion*, he does not come one whit behind Origen. He says: "To you" (Christ is represented as saying to Baptists,) "I have given to know my will, and to hope for eternal life through my death. Into my death ye have been baptized. Created anew, ye have been set forth as alive from the dead. From the waters of baptism ye have come forth as citizens of heaven to sojourn awhile on earth."<sup>3</sup> Again: "For the water in which we are buried" [a mode of speech nowhere found in God's word] "is a purifying element. Thus there is a figurative washing away of sins, a putting off of the body of sinful propensities, and, as it were, a depositing of it in the

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Chase's translation, *Christ. Review*! 1854, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> *Bapt. Tracts for the Times*! p. 28.



grave, from which in this emblem, we come forth as alive from the dead, to walk in newness of life." <sup>1</sup> Water, the emblem of a grave and of *purity* at the same time! That will do.

While on this subject, we may as well notice the assertions of Antipedobaptist writers as to "*baptismal regeneration*." None of the early Fathers held to "*baptismal regeneration*," in the popish sense; that, was an after-growth.<sup>2</sup> It is, "that the sacraments of the N. T." (baptism, of course included) "*confer grace by themselves, from the effect of the work wrought*."<sup>3</sup> Dr. Chase explains this point, and exculpates the Fathers *preceding* Origen. "He considered baptism" says our author, "as a grand and blessed remedy for sin. Subsequent Fathers"—mark the words—"thought so much of the remedy as to deem it efficacious even without the preparation."<sup>4</sup>

CYPRIAN. He is in the great controversy with Stephen of Rome in regard to baptism of heretics, and says: "For baptism is that in which the old man dies and the new man is born, this the Apostle shows clearly, saying: He saved us through the washing of regeneration." This is in his letter to Pompeius.<sup>5</sup> Again. "But if in the laver, that is in baptism, is regeneration, how can heresy beget sons to God through Christ?"<sup>6</sup> And—"Although the new birth of Christians is in baptism, yet regeneration and sanctification of baptism remains with the spouse of Christ alone, which is able to bring forth spiritually and beget sons to God."<sup>7</sup>

In his letter to Jubianus he says that those who come to the

<sup>1</sup> Bapt. Tracts for the Times, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Neander, Hist. Christ. Dogm. vol. ii, p. 589.

<sup>3</sup> Per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato conferri gratiam. Conc. Trid. Sess. viii, can. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Christ. Rev. 1854, p. 197.

<sup>5</sup> Baptisma enim esse, in quo homo vetus moritur et novus nascitur, manifestat et probat beatus Apostolus dicens: Servavit nos per lavacrum regenerationis. Epist. 74, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Cyp. Ep. 74, 6—Si autem in lavacro id est in baptismo est regeneratio, quo modo generare filios Deo hæresis per Christum potest?

<sup>7</sup> Cum autem nativitas Christianorum in baptismo sit, baptismi autem generatio et sanctificatio apud solam sponsam Christi sit, quæ parere spiritualiter et generare filios Deo possit. Cyp. Ep. 74, 7.

church from heretics ought to be baptized, "that those who are prepared by the lawful, true and only baptism of the holy church, by *divine regeneration* for the kingdom of God, should be born of both sacraments, because it is written: 'Except any one be born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter the kingdom of God.'<sup>1</sup>

Thus far the distinguished Bishop of Carthage, who, if any man, knew and spoke the sentiments and language of his age. But the language of the Eastern or Greek church is the same. Firmilianus says: "For if the baptism of heretics can be esteemed the regeneration of the second birth, then are tho se baptized among them to be reputed, not as heretics, but as sons of God."<sup>2</sup>

These extracts are abundantly calculated to show that baptism was every where called *regeneration* in those ages of the church. We need not dwell upon these instances, for those who read will be able to draw correct conclusions from the evidence before them.

TERTULLIAN. The language of this Father is of a far different character from that employed by other church writers, yet his doctrine stands out boldly and well defined. Speaking of the power of water, under the appointment of God, he says:—"Wherefore all waters, from the ancient privilege of their origin, obtain, after prayer to God, the sacrament of sanctification. For the spirit straightway cometh down from heaven above, and is over the waters, sanctifying them from Himself; and so sanctified they imbibe the power of sanctifying."<sup>3</sup> After speaking of sins as defiling us like dirt, to be

<sup>1</sup> Ut qui legitimo et vero atque unico sanctæ ecclesiæ baptismo ad regnum Dei regeneratione divina preparantur, sacramento utroque nascentur, quia scriptum est: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei. Cyp. Ep. 73, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Quodsi baptisma hereticorum habere potest regenerationem secundæ nativitatis, non hæretici, sed filii Dei computandi sunt, qui apud illos baptizantur. Secunda enim nativitas, quæ est in baptismo, filios Dei generat. Cyp. Ep. 75, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Igitur omnes aquæ de pristina originis prærogativa sacramentum sanctificationis consequuntur invocato deo. Supervenit enim statim spiritus de coelis et aquis super est, sanctificans eas de semet ipso, et ita sanctificatæ vim sanctificandi combibunt. Tertul. De Bapt. 4.

cleansed by water, yet not upon the skin, but in the spirit, "for the spirit rules, the flesh serves," he says: "wherefore, the waters being in a certain manner indued with power to heal by the intervention of the Angel, the spirit is washed in the water after a carnal manner, and the flesh cleansed in the same after a spiritual manner."<sup>1</sup> This is an explanation of the reasons why baptism was called "spiritual baptism"—"*spiritual regeneration*." "Remembering this declaration, as if not of future question, let us consider this foolish," (alluding to the cavils of those who called the idea, "*lavacro dilui mortem*"—such,) "and impossible thing, that of being *re-formed* by water"—*aqua reformari*.<sup>2</sup> In his book on Chastity, Tertullian uses these words—*Secunda virginitas a secunda nativitate, id est a lavacro*—"the second virginity is by a second nativity (or birth), that is, by baptism."<sup>3</sup> Baptism, therefore, is called by what it accomplishes, the "*second birth*," or, in other words, *regeneration*. And this doctrine, as we have before said, is taken from our Lord's words to Nicodemus. "But since" he says, "the rule is laid down that salvation cometh to none without Baptism, chiefly from that declaration of the Lord, who says, except a man be born of water, he hath not life;" etc.<sup>4</sup>

In regard to John's baptism, he argues that it was not "divine" (*divinum*) in its nature, but only in the "*command*." It was of *repentance*, which is human;—it did not give the Spirit, nor remission of sins. "But none forgives sins or grants the Spirit, but God only. Even the Lord himself said, that the Spirit would not descend except he first ascended to the Father. What the Lord did not as yet bestow, his servant surely would not be able to give." He then refers, in proof, to Acts xix: "Wherefore" he continues, "this was not

<sup>1</sup> Et spiritus in aquis corporaliter diluitur, et caro in eisdem spiritualiter mundatur. De Bapt. 4.

<sup>2</sup> De Bapt. 3.

<sup>3</sup> De Exhort. Cast. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Quum vero prescribitur nemini sine baptismo competere salutem, ex illa maxime pronuntione domini, qui ait: Nisi natus ex aqua quis erit, non habet vitam. De Bapt. 12.

an heavenly thing which gave not forth heavenly things," etc.<sup>1</sup> He closes this reasoning by referring to Matt. iii, 11: It is Christ who baptizes with the *spirit*, and *fire*, thus distinguished,—“a true and steadfast faith is concerned with *water* whereby it is baptized unto salvation, but a pretended and weak one, is baptized with *fire* unto judgment.”<sup>2</sup> What is this, but making Christ's rite of water baptism, that which gives the Spirit? “*Spiritual baptism*,” BAPTIZING WITH THE SPIRIT? Tertullian, therefore, evidently confounds baptism with spiritual birth, no further than he so understands John iii, 5, as signifying the same. In no particular does he differ from the other Fathers named, except in the minuteness of his analysis.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. This Father is confuting the Valentinian Gnostics, who held such wild and fanciful notions as to God and Christ, and who claimed that their baptism was more exalted than the church baptism; for theirs *perfected* the redemption of the recipient, that of the church did not. Clement introduces the Lord's baptism to confute them. Thus: The proposition is: “When we have been *regenerated* (ἀναγεννηθέντες) we then have received the *perfection*”. To prove this, he says: “As soon as the Lord was *baptized*, immediately there came a voice from heaven declaring him to be beloved.” “Now let us ask the wise men,” he says, “was not Christ as soon as he was *regenerated* perfect? Or will they be so absurd as to say, He was wanting in any thing?” This they could not say; hence—“As soon as he is *baptized* by John he is perfect.” “He is perfected by the *baptism alone* and sanctified by the Holy Ghost coming on him. Therefore—He that is once *regenerated* as the name of that sacrament is, and enlightened, has his state changed.”<sup>3</sup> Surely, we need not hesitate, after so positive a statement. There can

<sup>1</sup> Ergo non erat coeleste, quod coelestia non exhibebat. De Bapt. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Quia vera et stabilis aquæ fides, qua tingitur in salutem, simulata autem et infirma igni tingitur in iudicium. De Bapt. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Clem. Alexand. Pedag. I. p. 90.

be no doubt but that this learned man employed the words *baptism* and *regeneration* as synonyms. In what sense could this Father speak of regenerating Christ, unless it were the reception of some grace in the ordinance. To take it in the Antipedobaptist sense, would be blasphemy.

Dr. Gale has, however, attempted to gainsay this position. He brings forward a passage where Clement is speaking in a figurative manner of one who is *regenerated* by turning from evil ways and habits. It proves nothing to his purpose; it certainly can not disprove the positive evidence before us. Figurative usage can not disprove the literal.

Before the direct examination of Irenæus we shall briefly cite some satisfactory places from

**JUSTIN MARTYR.** It is a circumstance worthy of notice, that this Father does not mention baptism at all in his Second Apology. In the First, he does not use baptize or baptism for the initiatory washing. But in his Dialogue with the Jew, Trypho, these terms are more generally employed. This shows, that "baptism" was a religious, or church *technic*, understood by the Jews, but not by the Roman Senate and Emperor. To have talked to Marcus Antoninus of "*immersion*," would not have been intelligible, for he would understand such terms as denoting *specific actions*; while they only denoted to the Jew, and the Christian, an initiatory rite by the use of water, remitting sins and regenerating.

Justin, in his First Apology, is informing the Emperor how the Christians "**DEDICATED** themselves to God." After affirming their belief, and promising to live according to Christian rules, and having prayed for "forgiveness of past sins"—"Then," he says, "we bring them to a place where there is water; and after the same manner of *regeneration* (*ἀναγεννήσεως*) as we ourselves were *regenerated* they are *regenerated*; for they then make a purification with water† in the name," etc. "For Christ also said: "Except ye be born

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† Τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται.

again (*regenerated*) ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven."<sup>1</sup>

In the face of such evidence, Dr. Gale raises objections. Justin "joins it" (*regeneration*) "pretty closely with their being baptized, yet he does not say baptism is regeneration; but only intimates that they received or completed, or confirmed, etc., that regeneration by baptism: and as he is speaking only of adult persons, he must, doubtless mean some further regeneration than bare washing. The passage, I confess, is a little obscurely expressed."<sup>2</sup> Candor will not hesitate long in deciding to whom this "obscurity" belongs. Justin is very clear; but Dr. Gale, disagreeing with him, and not being able to withstand the plain facts, the matter all at once becomes a "*little obscurely expressed*." Justin Martyr differs with Dr. Gale, in regard to the *nature* and *design* of baptism; and it is this that makes the Father so "*obscure*." It is "*plunging the flesh into water*" with the one, but *sanctification* with the other. It was an escape from sin's guilt and curse. After citing Christ's words, as above, Justin thus shows this: "And it is declared by the prophet Isaiah, as I have already written, in what way those who have sinned, and who repent, shall escape their sins. It is said as follows: "*Wash ye, make you clean,*" etc.<sup>3</sup> "This washing is called *illumination*." Why may it not be called "*regeneration*," as well? This Father says of those admitted to the Eucharist, they must be those "who are baptized for the forgiveness of sins and for *regeneration*."<sup>4</sup> Antipedobaptist writers<sup>5</sup> have supposed, that here, *regeneration* is a separate matter from the baptism. How does it appear? The baptism is "*for*" or "*unto* REGENERATION." If one is baptized to be regenerated, is he not regenerated by baptism, and is not the baptizing the *regenerating*, in the view of patristic theology?

Still another passage in Justin Martyr is cited, intended to

<sup>1</sup> Justin Martyr Apol. 1, 61.

<sup>2</sup> Wall, Vol. III. p. 482.

<sup>3</sup> Apol. I. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Justin Martyr Apol. I. 66.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Gale, in Wall, vol. iii, p. 483. Fuller, p. 193.

show, that baptism and regeneration are different things, notwithstanding his own plain language in the premises. He says: "Christ is come the head of another people, who are regenerated by him by means of water, faith and the tree" [the cross.]<sup>1</sup> They are regenerated by Christ, who does not "baptize by water," says Dr. Gale; and "what sense is there in the expression baptized by faith?"<sup>2</sup> If this "regeneration by water" is not baptism, as he says the disciples "dedicate themselves to God," by such a regeneration, what can it be? Christ does not, in the patristic view, baptize by water, but he does baptize by the *spirit accompanying the water*, as explained by Tertullian. Has this not been made clear? Baptism by faith is not "*plunging*" by faith, for it is not suspected of any such attribute. But Tertullian has "*baptisma veritatis*;"<sup>3</sup> and, "*prima audientis intinctioest, metus integer*"<sup>4</sup>—"an entire faith is the first baptism of the Hearer." Take away the "*plunging*" theory, and all is easy to be understood. But are we baptized by the "cross?" Let Tertullian answer. Speaking of Elisha's raising the head of the axe by the branch of wood, he says: "What more clearly shows forth the sacrament of the cross, than that the wickedness of the world, sunk in the abyces of sin, is *liberated in BAPTISM by his cross*?"<sup>5</sup> So Justin Martyr says: "Christ has freed us from the heavy sins in which we were sunk," "through his crucifixion on the tree, and his sanctifying us by water."<sup>6</sup> If now, we hear Dr. Gale's explanation of John, iii, 5, we shall wonder how he could throw away so many pages in sophistries, that are silenced in so summary a manner by his own acknowledgments. He says: "He does not speak of two new births, one by water and one by the Spirit, but only of one, which was to be of water and the Spirit in conjunction." And this is precisely the patristic view, as we have again and again shown. It was the Spirit with the water that made the

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<sup>1</sup> Just. Martyr, Trypho, 138.

<sup>3</sup> Tertull. De Pud. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Tertull. Adv. Judæos, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Gale in Wall, vol. iii, p. 482.

<sup>4</sup> De Pœnit. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Trypho, 86.



"church baptism" "spiritual baptism," in contradistinction to heretical baptism which was *carnal*, being *mere* water. But we can see equally clear the error of the learned writer. He continues: "Yet the baptizing in water is not the regenerating; because that other part, viz: of the Spirit, is at least equally required to regeneration: and therefore baptism with water is not regeneration." Here, he ignores the doctrine of the Fathers, and shuts his eyes to all the explanations they give, determining the whole case from his own stand-point—"baptism is merely plunging the flesh into water" and can not therefore be regeneration!

#### EXAMPLES FROM IRENÆUS.

It would be an argument against us, of no ordinary weight, if, on examination, Irenæus should be found to distinguish between regeneration and baptism, in such a way as to show, that the former was not accomplished in the latter. The conclusion to which our examination thus far has led us, would be somewhat shaken. But, it would be indeed strange that such a thing could be true; for well-informed writers, both before and after his time, have testified very clearly, that to be *baptized* was to be *regenerated*, and to be regenerated was to be baptized. WHAT DOES IRENÆUS MEAN BY THE WORD *RENASCOR*?

Let us, therefore, bring before us the various passages that occur in this Father, for the purpose of a satisfactory solution of this question.

1. In a passage where he is speaking of the Valentinians, a heretical sect among the Gnostics, he says: "This generation of heretics has been sent out by Satan for frustrating, or denying the *baptism of regeneration unto God*."<sup>1</sup> What is a "baptism of regeneration unto God," but a regenerating baptism unto God, or a baptism unto God that regenerates? We have the phrase in the N. T.: "*baptized into or unto Christ*." To be baptized into the name of the Father, is the same as to

<sup>1</sup> *Εἰς ἐξάρνησιν τοῦ βαπτίσματος τῆς εἰς Θεὸν ἀναγεννήσεως, etc.* Lib. i, 18. [21, 1.]

be baptized into the Father, or baptized into God. If a man of any learning is to carp at the modification—"per eum," by him, he may be sure that he has at least one more lesson to learn. Christian baptism, as understood by the Fathers, and by ourselves, is, where Christ is the Baptizer, not man. Hence, when Dr. Sears, who considers "*immersed into Christ*"—"immersed into the Holy Ghost," elegant ideas, as well as good English, calls "baptism through Christ unto God" "incongruous," he allows his reason to bow to his dogmas.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Valentinians assumed to have a God above the God of the Jews and Christians: their baptism was a far higher baptism than that of the Church. "They say," Irenæus tells us, "that their baptism is necessary for all true Gnostics, that they may be *regenerated* unto that power which is above all;"<sup>2</sup> i. e. above the God of the Christians. These heretical people set their baptism, which they termed "*redemption*," [*ἀπολύτρωσις*] above the baptism of the Church, both in its power and in its forms. Their baptism was performed by pouring a mixture of oil and water on the head. The baptism<sup>3</sup> of the Church, "was of the appearing Jesus for the remission of sins, but the *redemption* is of Christ, that came upon him to perfection."

It is necessary to state these facts, in order to explain the objection that Dr. Gale brings at this place. He says: "Now this being said of those who deny baptism, the word *regeneration* can not mean baptized;" and he affirms, that Irenæus sufficiently distinguishes baptism from *redemption*, which 'is necessary that they may be *regenerated*,' for it is opposed to it."<sup>4</sup> What had the blasphemous distinctions of the Valentinians to do here, in this argument? Irenæus is plain, and

<sup>1</sup> See in Fuller on Bapt. p. 194, who exclaims: "What nonsense to talk of persons being 'baptized by Christ unto God!'" His idea is that of Christ's dipping a person into water unto God!

<sup>2</sup> Εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα Δύναμιν ὧσιν ἀναγεννημένοι.

<sup>3</sup> Τὸ μὲν γὰρ βάπτισμα τοῦ φαινομένου Ἰησοῦ. Irenæus, lib. i, 18. [21, 1.]

<sup>4</sup> Wall. Vol. iii, p. 521.

to the point. He is describing the heretical folly that, so far as it could, brought the baptism of the church, which was "for *regeneration* unto God," into contempt. But here is sufficient to show the weakness of the Antipedobaptist cause.

3. In another book against heresies, Irenæus has the following words: "That unity which is unto incorruption our bodies have received through baptism, but our souls by the Spirit. Whence also both are necessary; since both are profitable in respect to the life of God."<sup>1</sup> This passage is cited by Antipedobaptists to prove that the *washing*, and the reception of the Spirit, are different. But Dr. Chase has rightly interpreted all this, when he says of Irenæus:—"He contended, as we have already seen, that our bodies were affected by the laver, but our minds by the Spirit, so that both were renewed, or regenerated and united to God."<sup>2</sup> And this too, in the external ordinance.

4. Irenæus has a passage very much resembling that already given from Origen, in respect to our Lord's sending out his disciples to promulgate the Gospel. Thus: "And again, giving unto his disciples the power of *regenerating* unto God, he said, Go," etc; and after this N. T. quotation, he adds the promise of Christ, thus: "Working in them the will of the Father, and renewing them from the old (nature), to the new birth in Christ."<sup>3</sup> Now what "power of regenerating unto God," did Christ give to his disciples, but the power to *baptize* and teach? Dr. Chase, upon the two foregoing extracts, has the following: "Here it seems too obvious to require any comment, that Irenæus contemplated the conversion of persons whose minds should be enlightened by evangelical instruction, and influenced by the Holy Spirit; and who, by being baptized should make a suitable profession of their

<sup>1</sup> Corpora enim nostra per lavacrum illam, quæ est ad incorruptionem, unitatem accipierunt; animæ autem per spiritum. Lib. iii, 19—17, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Bapt. Tr. for the Times, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Et iterum, potestatem regenerationis in Deum dans discipulis, dicebat eis, Euntes..... Voluntatem Patris operans in ipsis, et renovans eos a vetustate in novitatem Christi. Irenæus, Hæres. Lib. iii, 19.

faith."<sup>1</sup> And what does that amount to, but an attempt of theory to warp testimony to its purpose? The Father says nothing of all this about which the critic expatiates. Let the reader look again into the extract which we have given from Origen, where he is speaking of the Gospel commission, and all will be clear. Dr. Chase will not give a creed to the Fathers in any such way as this.

5. This Father speaks of Christ's descent into Hades, and says: "Our Lord being made the first begotten from the dead, and receiving the ancient patriarchs into his bosom, regenerated them to the life of God": . . . and a little after: "He regenerated them into the Gospel of life."<sup>2</sup> It is contended, that here is an instance where *regeneration* is unconnected with baptism. Let us seek an easy explanation.

Are we not aware, that the Fathers put a sense upon I Pet. iii, 19, that would justify the language of Irenæus? And he himself says: "That the Lord descended into those regions under the earth and preached the Gospel that was about to come."<sup>3</sup> Can we bring ourselves to believe, that Irenæus contemplated a preached Gospel with baptism left out? Whoever does so, will egregiously err. The ancient patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were esteemed by Irenæus to have died as holy men, and *regenerated*, in the sense which Antipedobaptists claim for that word. What *regeneration*, then, did they receive, if it was not baptism? Remember we are interpreting Irenæus, not explaining *ourselves*.

Hermas, who most probably wrote very early, speaks, in the Shepherd, on this very subject. He figured the church as a tower built on the waters—"because your life is saved, and shall be saved by water."<sup>4</sup> He says of the ancients who

<sup>1</sup> Bapt. Tr. for the Times, p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Primogenitus enim mortuorum natus Dominus, et in sinum suum recipiens pristinos patres regeneravit eos in vitam Dei. . . . Hic illos in evangelium vite regeneravit. Lib. iii, 33. [22. 4.]

<sup>3</sup> Lib. iv, 45. [27, 2.]

<sup>4</sup> Quoniam vita vestra per aquam salva facta est et fiet. Lib. i, Vision 3, c. 3.

"died in righteousness and great purity," "it is necessary for them to ascend by water, that they might be at rest; for they could not otherwise enter into the kingdom of God, than by putting off the mortality of their former life. . . They, therefore, after they were dead, were sealed with the seal of the Son of God, and so entered into the kingdom of God." . . "Now that seal is water" etc.<sup>1</sup> . . . For this reason the seal was preached unto them, and they made use of it that they might enter into the kingdom of God."<sup>2</sup> We are constrained to think the words of Hermas afford a sufficient explanation; they ought to be satisfactory. With the unscriptural fancies of these writers, of course, we have nothing, in this discussion, to do. We are simply learning what doctrines they held as to the *nature* of baptism, and the language which resulted from such doctrines. It is, therefore, entirely out of place, and extremely unfair, for Antipedobaptists to thrust their own views upon these Fathers.

6. Irenæus is speaking of the blind man in the Gospel, and says of the Saviour: "He gave to him at the same time his formation, and that *regeneration which is by baptism*."<sup>3</sup> He had a little before called this anointing a "new formation," and the "washing the eyes in the pool of Siloam," "the washing of regeneration."<sup>4</sup> Why this passage should have been quoted to show that *regeneration*, in this Father, does not "always" include baptism, passes comprehension.

We might introduce other writers, as Bardesanes Syrus, of the same age with Justin Martyr, but it surely can not be necessary. It will suffice for us to consider, briefly, what Dr.

<sup>1</sup> Justin Martyr calls *Τὸ βαπτισμα . . . τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς ζωῆς*. Tryph. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Necesse est ut per aquam habeant ascendere, ut requiescant: non poterant enim aliter in regnum Dei intrare, quam ut deponerent mortalitatem prioris vite. Illi igitur defuncti sigillo filii Dei signati sunt, et intraverunt in regnum Dei. . . Illud autem sigillum aqua est. . . Et illis igitur predicatum est illud sigillum, et usi sunt eo, ut intrarent in regnum Dei. Lib. iii, Simil. ix, c. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Simul et plasmationem et eam quæ est per lavacrum regenerationem restituens ei. Lib. iv, 15. [15, 3.]

<sup>4</sup> Lavacrum regenerationis.

Chase has said in the premises, and close this protracted discussion.

This writer quotes from a fragment,<sup>1</sup> in which it is said of those obeying the will of Christ, that they are "children of God by *spiritual regeneration*." Of course; but then, would the writer think of excluding baptism from its place in this *regeneration*? Let another passage cited by our author explain. Irenæus is speaking of Naaman's cleansing and says: "We, being leprous in sins, are, by the holy water and the calling upon the Lord, cleansed from the old transgression, as new-born children, being *spiritually regenerated* according to what our Lord said, Except any one be born again." etc.<sup>2</sup> Upon this Dr. Chase makes the following concession: "It is sufficient to know, and I do not hesitate to admit, that Irenæus sometimes speaks of a regeneration as being connected with baptism."<sup>3</sup> He does not leave much to contend about, and does not seem to have transferred any great amount of testimony to the Antipedobaptist side of the question. He finally says: "Irenæus himself, as we have seen, does not always confound baptism with regeneration, renewal, restoration, or introduction to a better state." He does not "always" confound baptism with regeneration, is a long stride from the flippant statements of many Antipedobaptists, that Irenæus never means baptism by regeneration. One writer<sup>4</sup> makes this statement as a conclusion of Dr. Sears: "Regeneration, standing alone without any such words as 'baptism,' or 'bath,' prefixed, and governing it in the genitive, never means baptism in Irenæus."

Now these conditions cut off the two examples last cited from Dr. Chase; yet who, after reading over this discussion, will not see that here is mere assertion to carry out a theory,

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<sup>1</sup> Ex codicibus a manuscriptis Bibliothecæ Regiæ Turinensia Bapt. Tr. for the Times. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Bapt. Tracts for the Times, p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. (Ex. Ms. Biblioth. Coislianæ Catena.)

<sup>4</sup> Fuller on Baptism, p. 194.

and fitted to a given case ; an assertion that directly contradicts facts? What did the Valentinians mean by their "*redemption*?" Was it not the same to them that "*regeneration*" was to the Church? Both were rites performed on the subject, and in which the spiritual grace was *really* bestowed, or *supposed* to be bestowed. Irenæus very rarely, if ever, uses this word, except he is speaking of the work of redemption. If such places could be produced, they would have been forthcoming ere this late day. But many writers, who doubtless, never saw the original of what they quote, are full of positive assertions. Says Dr. Fuller of Prof. Sears: "He gave abundant citation from this writer" (Irenæus,) "to prove that he never uses the words 'born again' in the sense here pretended."<sup>1</sup> The confidence of writers who take things at *second-hand* ought to be somewhat abated. Dr. Chase admits that *generally* Irenæus does mean *baptize* by *regenerate*, but not "*always*!"

What the writer alleges about the context of the passage under discussion, that is, against our interpretation, can not be maintained. He says, to support this assertion—"the context directs our attention to *Christ*, and what He himself personally came to do for the human family. It is by *Him*, and not by baptism, that they are said to be renewed, born anew, or regenerated." A tolerable theologian would hardly suppose, that such an objection would be made by a learned man. We have several times refuted this objection. It is not man that baptizes in the ordinance, it is Christ. What Christ does, He performs by his ministers. Does Dr. Chase need to learn so simple a lesson?

He closes, with assuming all that he has granted. He asserts that parallel passages are against our sense, and abundantly confirm that which he has given. They are before the reader. Do they sustain the Antipedobaptist view? What shall we name such statements? Let the reader decide. The

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<sup>1</sup> Fuller on Baptism, p. 193.



logic of the writer's whole article may be learned by the following: "We must learn what Irenæus thought of baptism from passages where he is speaking of it." Is that the subject of our inquiry? Have we not been seeking to find whether or not Irenæus is speaking of baptism in this passage? Are we to be driven from its consideration, by an assumption of the very point in debate? Do the Antipedobaptists *own* all the provinces which lie around baptism, that they assume such airs? We apprehend not. We claim baptism as a common property of our blessed religion. Some of their own men have conceded the points here in this dispute, among whom is Mr. Whiston, an able linguist. And yet, this writer still caught at the notion, that the infants might have been those of *ten years*! But this is too strained for credence. Did Christ sanctify infants in *every stage*, and yet not till in the *tenth year*? In whatever light we view this question, the conclusion seems forced upon us—that the settled usage of Irenæus was like that of the five other Fathers mentioned in the foregoing discussion. He everywhere implies baptism in the regeneration he so often names. And we are compelled to believe that it is only by ignoring his doctrine, learned from John iii, 5, that we can mistake him. The phrase, "Baptised by him unto God," is incongruous to us, because baptism does not include all, under our theology, in our modes of thinking, that it did in his. Let us pass to his age and standpoint, and all difficulties will vanish. That Infant Baptism is proved to have existed in the days of the Apostles, is conceded, if "*renascuntur*" includes baptism; which we deem fully proved.

## ART. IV.—THE DIVINE NAMES IN THE HEBREW SCRIPTURES.

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THE Divine Being has revealed himself by a great variety of vocal announcements, verbal appellations, significant of his existence, and of different aspects of his character—the attributes, perfections, purposes, acts and relations, requisite to be made known to man. To know him, is to discern the meaning and relations of the names and titles by which he has described himself.

The name EL, seems to have been the first that was announced as a Divine designation—a simple aspiration in the primitive language, denoting the Almighty, the Omnipresent, the object of homage and obedience. Next, we may infer the frequent use in the beginning, of the appellative *Deber* (Logos, Word), designating personally the overt actor in all finite and visible works and manifestations. John, i.

These designations may have been exclusively in use in the beginning, and for ages, though not familiar when the Pentateuch was written. The name El, though not written in this simple form in the opening records of Genesis, occurs about forty times in the Pentateuch, sixty times in Job, seventy in the Psalms, and often elsewhere. It is often distinguished and made emphatic by the definite article, as The El, The Jehovah El, etc., and by such qualifying words as the Most High El; the Almighty El; the everlasting El; the El Jehovah that created the heavens, etc.

Anciently this word as a designation, signified an interposer, mediator, the omnipresent, omniscient, almighty Interposer, etc.—founded on or suggesting the universal presence, intervention, interposition of air, light, fire, the celestial fluid in space, and between the parts of all material substances. This is corroborated by its use as a verb, and in cognate languages. No term could be so obviously appropriate and expressive as this, on supposition that as a name it was to indi-

cate something of the nature and attributes of the Infinite Spirit.

Between the creation and the time of Moses, there was an interval of about 2,500 years, during which the El visibly appeared to, conversed with, and instructed particular individuals, patriarchs, heads of tribes, and families at their isolated residences, and at places consecrated to his worship. They were constituted the leaders of public worship, the priests, administrators of ordinances, etc. On the other hand, from the date of the apostasy, Satan assuming to be the god of this world, and seeking to establish a kingdom, had usurped the names and prerogatives of the true God, perverted his revelations and counterfeited the institutions and ordinances of his worship. As an adversary and rival, he appropriated the Divine designations to himself, and exacted the homage and obedience of men. Apparently to suit the demands of polytheism, he adopted the plural form of the primeval designation—Elohim—and brought it into common use among the idolators of Egypt; whence, from long and degrading intercourse with them, it became familiar and dominant with the children of Israel. Accustomed to use that form of the word, as a designation of the object of worship; and, from their ignorance and degeneracy, not to be easily weaned from it and from the associations connected with it, the Inspiring Spirit sanctioned the use of that form by Moses in his retrospective book of Genesis, and in his subsequent history, as a singular. This is consistent with his use subsequently of the primitive word El, and with the frequent use of that word in Job, the Psalms, and elsewhere. By ascribing the creation of all things to Elohim, and establishing the use of that word as a *singular*, by ascribing the same work to the same person under the name Jehovah, and recording the two designations separately, jointly, and interchangeably, he did the utmost to rebuke the pretensions of idolatry, and to awaken and reclaim the Israelites.

The Patriarchs exercised the office of prophets to instruct, of priests to offer typical sacrifices, and of kings to rule.

Melchisedeck, King of Salem, was a priest of the Most High El. He blessed Abraham in the name of the Most High El, possessor of heaven and earth. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Jethro, officiated in like manner, built altars and offered sacrifices. Up to this time they may all have known and worshiped the Supreme, under this monosyllabic name. But at the close of the patriarchal age, the priestly office was restricted to Aaron and his descendants. Long prior to that period, the idolators had, in different countries, their simulated, counterfeit priests of the rival worship. Potiphera was priest of On—the name of a place corruptly derived, like other words of different nations, from El, to signify the Sun, and the object of worship in the Sun, as an Interposer by the radiation of light and heat. To the same purpose the Greeks called this place H-El-iopolis ; the city of the sun. A similar appropriation obtained in all the ancient languages. In Chaldee the object was signified by B-El, Baal, B-El-zebul. To be priest of On, was to be priest of the primitive idolatry of Satan under the designation of the true God falsely, applied and variously written Bel, Bil, Baal, Baalim, and incorporated with the names of places, persons and things. He had altars, priests, sacrifices, oracles. Arrogating this primeval name, he assumed to be god of this world, and to have the glorious orb of day, the fountain of light and heat, causing a supply of temporal blessings, for his dwelling-place, or shekinah. When material idols of him were made, and other objects deified, the plural of B-El, Baalim, was appropriated, and Elohim was used in place of El, and applied to human heroes, magistrates, etc., as well as to false objects of worship.

Referring to such perversion of terms by the children of Israel in their apostasy to idolatry, the Jehovah says : " They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not El ; they have provoked me to anger with their vanities." Deut. xxxii, 21. Whenever El and Elohim are used in Scripture as divine designations, they refer alike to one and the same person. " I am the Jehovah, thy Elohe, thou shalt have no other

Elohim before me." Ex. xx, 2. "Elohim said to Jacob, I am El-shadai." Gen. xxxv, 11.

This name El, primitive and cherished in the Hebrew, was transferred and largely prevalent in the Chaldee and Arabic languages and dialects, modified and variously applied. Many of the errors of the early, and of the later Israelites, are likely to have arisen from the pagan substitution and application of the plural, Elohim, to local and rival deifications: such as their notion that the true object of worship, the Jehovah, was a local, tutelary god of their nation, in rivalry with the local deities of other nations, and their various applications of the different names and titles, which all designate one and the same person. Moses seems to rebuke such diversity: "The Jehovah our Elohe is one Jehovah"—one self-existence.

That the names Jehovah and Elohim were not in use at first or among the Patriarchs (though employed in writing the retrospective history), and that they knew him by the name EL, is rendered probable by the instruction given to Moses respecting the Divine names to be announced to the Israelites in Egypt and to Pharoah, Exod. vi, 3, viz: "I am Jehovah—I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name El-shadai, but by my name Jehovah was I not known unto them." Apparently this name with Elohim for El, was now first appropriated and written in the current and in the retrospective history. In the preceding period, places of stated manifestation had been consecrated, altars erected, and worship offered to the El. When Abram came from Ur into Canaan to the place of Sichem, he pitched his tent at Beth-El—the house of or place consecrated to the El. Gen. xii, 8; xiii, 3. Jacob stopped for the night at Beth-El, the place where he had the vision of the ladder: the same locality afterward known as Sichem or Shechem, and Shiloh.

The Elohim directed Jacob to go and dwell at Beth-El, and to "make there an altar unto El, that appeared unto him." He obeyed, "and built there an altar, and called the place El-Beth-El, because there *the* Elohim appeared unto him; and Elohim said unto him, I am El-shadai." And after renewing

to him the promises before made to Abraham and Isaac, "Elohim went up from him, in the place where he talked with him." Ibid. xxxv, 1, 13.

This locality was long a station of theophanies, Divine revelations, sacrifice and worship. In the war with Benjamin, the children of Israel went up to Beth-El, the house of El, and asked counsel of Elohim. All the people came unto the house of El, wept and sat before the Jehovah, etc. Judges xx, 18, 27, and xxi, 2, 3; also Hosea, xii, 3-5. Psalm xc, 2; xix, 1; xxii, 1.

The retributive visitations for the act of Jeroboam, in placing an idolatrous calf in Beth-El, offering sacrifices to it and causing Israel to sin, are noted on several occasions. He substituted the worship of Satan, represented by the material idol, in place of the worship and service of the omniscient El.

Much more might be advanced to show that El was the primitive designation. Its occurrence in the Chaldee and other affiliated languages, and incorporation with the names of secular persons and places, might be largely traced. The form of the word as a monosyllable, would naturally precede its derived forms.

Some of the foregoing, and other considerations, might be advanced in favor of *Jah*, as a primeval name in conjunction with El.

The confusion of tongues and the dispersion, when nearly all the race had apostatised to idolatry, and the resumption and practice of their former usages, with their dialects and pronunciation deranged and confounded, naturally led to the diversity of forms and the misapplication of words which ensued. But the primary usurpation of the Divine names and misappropriation of them to the false objects of their rival system, preceded and led to the dispersion itself. B-El, was worshiped before a temple was erected for him.

It is greatly to be regretted that the translators of the Bible, sympathizing with heathen usage and with the degrading titles of human distinction in sacred books, rendered the Divine

names of the original text into worldly and vulgar terms, and confounded them with each other by substituting vernacular epithets of creatures, instead of literally transferring them. Their transfer would have been natural and easy, and as obvious as the customary transfer of the names of men and of places. But while they transfer the names of men and places, of Satan and his idols, they enervate and obscure the ineffable names of the Supreme, Eternal, Self-existent, by substituting human titles and epithets of quality. For *Jah* and *Jehovah*, we have the titular soubriquet *Lord*. For *Adon*, and *Adonai*, the same. For *Adonai Jehovah*, we have *Lord God*. *El*, *Elohe*, *Elohim*, are rendered *God*, an epithet derived from the Icelandic *godi*, chief magistrate. The translations into other languages, Greek, Latin, German, French, etc., are even less respectable. In the applications of these substitutes in the translation, there are many inconsistencies and anomalies: as at Joshua xxii, 22, *El*, *Elohim*, *Jehovah*, is rendered *the Lord God of gods*. Throughout Ezekiel, and often in Isaiah and elsewhere, for the name *Jehovah*, when preceded by *Adonai*, is substituted the word *God*. In ancient times the prince of Tyre, the emperors of Rome, and others, assumed this name and claimed the attributes signified by its use as a Divine designation.

The name *Elohim*. This plural form of the word *El*, was, when Moses wrote, in common use among idolators as a designation of the false objects of their worship. Their polytheistic appropriation of it became familiar to the children of Israel in their bondage, and was adopted by them. They degenerated, and to some extent concurred in the Egyptian image worship. When Moses at Sinai tarried on the mount, they called on Aaron to make them *Elohim* (translated *gods*), a representative image, an Egyptian idol, to preside over and go before them. He made the form required, a molten calf, built an altar before it, and offered burnt offerings thereon. And they said: "These be thy *Elohe (gods)* O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." Exod. xxxii.

They were inured to such confusion of true and false wor-



ship, and such accommodation and perversion of terms, which accounts for the use of it by Moses as denoting the same as El, the One Almighty, in immediate and perpetual contrast with the usage of idolators. In our English version the word Elohim, wherever it occurs as a Divine name, is rendered in the singular number ; but wherever it occurs as denoting false objects of worship, it is rendered a plural, *gods*. The profane appropriation of the name to idols, was to be corrected, and the minds of the Israelites reclaimed, by using it as a designation of the one Creator. It was therefore conspicuously employed by Moses at the commencement of his history. Throughout the first chapter of Genesis he designates the Creator of the heavens and the earth exclusively by the name Elohim. There is a noticeable progress in his introduction of the sacred names, as if to familiarize a new or unwonted application of them. In chap. first, and the first three verses of chap. second, he uses only the name Elohim, which occurs 35 times. From the fourth verse of the second to the end of the third chap., he employs the formula Jehovah Elohim 20 times, and Elohim four times ; in the fourth chap. the name Jehovah by itself ten times, and Elohim once ; chap. fifth and sixth, Jehovah separately, and Elohim also, but generally with the definite article prefixed. The article, as frequently elsewhere, is emphatic, apparently making the name suggestive of omnipresence and omniscience. Adonai is first introduced at Gen. xv, 2.

It is highly probable from the first chap. of John, and from its frequent occurrence in the Hebrew Text and in the Chaldee paraphrases, in a personal sense and reference, that *Deber*, *Word*, was from the beginning, in colloquial and familiar use as a designation of the Creator, Redeemer, etc : a designation obviously arising from his mode of exerting his power of creation and providence by vocal utterances. There was life and power in his Word, producing all overt and visible effects. The same Divine Person is designated by this appellative as by the names El, Elohim, Jehovah, etc.

The names Elohim and Elohe, occur in the Hebrew Text

about 3,000 times, less than half as many times as the name Jehovah. They are used in the same connections interchangeably with Jehovah; showing their identity of meaning and reference as personal denominatives. Wherever they occur as Divine designations, El, Elohim and Elohe, are alike used as a personal name in the singular number. The singular pronouns, I, thou, he, only, are connected with them. He appears visibly, interposes, speaks, is recognized and addressed uniformly as a person.

An abstract from Exod. iii, will illustrate several particulars. "When Melak Jehovah (the Jehovah as Messenger) appeared in a flame of fire in a bush, Moses turned aside to behold. And when Jehovah saw that he turned aside, Elohim called to him out of the midst of the bush, and said to him, I am the Elohe of thy fathers. And Moses was afraid to look upon the Elohim. And the Jehovah said, I have seen the affliction of my people, and I am come down to deliver them. And Moses said unto the Elohim, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The Elohe of your fathers hath sent me unto you, and they shall say to me, what is his name? what shall I say unto them? And Elohim said unto Moses, I AM that I AM (the Existing, Eternal, Almighty). And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you; and thus shalt thou say, The Jehovah Elohe of your fathers hath sent me unto you."

Elohim as the name of one person, and of the same person as the names with which it is interchanged, is discriminate and clear. The use of the article in some instances implies, as elsewhere, a more special reference to his nature, or to his attributes of omnipresence or omniscience. The names Jehovah and Melak Jehovah, relate to the same person in his aspect as Redeemer, the Jehovah our righteousness, the Messenger of the covenant. That the names Elohim and Jehovah were new to the Israelites, in the special application made of them as designations by Moses, is strongly suggested by his inquiry as to what name he should announce, and by

the answer, introduced as it is by the assertion of his self-existence and his personality, by the Divine Speaker. He at once arrested and fixed attention, and rebuked the application of these names to idols, false objects of homage, by the startling and sublime assertion of his Being, his self-existence as a Person, the living, the acting One, who is, who was, who is to be. I exist : I am : besides me there is no other : henceforth I am to be known, and worshiped, as *the Jehovah*, the Elohe of your fathers.

Fearing that the people would not believe his message to them, Moses was empowered to convince them by a succession of miracles, that it was Jehovah, the Elohe of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, who appeared to him : and they believed. When he and Aaron went to Pharoah, they said : " Thus saith Jehovah the Elohe of Israel, Let my people go. And Pharoah said, Who is the Jehovah, that I should obey his voice to let Israel go ? I know not the Jehovah, neither will I let Israel go. And they said, the Elohe of the Hebrews hath met with us ; let us go and sacrifice to the Jehovah our Elohe." Exod. v. Pharoah refuses ; and Elohim said unto Moses : " I am Jehovah, and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name *El-shadai*, but by my name Jehovah, was I not known to them." Exod. vi, 2, 3. After referring to the covenant which he, the El, had made with them to give them the land of Canaan, and to the present bondage of the people, he adds : " I will take you to me for a people, and I will be Elohim unto you, and ye shall know that I am Jehovah your Elohe."

Such prolonged embarrassment and difficulty had Moses on introducing the name Jehovah, and fixing in the minds of the Israelites the name Elohim. They were without any written revelations, and had in their bondage become ignorant. Pharaoh knew not who was referred to by the name Jehovah, and probably supposed that the name Elohim referred only to idol gods like those of Egypt. The succession of plagues inflicted on him and his kingdom, and on the false Elohim of Egypt, scarcely convinced him. The scene was that of a pitched

battle of Satan and his agents, the magicians, soothsayers and devotees, for maintaining his empire against the Jehovah.

Such desperate contests occurred frequently: as in the time of Elijah, when the question whether *the* Elohim or *the* Baal, was supreme, was determined by supernatural fire consuming the sacrifice on the altar.

The prophet Isaiah repeatedly records the asseveration, in opposition to Baal and his idols, that the El, the Elohim, the Eloe, is the Jehovah, the Creator. "Thus saith the El, the Jehovah, he that created the heavens." "Before me there was no El—I, even I am the Jehovah. Ye are my witnesses saith the Jehovah, that I am El. I am the Jehovah, your Holy One, the Creator of Israel, your King. Besides me there is no Elohim. I am the Jehovah and there is no Elohim besides me, a just El, and a Saviour." He contrasts their stupidity in making and bowing down to dumb idols, with the worship of the El, the Elohim.

The names *Jah* and *Jehovah*. These names, or at least the latter of them, would plainly seem to have been first employed by Moses, and to have been gradually familiarized, in conjunction with Elohim, to qualify the appropriation of the latter to the true object of religious homage. In the first and second chapters of Exodus, the name Elohim, only, occurs. In the third chapter, when the *Messenger* Jehovah first appeared to him and sent him to promise deliverance to the children of Israel, Moses inquired by what name he should announce him. He replied, *I am* that *I am*: and he said, Thus shalt thou say, *I am* hath sent me unto you. These words may perhaps with greater consistency be rendered *the living Jah*; the Jah who is and shall be, imparting eternal independent existence. See Rev. i, 8. *Jah* first occurs separately, in Moses' song of triumph, where El is also used, Exod. xv. Elsewhere it appears more than fifty times, generally in ascriptions of praise; occasionally in the formula of Jah, Jehovah. The name Jehovah comprehensively designates the Second Person of the Trinity, in the aspect of the overt actor, and efficient agent in all the works of creation, provi-

dence and grace—of revealer, teacher, guide, lawgiver, ruler, redeemer, keeper and fulfiller of the everlasting covenant—exercising his infinite attributes in finite relations—appearing personally under the conditions of time and place, in a visible form, meeting the weaknesses and wants of men, instructing, defending, protecting them: in a word, acting mediatorally throughout the ancient—as well as the present dispensation, exemplifying, in subordination to the economy prescribed in the covenant, the offices of prophet, priest and king.

In his nature as Divine he was personally the same, before and after he assumed the human nature. From the first, as an essential step in the progress of his work, his incarnation was predicted, typified and realized to the faith of his people. They were all of one body, redeemed by his expiatory sufferings in their stead, justified by his righteousness imputed unto them through faith.

His relations to the First Person, as being officially subordinate to him, his image and representative for the execution of all external works provided for in the covenant, are abundantly elucidated in the New Testament. "The mystery of God and [even] of the Father, and of the Christ," was explained to the Gentiles. The First Person, when the time arrived for the incarnation of the Jehovah Second Person, prepared for him a body (Heb. x, 5), the seed of the woman, with reference to which he was called his son. The typical sacrifices and offerings were no longer desired. Then the Jehovah, in the character of Messiah, said: "Lo, I come: in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will, O my Elohe, yea, thy law is within my heart."

It is not sufficiently noticed that the Jehovah, in the progress of the ancient dispensation, when predicting the future of his work as the Messiah incarnate, personates himself in that aspect: speaks to and of himself: speaks by anticipation of his humiliation and of his atoning death as fulfilling the typical sacrifices, and in support of the faith of his people. His appearing literally in human nature was the great lesson of the typical system, and his subsequent agency was to jus-

tify and consummate their hopes. His incarnation was the central event, then looked for as essential to their hope of deliverance, as it is to us, retrospectively regarded as past. He anointed and constituted David and others officially as types of his future self. When he said of David, that his soul was not left in sheol, and that his flesh should not see corruption, it was of the Messiah, whom David typified, that he spoke. Psalm xvi, 10; Acts ii, 27: xiii, 35. Elsewhere he speaks of the official types as representing his future self. As Jehovah he predicts his coming incarnate as being proclaimed by a voice in the wilderness: which was fulfilled by John the Baptist.

Nor is it sufficiently considered, that all the Divine acts recorded in the Scriptures are distinctively personal acts, and are referable or expressly ascribed to one or other of the three Persons by name. This is as manifest as language can make it; as evident as that there is a distinction of Persons, and that, with reference to the dependant universe, they act on a plan which prescribes and fore-ordains whatsoever comes to pass. If we conceive of the creation of the heavens and earth and all that in them is, as resulting from the prior counsels and mutual covenant of the three coëqual Persons subsisting in the one nature and essence, we must contemplate them respectively, as possessing the attributes of personality and acting distinctively as Persons: as comprehending with the infinite all possible finite entities, conditions and relations; as able to constitute and act in a conditioned, dependant, finite sphere, and give existence to whatever creatures they willed and fore-ordained to be. Nothing finite, then, actually existed. Time and succession were not. Duration was the ever-present.

The creation and government of a finite universe, was a condescension of the Infinite unconditioned, to the finite and conditioned. Out of all varieties and degrees possible in the natures, qualities and endowments of creatures, a selection was to be made and determined on beforehand. Hence the mutual agreement of the three coëternal and coëqual Per-

sons subsisting in unity in one nature, concerning the relations they should sustain toward each other in the execution of the works preordained ; the numerical order in which they were to be named and regarded ; the special departments of agency to be assumed and executed by each, harmoniously with those of the others : and all the details of what was to be accomplished.

Being eternally coequal, and remaining eternally so aside from the provisions and results of this covenant and their agency toward creatures, an economy personally, in respect to the precedence of one and the subordination of the others, was requisite : the First, ever invisible to mortals, to be the fountain of authority, the rectoral head and representative of the Triunity : the Second to be subordinate to the First, executor of his will, his representative, legate, messenger, in all overt and visible works, interpositions and manifestations in the sphere of finite existence, creation, providence, revelation, redemption : the Third to be subordinate both to the First and Second, acting invisibly throughout the sphere of moral agency, and designated (about four score times) simply as the Spirit—the Holy Spirit—author of sanctification, illumination, inspiration.

The Second Person, by the names Jehovah, Elohim, Adonai, and various other names and titles, as used separately, conjointly and interchangeably, is revealed in the Scriptures as the Divine agent, actor and revealer in all overt and visible works and manifestations, from the beginning to the end—the Alpha and Omega, to whom every knee shall bow and every tongue confess : yet subordinately to the First Person, immediately representing him, speaking his words, doing his will in all things, revealing the infinite in finite relations, the invisible in visible works and effects. He represents him as his visible image, reflecting the brightness of his glory, and, as the Messiah incarnate, addresses him as his Father.

That such was the faith of the ancient church need not be studiously argued. It is implied in the nature and purport of their worship, their sacrifices, confessions, prayers, thanksgiv-



ings, praises, which alike pre-supposed Divine mediation, substitution, imputation, intercession. That their prayers and their entire system of worship was authorized and founded on the present active and effective mediation of a third party uniting the infinite and the finite, is as plain as that the terms employed in describing it have any intelligible significance. They erected altars, shed and offered the blood of innocent victims, prayed, gave thanks, directly to the Jehovah, to express their faith in him as Mediator, standing between them and the invisible First Person as the medium of pardon, reconciliation and access to his throne; and as Messiah, in due time to fulfill and supersede the types by offering himself an expiatory sacrifice—the Lamb virtually slain from the foundation of the world.

The principles of this system as first principles of the oracles of God—were orally taught, adequately understood, and efficaciously believed by the succession of true worshipers. They were visibly represented in the form and furniture of the Tabernacle, and acted out in its routine of services.

Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, treats of this as the ancient faith, which was to be revived and renewed in the minds of those who had lost it through unbelief. The Jewish people in their apostasy to idolatry before the Babylonish exile, rejected it, and adopted pagan sentiments and beliefs. They came to regard the Jehovah simply as their peculiar national protector, their local tutelary deity, in common with the heathen gods of surrounding nations whom they feared, desired to conciliate, loved for their indulgences, and worshipped. They no longer regarded the Jehovah as self-existent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, in distinction from other gods; yet deemed him to be bound by covenants to protect them as a nation, so long as they formally observed the external rites and ceremonies prescribed. "They worshipped all the host of heaven, and served Baal," 2 Kings, xvii. They provoked the Holy One of Israel to anger, desecrated his temple, and filled it with idols and abominations, trusting to the false prophets, who insisted that, as the national God, he was

bound to protect them, and would not suffer the temple to be destroyed and the nation exiled.

When their delusion was dissipated by their captivity and subjection to the tyranny of idolators, conscious that they had insulted and forsaken the Jehovah and were forsaken by him, they utterly cast him off and forbade the pronounciation of his name; and with him they repudiated all false gods, and fell back upon monotheism,—the idea of an abstract, absolute Supreme Being, existing as a unity; claimed him as their God, and construed their scriptures accordingly. Of course they rejected all ideas of the one mediator of the revealed system, and the many creature mediators of idolatry and polytheism. For nothing is more palpable than that the whole theory of idolatry—a perversion of the scripture doctrine of mediation by one divine mediator—is a theory of creature mediation and of innumerable creature mediators, imaginary beings, male and female, fabulous celebrities, departed heroes, whatever could be idolized as having intelligence or exerting power: in which respect it is copied by popery.

The predictions of the Jehovah becoming incarnate as the promised Seed, the Messiah, the atoning Saviour, they in their unbelief, perverted and suppressed. They expected a Messiah only as a human chief and deliverer of their nation. Those who returned from Babylon, (with the exception of a small remnant, always preserved and perpetuated,) returned with these notions and beliefs—not as penitents. They were not reformed—they did not reform. Prophets were raised up who remonstrated with and labored to reclaim them; but they grew worse, and soon were wholly left to themselves in their deism and unbelief. They had broken their covenant with the Holy One of Israel, and were left under his ordinary providence like the heathen nations. In this state of fixed and obstinate unbelief, they continued down to the advent of the Messiah, when they rejected and condemned him to death, because he claimed to be the Divine Messiah described and predicted throughout all their Scriptures. The unbelieving part of the nation, vanquished and dispersed among all

nations, have, with one consent, approved the sentence of condemnation, and persisted in the same unbelief to the present day, clinging to the dogma of an absolute unity, and scornfully rejecting the idea of a personal Divine Mediator, and of their needing any mediation.

It must be observed that the names Jehovah and Elohim are customarily employed, as well as other names and official titles, to designate the Second Person, in the works which he executes as representative of the First; who, remaining ever invisible in the finite sphere, prescribes and sanctions them, being ultimately united to him in the same essence and will<sup>1</sup> and acknowledged as the fountain of authority. This was so essential, and so familiarly understood by the faithful under the ancient dispensation, that the First Person is rarely alluded to distinctively in the Hebrew Scriptures. In seeing the Second Person, in his visible appearances and characteristic works, they saw the First; as was plainly taught by the Second when incarnate and endeavoring to revive and reestablish the ancient faith, by explaining the relations and the distinctive agencies of the Three Persons. The Jews, in general, were deeply imbued with the monotheistic theory, the traditions, perversions, cabalistic constructions and blind unbelief which had long prevailed. "Philip saith unto him, Lord—(Jehovah) shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus, saith unto him, have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father, that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very works sake," John xiv, 8–11. "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me. But ye believe not," Ibid, x, 25. "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me. I am one that bear witness of myself; and the Father that sent me beareth witness of me; if ye had known me, ye should have known my

Father also." "I speak to the world those things which I have heard of him.—He that sent me is with me; the Father hath not left me alone.—I came forth from God; neither came I of myself, but he sent me.—It is my Father that honoreth me, of whom ye say that he is your God. Yet ye have not known him; but I know him. Before Abraham was, I am," chap. viii. "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father," vi, 46.—"I came forth from the Father and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father," xvi, 29. And so throughout this, latest of the Gospels, which treats mainly of this theme.

How far their false theory concerning the absolute unity, a divine mediator, and all mediation, was adopted by Gentiles; by Arians, Sabellians, Marcionites, and other heretics near the close and after the Apostolic age; and how far their teachings, mixed with oriental philosophy, Gnosticism, Platonism, and the like, have influenced and modified the theology, literature and criticism of succeeding ages, and furnished materials for the modern theories of naturalism, neology, and rationalistic infidelity, let others decide.

When the advent of the Jehovah took place, the lineage of the human nature, which, as the promised seed of the woman, he was to take into union with his preëxisting person, to become incarnate, fulfill the types and predictions, and accomplish his sacerdotal work as Messiah, was traced back through David, Abraham, Noah, Enoch and Seth, to Adam. As the great High Priest, he was in this respect shown to be qualified to supersede all the intermediate priests and other officials, as priest, prophet and king of his people forever. The Jehovah, even the Messenger of the covenant, came as he had predicted of himself by Malachi and the preceding prophets; and was hailed at his incarnation as Immanu-El, i. e., as El, or Elohim, with us. The holy offspring was called the Son of the Highest; the anointed one, or Messiah; Jesus the Saviour; the Son of man. He was to ascend the throne typified by the throne of David. Of his reign and kingdom there was to be no end.

In Greek, *Kurios* is used in place of and as equivalent to the Hebrew name Jehovah ; and like that, is translated *Lord* in our English version. El, Elohim, Elohe, are, in Greek, *Theos*, in English, *God*. Mary said, My soul doth magnify the Jehovah, and my spirit hath rejoiced in Elohim my Saviour. The Angel said to the Shepherds, Unto you is born this day a Saviour, which is Christ—(the anointed, or Messiah) the Jehovah. Simeon waited for the consolation of Israel, assured that he should not see death before he had seen the Messiah Jehovah. Anna gave thanks to the Jehovah, and spake of him to all those that looked for redemption in Jerusalem. John the Baptist cried, Prepare ye the way of the Jehovah ; all flesh shall see the salvation of our Elohe.

In the progress of his work, he fulfilled all the predictions of him as Messiah. In the beginning, he was denominated the Word ; he was with God the First Person invisible ; he was God the Second Person, in the relations requisite for his official work. By him all things were made. In him was life. He was in the world, and the world knew him not. He became incarnate and dwelt among men, and they beheld his glory, as he appeared incarnate, the only begotten Son of the Father. As such the *same person* again ascended up to heaven and sat on the right hand of God the Father. "He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens that he might fill all things," Eph. iv, 10.

On this view, it is not strange that, in the Old Testament, the First Person being known, and acknowledged in his representative, is very rarely alluded to by name, and only by the names Jehovah and Elohim. Such references do not occur in the writings of Moses and the Prophets, but only in the Psalms, in passages predictive of the person and work of the Jehovah incarnate, when it was necessary to distinguish the First Person from the Second. Thus in Psalm xlv, quoted Heb. 1: "Thy throne, O Elohim (the Second Person), is forever and ever;" also Psalm, ii, spoken by the Second Person as Messiah, of events at and after his incarnation. "I will declare the decree: Jehovah (the First Person) hath said

unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," Psalm cx, 4. "*Jehovah* (the First Person) said unto my (David's) Adonai, sit thou at my right hand," etc. These distinctive personal references are very rare; and even in the New Testament, apparently the First Person as the Father, ever invisible, never speaks audibly to men, but only to the *Jehovah* incarnate as Messiah, his beloved Son; as at his baptism, and at his transfiguration.

The name *Adon*, *Adonai*, is translated by titles of human respect, as *Master*, *Lord*. In the first form it occurs chiefly in application to men; in the second, to the Divine Being when reverently and submissively addressed. This use of the name or title occurs in the earlier books, but most frequently in the Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and later prophets; in all more than 400 times. As a Divine designation it is often used singly; but more commonly it is conjoined with and precedes the name *Jehovah*, and is translated uniformly, as in Ezekiel, *Lord God*.

This appellative, especially in the earlier occurrence of it, as a Divine designation, was used when the *Jehovah* was present, visibly in the similitude of man, as the Word, and the Melak. "The *Jehovah* appeared unto Abraham" in the visible form of man, attended by the angels, just prior to the destruction of Sodom. In the colloquy which followed, *Jehovah* speaks to Abraham, and is addressed by him with reverence and awe, as *Adonai*: "Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Adonai, which am but dust and ashes:" and the like in his successive petitions, Gen. xviii. So also, Gen. xv, 3, when the *Jehovah* was present as the Deber (Word). Abraham addresses him as Adonai *Jehovah*. See, also, Exod. iv, 10, and Joshua v, 14. To Gideon he visibly appeared as Melak *Jehovah*, and is addressed as Adonai, Judges vi, 13-15. In like manner he appeared to Manoah, who "entreated the *Jehovah* and said, O Adonai."

The association of this name with the local appearances and the Person of the *Jehovah*, condescending to, instructing, and hearing the requests of men, and familiarly acting in

their social relations, yet disclosing in connection with his appearances, omniscience, omnipotence and other attributes of Jehovah, may be traced throughout the Hebrew text, as literal or implied, in the instances, generally, in which it occurs. It appears in some of his more public theophanies, as in that recorded Isaiah vi; where the Adonai is seated upon a throne, v. 1: speaks v. 8: is addressed v. 11: and at v. 5 is declared to be the King, the Jehovah of Hosts: and in that described by Ezekiel chap, viii, when "the hand of the Adonai fell upon him."

So familiar was the aspect of Jehovah, signified by the name Adonai, as the refuge, the hearer of prayer, the deliverer of his people, that the psalmists, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, constantly reiterate it. Psalm, xxxv, 17-22; xxxviii, 9, 15, 22; xl, 17; l, 15; lxvi, 18, 20, etc. We may well regard this name as signifying the same as our word Mediator—the Jehovah acting in a special aspect and relation; Adonai, the Mediator; Adonai Jehovah, the mediating Jehovah, or Jehovah the Mediator; like the phrase, Jehovah the Redeemer. The Psalmists, in the extreme personal trials and dangers to which they allude, and the prophets, overwhelmed by public calamities and perils, and by the encroachments and abominations of idolatry, were led to appeal constantly to the Jehovah, in his aspect and relations as Mediator between them and the invisible One.

*Deber, (Logos, Word).* We have already alluded to the use of this term as an appellative resulting from the act of enunciation—conveying intelligence and power by the vocal utterance of words as the instrument of executive agency; the sign and expression of the act, appropriated to designate the agent. When thus employed as a Divine designation, it denotes absolute authority and efficiency. He who executes his will overtly in acts by means of his vocal utterances, is called THE WORD. "By the Deber Jehovah were the heavens made. He spake and it was done," Ps. xxxiii, 6, 9.

Our translators, imitating the example of earlier versions, seem not to have discovered that the personal WORD, who



made the world, who was in it and pervaded it with his presence, was so much as once mentioned by this distinctive name, in the Hebrew text. An oblivious confusion of grammar and sense, second only to that relating to Melak—conceals its personal meaning and reference, as a designation. That it was in this sense appropriated and familiarly used in Eden and afterward, is rendered probable by the first chapter of John. In the Heb. text it occurs, as a personal appellation of Jehovah, 130 times or more, in the Pentateuch, the historical books, the Psalms and the prophets; generally in the phrase, Deber Jehovah came, *saying*, or *to say*: as Gen. xv, 1-3, Deber Jehovah came unto Abram, saying; and elsewhere to Samuel, to Nathan, to Elijah, to David, to Isaiah, etc. Sometimes the phrase varies, as at 1 Kings, xiii, 17. In general the grammar and sense of the passages determine the personal reference.

The familiar oral use of this significant title from the beginning, is demonstrated by the Chaldee paraphrases, which originated with Ezra on the return from Babylon, and were at length reduced to writing—the more ancient of them in the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan. The Jews with few exceptions, while in captivity, lost their knowledge of Hebrew and of the teachings of their Scriptures. Ezra and certain Levites attempted to instruct them and to revive the ancient faith, by publicly reading the roll of Scripture in Hebrew, and expounding it in Chaldee, adding such explanatory words as were then necessary to their understanding. These oral translations were handed down among the believing remnant, till they were reduced to writing. In these writings the Chaldee term *Memra* is used in place of the Hebrew *Deber*, and placed before the name Jehovah where Deber is not, as well as where it is, written in the Hebrew text, and often inserting it in place of the name Jehovah. According to them, Messiah—the Word—created the World, administered providence, appeared to Abraham and others, gave the law, etc.; as if to understand his character, as indicated by this term,

was part of the ancient faith and essential to their understanding and belief.

*Melak.\** This term originally signifies *Messenger*, one *sent*.\* But it involves the idea of likeness, comparison. As a Divine designation it imports the visible appearance of Jehovah as Messenger—the Messenger Jehovah. See its elements in *Lak*, to send a messenger; caph, *K*, likeness; and *mela*, fullness, universality of presence; expressing, as combined, the visible appearance of the omniscient, omnipresent Jehovah, in distinction from his invisible agency, and from his overt executive agency as Deber.

Like other primitive Divine names, it came to be applied to creatures, human and angelic. Where applied to ordinary men when sent with messages, it is correctly rendered, in our version, messenger; but when it is employed to designate officials, prophets, ministers of religion sent with messages, it is tropically used to signify their nature, and translated angels. When employed to denote angelic beings sometimes sent to this world on errands with messages, this word is heedlessly translated angel, as a name for all unknown, invisible and spiritual creatures.

This may be ascribed to the influence on the translators of the oriental theories and fancies concerning angels, adopted by the Jews while in Babylon, reconciled with their monotheism on their return, and propagated by Cabalists, Talmudists, Rabbins, Gnostics, and Judaizing teachers; and to the superstitious confidence reposed by Gentiles in learned Jews as guides in regard to the meaning of the Hebrew language. It had the effect of a blind, concealing a prominent title of the Jehovah.

*Melak*, which in the Hebrew text is employed to designate men and angelic creatures about 120 times, occurs as a Divine

\* In the present and succeeding instances, we follow the simple orthography of the Hebrew Text, in place of the appendages of a Jewish sect 1200 years after the Hebrew ceased to be a living language, and when the true pronunciation was irrecoverably lost; appendages designed by learned Scribes for sectarian purposes, at least so far as the names and doctrines of the ancient faith were concerned.

designation about 90, and is identified with the Jehovah in his official relation as *sent*. Thus Melak Jehovah met Hagar in the wilderness with a timely message, Gen. xvi; and again chap. xxi, 17. Melak Jehovah called to Abraham in an extreme emergency, chap. xxii, 11, 15. The Melak Jehovah appeared to Moses in a flame of fire in a bush, with a message to the children of Israel, Exod. iii, 2; Melak, the Elohim who went before the camp of Israel, Exod. xiv, 19, appeared and delivered messages to Balaam, Numb. xxii, came up from Gilgal to Bochim, with special messages, Judges ii, 1. In like manner he appeared to Gideon, Judges, vi, 11, etc., and to Manoah chap. xiii, where he is called Melak Jehovah, and a man of the Elohim, and addressed as Adonai, and as Jehovah. His appearances generally indicate some great exigency, as when he came to Elijah; when he destroyed Sennacherib's army; and when David numbered Israel. It is everywhere translated angel, meaning a created angelic spirit, except in one instance, (Malachi,) where it is rendered, the *Messenger* of the covenant. But the text ascribes to the Melak the same Divine attributes and works as to the Jehovah, employs the term as a designation of Jehovah and Elohim, and uses it interchangeably with those names. The making of the name Jehovah a genitive, and translating Melak Jehovah, the *angel of the Lord*, is as manifest a violation of grammar as of sense, and can not be accounted for but by supposing that Melak was regarded as a creature. On any other supposition there would be no more propriety in this rendering, than in rendering Jehovah Elohim, the Lord of God, or Adonai Jehovah, the Lord of the Lord.

Melak designates the Second Person in one form of manifestation, in the execution of the mediatorial work pursuant to the primeval covenant. The various names and titles by which he is designated in the progress of that work, are employed from time to time to distinguish him in the different aspects and relations in which he appeared on different occasions and in different parts of his agency. The names Elohim and Jehovah refer to the essential nature of the Divine Being

as self-existent and almighty, and to his agency as Creator, Lawgiver, and Administrator of providence and grace; the name Adonai, more especially to his mediative work as the present, sympathising, and ever-ready hearer and answerer of prayer; Deber, to the efficient exertion of his power, and execution of his will in all overt acts, by his vocal utterance of words: Melak, to his official agency as the Messenger of the covenant, appearing on special occasions in the visible similitude of man.

**GAEL, Redeemer.** This term is employed as a designation of the Jehovah in his aspect and office as Redeemer, more than a score of times, and is often connected with the names Jehovah and Elohim. "For I know that my Redeemer liveth," Job, xix. "O Jehovah my strength and my Redeemer," Ps. xix, 14.—See also Isaiah, xli, 14, xliii, 14; xlv, 6; xlix, 26; liv, 5; lix, 20. Its import is plain, apart from the typical references of the *kinsman*, the *avenger*, etc., and of temporal deliverances; and aside from various other terms of like significance, as *Peda*, redeem, redeemed, etc.: *Pelath*, deliver, delivered, etc.

**Eso, Saviour,** (Eso, Esous, Jesus,) designates the Jehovah in the aspect of the Saviour of men. As applied to him when he became incarnate, it is rendered *Jesus*—Jehovah Jesus the Messiah. It repeatedly occurs as a name or title; and in different forms, 150 times or more, as signifying his salvation. "I the Jehovah am thy *Saviour* and thy Redeemer, the mighty one of Jacob," Isa. xlix, 26; see also Isa. xliii, 3; xlv, 15; lx, 16. Ps. xxv, 5; xxvii, 1.

**MESEA, anointed, Christ**—the Jehovah predicted as incarnate. Kings and Rulers "take counsel together against the Jehovah even against his [person as] anointed," Ps. ii, 2. "Behold O Elohim our shield, and look upon the face of thine anointed," Ps. lxxiv, 9. "The Spirit of the Adonai Jehovah is upon me [the Messiah], because the Jehovah hath anointed me to preach good tidings," Isa. lxi, 1. We omit extended illustrations.

**MELAK, King,** referring to his mediatorial office in that re-

spect, and nearly resembling *Melak*, messenger. "The Jehovah your Elohe was your King," 1 Sam. xii, 12. "The Jehovah is King forever and ever," Ps. x, 16. "I have seen the King the Jehovah of Hosts," Isa. vi, 5—(the Christ, John, xii, 41,) see Ps. lxxxix, 18; cxlv, 1; Isa. xliii, 15; Jer. x, 10; xlviii, 15; Zach. ix, 9.

MEGEN, *shield*; interposer for defense, protection, deliverance. This expressive epithet is of frequent occurrence. "The Jehovah is my Rock, and my Fortress, and my Deliverer . . . he is my *Shield* . . . my Refuge, my Saviour," 2 Sam. xxii, 3. See Gen. xv, 1; Ps. xxviii, 7; xxxiii, 20; lxxxiv, 9; cxv, 9, 10.

KEDOOS, *Holy, Pure*, the *Holy One*, as a designation of the Intervener, Redeemer, Saviour, occurs often, especially in Isaiah. "I will help thee, saith the Jehovah thy Redeemer, the *Holy One* of Israel—I am the Jehovah thy Elohe, the *Holy One* of Israel, thy Saviour," Isa. xli, 14 and xliii, 3.

SEM, *Name*; as a Divine designation denotes comprehensively the Being, Person, Attributes, Authority, Presence, of Jehovah as addressed or manifested in some special relation, as that of being invoked, hearing prayer, and the like. It often occurs with a personal sense and reference, as at Isa. xviii, 7; Ps. lxxv, 1; cix, 21; cxviii, 26. *Melak* was the Jehovah in the aspect of Messenger; *Name*, in the aspect of being stationary.

SHELO, and TZOOR, the or my *Rock*; denoting fixedness, immutability, a metaphor for refuge, defense, safety; often applied to the Jehovah as Redeemer and Saviour. "The Jehovah is my Rock," Ps. xviii, 2; xxxi, 46; also xxviii, 1; xlii, 9; lxxvii, 35; xciv, 22.

PENA, in its various forms as PENE, PENUM, *face, countenance*, turned toward any one, often refers to the Jehovah in that posture and aspect of his Presence. In this sense it occurs 2000 or more times, and in all the Hebrew Books, except Ruth and Obadiah. It signifies the presence of the Jehovah manifested to the eye, or realized to the soul, Ps. cii, 2.

AESH, a *man*; often used to signify the visible appearance

of the Jehovah in the similitude of man, foreshowing his Person when incarnate as the Second Adam. "There walked a man with Jacob—Jacob said I have seen Elohim face to face," Gen. xxxii, 24, 30, and Josh. v, 13. Gen. xviii, 2, 3. Judges xiii, 11. Exod. xxiv, 10. Ezekiel, xliii.

But we must omit further details; leaving numerous designations, titles, and terms metaphorically used, to denote the person, offices, particular attributes, modes of interposition and manifestation, and the efficient and ceaseless agency of the Jehovah toward his people in the progress of his mediative work: such as Creator; Maker; Ruler; Keeper; Lawgiver; Judge; Shilo; Light; Majesty; Glory; King of Glory; Immanuel; Oracle, (shekinah); Branch; Root; Priest; Prophet; Teacher; Prince of Peace; David (as typified); Servant; Righteousness; Praise; Justifier; Arm; Hand; Right hand; Covenant; Elect; Wisdom; Counsellor; Physician; Buckler; Fortress; High tower; Strength; Refuge; Trust; Rest; Hiding place; Covert; Mercy; Ark; Lamb; Passover; Propitiation; Helper; Fear; Beloved; Hearer and Answerer of Prayer; Witness; Most High; Exalted; Excellent; Almighty; Leader; Jacob, i. e. Prevailer; Israel, i. e. Salvation of Jehovah; Husband; Shepherd; Preserver; Deliverer; Fountain; Horn; Stone; Foundation; Sun; Star; First and Last: and many others.

Several of these terms occur but rarely in the text; but their being written at all, is sufficient evidence that they were colloquially in use among the true worshipers. The names, titles and acts of the Jehovah, were the chief subject of instruction and meditation, and intimately associated with all the religious rites, observances and hopes, and with the secular relations and duties, of that dispensation. It was peculiarly a dispensation of teaching by visible manifestations and acts, visible objects, comparisous, contrasts. The Jehovah himself was the Teacher, appearing locally and visibly in person, speaking audibly, and by the mouth of prophets, and adopting titles and objects of comparison, suited to distinguish his various attributes, offices, acts and relations. There was a

mass of revealed, accurate, and practical knowledge pervading the ancient church as well before as after the time of Moses. Their system of worship by sacrifices, their typology and their ritual services, from their very nature, required a constant recognition and repetition of the Divine names and designations.

From age to age, the succession of individuals and their families, isolated, without writing, surrounded by unbelieving scoffers, idolators and persecutors, were shut up to the revealed system with its rites, types and ordinances, and must have been directly taught from above, and had the names and titles of their Divine Leader, continually on their lips. To suppose the contrary, is like supposing that the churches of Christendom could exist and be perpetuated were the Bible wholly suppressed, and with it, all preaching and ordinances. Even after the mission of Moses, and the institution of the law, and of Levitical priests, prophets and synagogues, how few of the common people possessed the rolls of Scriptures, or did not get their religious knowledge daily in immediate connection with the practice of their religious rites. At Patriarchal altars, and in the Tabernacle and Temple, the Jehovah was personally present, presided over the services, interposed by his voice from the oracle, and was consulted by Urim and Thummim.

Considering that the Divine names and titles in the Hebrew Text, are strictly personal designations, and identify one Divine Person in different aspects, indicating different attributes, acts, affections, forms of manifestation and agency, we may, in view of the meager sketch above given, conceive the meaning of Jehovah Jesus, when he directed the faithless Jews to search the Scriptures as testifying of him, and saying that he was before Abraham—that Moses wrote of him—that he was the subject of the writings of Moses, the prophets, and the psalmists: and sanctioning collectively all parts, and every jot and tittle of the Scriptures, as his word.

No man hath seen the Absolute unconditioned essence. No man hath ever seen God the First Person. But the Second



Person, the Jehovah, under various names and designations, was literally seen as a person. His personal presence was demonstrably manifest, his voice heard, and his prerogatives overtly exercised in Eden, and from time to time under the ancient dispensation, as really as after he became incarnate. He was the Revealer and Teacher. All that was ever known to man of the Creator and of invisible things was made known by him, by his visible appearance, by his audible voice, and by his inspiration of words. The invisible things relating to him from the creation of the world, even his eternal power and godhead, were seen and understood by the things which *he did*. "Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen."

From the date of the apostasy he began effectually to teach, renew, justify and save individuals of the church chosen unto salvation in him before the foundation of the world, of whom he ever after rescued and maintained a continuous succession. The names, acts, triumphs of faith, and victorious death, of a few of these, down to the period of Moses, are set forth, Heb. 11, as examples for our imitation; with allusion to others—"of whom the world was not worthy"—of like faith, founded solely on the teachings of Jehovah in person and by inspiration; instead of being founded on the teachings of polytheism in heathen classics, monotheism by apostate Jews, Talmudists and Rabbins; or neology, deism and infidelity by philosophy, natural science and nature.

Some may be slow to realize that, under a dispensation which they have been led to suppose was adapted not to the nature and necessities of man, as such, but to the condition of an ignorant and obstinate people, destitute of science, and for a long period without a written language, a Divine revelation should have contained such diverse methods and forms of instruction, so many various names, designations, recognitions of, and allusions to, the One Creator, Disposer, Redeemer and Saviour, as have been referred to. But let it be considered that from the beginning the separated people, in order to justification, acceptance, and salvation, needed as accurate and

particular instruction as any class of men at the present time ; not to say that the methods adopted by Infinite Wisdom were the only ones by which they could be effectually instructed. The process of recovery and salvation is one and the same at all times ; and men are as dependant on revelation at one time as at any other. Man is everywhere and at all times the same fallen, guilty, lost creature, and the means of his recovery and salvation are the same to all.

But we may allude to a reason for such forms and variety of instruction concerning the Jehovah and spiritual subjects, in the very nature and condition of created, finite, dependent moral agents—the absolute necessity, that the names, qualities and relations of all such objects should be presented in immediate CONTRAST with their opposites, to evoke the judgments and decisions, the emotions and affections, of the intellectual and moral agent. Man comes into the world wholly devoid of knowledge ; but with capacities and faculties for perceiving, discriminating, and appropriating instruction presented from without, by the internal, mental and moral faculty of *Intuition*, and by the external faculties of seeing, hearing, etc. Of these, the faculty of intuitional perception is the most important, as being liable to no mistake from physical organization or outward circumstances, like the eye, and surviving the dissolution of the physical structure.

The faculty of intuition is the internal eye of the mind. Intuitions are the judgments and decisions of the mind, which result spontaneously and necessarily from the seeing things in contrast. When the opposite, diverse, contrasted, antitheses of natural, intellectual, moral or spiritual natures, objects, attributes, qualities, designations, or propositions, asseverations, and the like, are presented, we intuitively and immediately, judge and decide between them, and have corresponding emotions and affections.

The eye of the mind is ever open, and unavoidably sees what is presented within its range of perception ; as the eye of the body, opened under the conditions of space and light, can not but see the natural objects within its range—their

magnitudes, proportions, colors, beauty, deformity, etc., in immediate contrast, for the practical instruction, guidance, culture, and benefit of man.

The beneficent Creator, foreseeing all things, conditions, relations and results, filled the earth with all forms and varieties of natural objects—all forms and phenomena of animal and vegetable life, all varieties of organization, size, motion, growth, decay, vicissitude and change—all varieties of color, metals, minerals, soils, rocks, constituting a ceaseless spectacle of contrasts.

The Scriptures, in their doctrinal, ethical, and æsthetical constructions, address the soul, the mind, the heart, at the inner portal of intuition, where their effectiveness will survive the physical organization and the natural eye and ear.

The perception of contrasts is the basis, the condition precedent, to all our intuitive judgments and decisions, emotions and affections. Hence, in the moral world, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, good and evil, love and hatred, beauty and deformity, and the like, are always presented in contrast, real or implied. And when the Jehovah would reveal himself to creatures in finite relations, as Creator, Administrator of Providence and Grace, Lawgiver, Redeemer, Saviour, in the various forms and relations in which he appears and acts in executing the different offices and parts of his covenant work, so as to induce, regulate and nourish the faith of his people in him as the actor, under diverse circumstances and successive dispensations, he declared and identified himself by a variety of names and titles, with allusions of comparison and contrast.

But we can not further enlarge upon this view.\* We have the results in the perfect, immutable, and effectual revelations of the Scriptures as inspired; in virtue of which patriarchs, nomads, isolated shepherds, were immeasurably wiser than the philosophers of Babel and of all heathendom. A Hebrew

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\* See Chap. VI, of "Inspiration not Guidance nor Intuition." Published by A. D. F. Randolph, 1858.

poet with only such knowledge, compared to Homer or any of his classic successors, Greek or Roman, was as gold to dross, the most fine gold to dust and ashes.

### ART. V.—THE GREETINGS OF PAUL.

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[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 77.]

#### III.—*The Words of the Greeting Itself.*

IN no part of these introductory salutations is there so much uniformity in the language, as in this third part: *Χάρις ἡμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, is the monotone of each benediction, with only here and there a variation—too small to excite surprise, yet sufficient to vindicate the apostle from the charge of saying anything by rote. His inspired liturgy has the form, without the formality of sound words.

The greeting, as a whole, divides itself into two parts: the blessing, and the source of the blessing. Grace to you, and Peace, is the uniform expression in all the collective epistles of Paul; also in Peter, who, however, expresses the wish, natural to his impulsive heart, that these blessings may be "multiplied" (1 Pet. 1, 2. 2 Pet. 1, 2). Jude uses *ἐλεος* probably as equivalent to *χάρις*, (Jude 2,) and then adds *ἀγάπη*, "multiplied," after the manner of Peter. James puts it all into *χαίρειν* (James i, 1). Grace and peace are old forms, the former Gentile (*χαίρειν*), the latter Jewish (*Shelom*); but a new and larger life informs them here, changing both their appearance and contents. The East and the West here meet and kiss one another. The love of God (*χάρις*) having flowed down to man through Christ, the peace of God (*εἰρήνη*) began thenceforth to dwell among men (Luke ii, 14). From God Incarnate, as the fountain, flows the river of peace, along

whose shores shall gather and build all nations, and from its streams shall drink forgetfulness of all past strifes and enmities. By its healing waters shall grow the olive of peace and the palm of victory, and beneath their blessed shade, the old hostility of man and brute shall be appeased and forgotten (Is. xi, 6-9). We have called these words old forms, but whether they are fragments of an original benediction, which was carried in the hearts and memories of our first parents, and accompanying the young race, in their divergent wanderings, after the great dispersion, finds its home in the language of all nations—a mutilated, yet true witness of the primitive condition of man, and a true prophecy of his ultimate condition; or whether these forms are not religious, not revealed, not verbal portions of the primitive faith, but only the instinctive utterances of kindness, and therefore universally diffused in human speech, can not be determined. As, however, godliness was a part of man's original heritage, and worship its outward form, it is not impossible, nor indeed improbable, that these words are portions of that service retaining something of the flavor of the precious ointment once contained in it—like our "hail," no longer, indeed, consciously tied to its original, yet, on examination, found to be of divine parentage; still, it is more after the analogy of the relation of the supernatural to the natural, to follow the order laid down in 1 Cor. xv, 46: "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual." Christ never spake a parable, or wrought a miracle, out of hand. His words and works were always wedded to their circumstances. Nature was polled, and the supernatural engrafted upon the natural stock. This is the order of the whole economy of grace, from the calling of Abram, to the gates of the New Jerusalem. The "ten plagues," under the stimulus of a divine husbandry, grew out of the soil, and hence were properly plagues of *Egypt*. The wonders of the prophetic age are equally racy. Judaism is not suppressed, but sublimated. The first Adam is not annihilated by the second Adam, but only supplemented. The fallen soul is not cast aside by grace, but

regenerated; nor is the old body destroyed by the resurrection, but glorified into a spiritual body. So also Peter, and all who "have obtained like precious faith with him," look not for "another," but a "new" heaven and earth (2 Pet. iii, 13). Following this analogy, we think that the spirit of inspiration took these old, wild, and secular roots, and engrafted upon them the new, the tame, and the spiritual olive of peace—peace with God, and peace with men. How full of meaning, then, these simple gratulations! When we utter them not unwittingly, we "show forth" the work of reconciliation in its source, "the grace of God," and in its issues, "peace on the earth."

In the letters to Timothy, this uniformity is broken. "Mercy" is inserted between "grace" and "peace." How came this tender word into the pastoral epistles only, and, of these, only into the letters addressed to Timothy? Was the aged and dying apostle thinking of Timothy as the successor to his sufferings, as well as to his office? Such sufferings as are alluded to in 2 Tim. iii, 10, 11?—for verse 12 implies that such afflictions were the common and certain lot of every faithful servant of God. If so, what more natural than that Paul should wish him "mercy"—the softest side of divine love? Yes, we must regard this word as a sigh of sympathy, coming from the prison of the martyr Paul. Let no one be shocked at the intense subjectivity of this interpretation, as if we conceded more to Paul's feelings than comports with the divine dignity in speaking through man. We say to Paul, as the Israelites did to Moses, at Sinai: "Speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us, lest we die." Ex. xx, 19. Moses could hear and understand God, for his ear was strengthened for that purpose; but how could we—unless miraculously prepared for such an audience? No! Let the Lord speak to Moses and to Paul, and when they have received it, and yet live, let them speak to us. The human in them touches our humanity. The divine light, strained through this inspired human medium, and shorn of its excessive brightness, is more intelligible; and, mingled with the human, is more effectual. When,

amid the sublime symphonies of God's word, we catch the accents of a human tongue, our faith is reassured, we step into the dark future, as Peter ventured upon the raging sea, when he heard the familiar tones of Jesus amid the wild uproar of the elements.

Before leaving this portion of the greetings, we may notice the use and omission of *ὑμῖν*, following the first gratulatory word (2 John is the only exception). In all the collective letters, Paul uses it; so Peter and Jude; but in none of the individual epistles. In the latter, the pronoun representing the person greeted is always omitted (3 John). The exception, in the epistle to Philemon (verse 3), is only apparent, not real, as is evident from verse 2, which conjoins others, no less than Philemon, in the greeting; hence the *ὑμῖν* in the third verse.

In testimony of the second part of this member of the greeting, we observe the same uniformity, modified by the same slight variations already noted in the first part: "From God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." If we except Galatians and the Pastoral epistles, this is the stereotyped formula in all Paul's epistles. The Fatherhood of God, and the Lordship of Jesus Christ are the foci around which moves the whole system of grace. In the Christian economy, *θεὸς πατήρ* had risen to the dignity of a proper name, (Phil. ii, 11; Eph. vi, 23; 1 Pet. i, 2). The *ἡμῶν* which follows shows that *this* Fatherhood has reference to Christians. It is the *Our Father* of the prayer which the Master taught his disciples (Matt. vi, 9-13; see also Gal. iv, 6; Eph. ii, 18; James i, 27, and John's epistles, etc.). The Lordship of Jesus Christ (Phil. ii, 9-11) is also a proper term by its force, and, like the divine Fatherhood, is the peculiar property of the new dispensation; together, they are "the fount of every blessing." Nor is it to be overlooked that the two persons of the adorable Trinity—the Father, and the Son, are bound together in the closest union by *ἀπό* in the greeting, in every one of Paul's epistles. Both are interchangeably the source and means of the blessings invoked. In Gal. i, 1, both persons are joined in the vinculum



διὰ, when Paul asserts his apostleship. In 2 John, παρά performs the same office. Surely, the use of these prepositions is not an accident or coincidence, but the natural result of viewing God and Christ as coëqual. We observe the same consent in the parallel use of Saviour, by Peter (2 Pet. i, 1), and Paul (Tit. i, 4), as well as in the position of ὑμῶν after the second instead of the first person of the Trinity—thus bringing upon the same platform, the apostle of the circumcision, and the apostle of the gentiles. It only remains to take one more look at Galatians. The position of ἡμῶν (i, 3), is the distinguishing feature of this greeting. In all the other epistles of Paul it follows Father, here it follows Lord. Did the apostle, by thus placing this pronoun, wish to intimate that the God-Father was not common property between him and the perverted Galatian churches; or that Jesus Christ was not “our” Lord, as including Paul’s adherents and the victims of “the agitators” (i, 7) and “subverters” (v, 12); but only “ours,” as emphatically belonging to those who had not been “removed” (i, 6) from the only foundation, “which is Jesus Christ” (1 Cor. iii, 11)? Be this as it may, the position of this inclusive, and therefore exclusive particle, adds another characteristic feature to this very characteristic letter.

In order to bring more clearly before our minds the contrast between the form and contents of the greeting as Paul found it in the world, and as he left it in the church, let us compare the first germ with its full and final efflorescence :

1. Παῦλος 2. τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ 3. χαίρειν.

The first member has the following developments :  
 Παῦλος becomes :

- (1.) Παῦλος δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.—*Philemon.*
- (2.) “ “ δοῦλος Θεοῦ.—1 and 2 *Thessalonians.*
- (3.) “ “ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.—*Philippians.*
- (4.) “ “ “ “ κλητὸς ἀπόστολος, ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ.—*Romans.*
- (5.) Παῦλος ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ. 1 and 2 *Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, and 2 Timothy.*

(6) Παῦλος δοῦλος Θεοῦ, ἀπόστολος δὲ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. . κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Θεοῦ.—*Titus.*

(7.) Παῦλος ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, κατ' ἐπιταγὴν Θεοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἡμῶν. 2 *Timothy.*

(8.) Παῦλος δοῦλος (οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ) Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Θεοῦ πατρός. *Galatians.* In the beginning, we have plain Paul; in the end, we find Paul with all the insignia of his divine apostolic dignity.

The second member shows the following increase.

'*Ἡ ἐκκλησία* becomes:

(1.) *Ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατίας.*

(2) *Τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Θεσσαλονικέων ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ,* (2 *Thess.* ἡμῶν,) καὶ *Κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ.*

(3) *Τοῖς ἐν Κολοσσαῖς ἀγίοις καὶ πιστοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ.*

(4) *Τοῖς ἀγίοις τοῖς οὖσιν (ἐν Ἐφέσῳ) καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.*

(5) *Πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγίοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Φιλίπποις, σὺν ἐπισκόποις καὶ διακόνοις.*

(6) *Πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ, ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ κλητοῖς ἀγίοις.*

(7.) *Τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ οὔσῃ ἐν Κορινθῷ, σὺν τοῖς ἀγίοις πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ.* 2. *Cor.*

(8.) *Τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ οὔσῃ ἐν Κορινθῷ, ἡγιασμένοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, κλητοῖς ἀγίοις, σὺν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐπικαλουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν.* 1 *Cor.* In this member, the church, from a characterless meeting (*Gal.*), grows until it becomes the beloved assembly of the saints and believers, in all places, and having a common Saviour in Christ (*Rom.*, 1 and 2 *Cor.*). As *Titus* furnishes the connecting link between those greetings in which ἀπόστολος is used as an adjunct, and those in which it is not used; so 2 *Corinthians* forms the bond of union between the greetings

in which *ἐκκλησία* is used, and those in which its descriptive equivalents are used.

In the third member, we have this growth :

*Χαίρειν* becomes :

*Χάρις* (Timothy adds *ἐλεος*) *ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν* (except Gal.) *καὶ Κυρίου* (Gal. *ἡμῶν*) *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. This is the largest, as well as the richest exhibition of the greeting. Now, in all this growth, we recognize the living power of the Gospel. Empty compliments glowed with a new life. The old ideas were not so much unclothed, as clothed upon. They put off their old, world-stained vestments, and put on the new and celestial robes of the Kingdom of God.

There remains one more aspect of this subject to be considered—the dogmatic. A closer examination of these forms of greeting discloses a series of facts amounting, in their sum and collocation, to a creed—an Apostles' creed, and (with what is contributed by Peter, James, Jude and John) a genuine Apostles' creed, to which, as we shall see, the so-called "Apostles (Apostolic?) Creed" bears a not very remote resemblance. Nor is this symbolic character of the greetings to be considered as an accident, but rather as an attribute. Paul's Epistles are the oldest portions of the canon. Their subjective doctrinal character was the development of the previously existing objective facts—but which facts were only subsequently set in order (Luke i, 1). The written commentaries preceded the written text, and for obvious reasons. The facts could safely be committed to human history—they were indestructible. As facts they would change the spirit of the age, being themselves unchangeable. But not so with their import. The Epistles were the inspired exposition going before, announcing their true meaning, and directing the growing Christian consciousness into the right channel. At length the time came when a selection from Christ's words and works must be authoritatively made. From the world-mass (John xxi, 25,) many (Luke i, 1,) had already undertaken to construct a habitation for the truth, but Wisdom had not

yet builded *her* house (Prov. ix, 1). Matthew, Mark, Luke and John—men filled with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding and in knowledge, (Ex. xxxi, 3) were to rear its four corners—immovable—unchangable—indestructible—immortal. The stadia of this development may be stated, in general terms, thus : 1. The fact of the Incarnation. 2. The exposition of that fact (*κήρυγμα ἀποστολικόν*) and the transmission of it (*παράδοσις ἀποστολική* : 2 Thess., ii, 15 ; iii, 6 ; 1 Cor. xi, 2). 3. The inspired interpretation of the fact and facts (Paul's Epistles—particularly, as well as the other apostolic letters). 4. The record of the fact (Gospel Biographies), and facts (Acts of the Apostles). Now it is in the fragmentary, or rather the abbreviated forms of doctrine, contained in the greetings, that we find the best of proofs, that not only had the religious consciousness of the Jewish and Gentile world been stimulated to great activity, but that the fundamental dogmas of the church had already begun to assume substantial form. The mother dogma : **IMMANUEL**—God with us, which had lain dormant in the Jewish religious consciousness, began to swell with new life at the advent season of the world ; and even the partial views of heathen approached this central truth, and sought in it the solution of their painful longings for a union between God and man. Thus there was a two-fold preparation for the Gospel ; first, in the deep human craving for an Incarnation ; and second, in the actual dogmas which this craving had already developed. The craving itself had two manifestations—the one Gentile, where man struggled in the darkness, unaided, or aided only by the dim light which glimmered across the waste ages, from Edenic traditions ; the other, this craving aided by the higher religious consciousness, which the Old Testament had developed. In addition to these immortal sighs for the Incarnation, there was in man a *lex non scripta*, imperative, and indestructible, in accord with the highest demands of the Sinaitic statutes as interpreted by Christ himself. It was with these preparatory helps that the gospel of God first entered on its mission, and we are therefore not surprised at its sudden

and great success among the Jews (Acts xxi, 20), and through them among the Gentiles (Acts xxi, 8-10). The proselytes of the gate (Acts xv, 21,) were the layers by which the vine of the Lord was spread all over the civilized world ; but by its side, interlaced and interleaved with it, grew also a wild vine. During the quarter of a century which elapsed between the first promulgation of the gospel, and the first authoritative exposition of it in a written form, there was the widest field and freest scope for every form and degree of error, both in doctrine and practice. The facts connected with the first appearance of the new doctrine were of the most bewildering nature, and fell upon times of many, importunate, and vacillating expectations. When, therefore, Jesus of Nazareth assumed the office of a divine teacher, and asserted the dignity of a divine character, sealing his doctrine and claim with miracle and sacrifice, resurrection and ascension, there was laid the foundation for the widest, and wildest, and deepest disturbances—intellectual and spiritual. And, aside from the general preparation for the new doctrine among Gentiles, there was a special preparation for it among the Jews ; both in their previous historical training, and in their general dispersion throughout the Roman empire.\* Not only was every city a centre whence could be carried the speculations of the schools, and the fermenting thoughts of town and table-talk ; but every synagogue was a *seminarium* where, as in a hot-house, everything touching *ὁ ἐρχόμενος*, Matt. xi, 3 “The coming One,” The Messiah, Ps. xi, 7, would be germinated,

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\* Says Philo Judæus, a contemporary of the Apostles, perhaps with a little patriotic exaggeration, yet, in the main, true—“Jerusalem is my ancestral city, and the metropolis not only of Judea, but of many other countries, in consequence of the colonies which it has sent out at different times into the neighboring countries, such as Egypt, Phœnicia, Syria and Cœlo-Syria ; and into those more distant, Pamphylia, Cilicia, the greatest part of Asia Minor, as far as Bythinia, and the eastern shores of the Euxine ; so also into Europe, Thessaly, Bœotia, Macedonia, Aetolia, Attica, Argos, Corinth, the greatest and best parts of Peloponnessus. And not only are the continents full of Jewish colonies, but the principal islands also—Eubœa, Cyprus and Crete, I say nothing of the countries beyond the Euphrates ; for all of these, except a small portion, particularly Babylon and the Satrapies which occupy the rich countries round, have Jews living in them.”

and thence transplanted. These synagogues were the branches of the old olive cut off, and ready to receive the engrafted word. From these synagogues—a kind of convents, the *patres prædicatores*, like the Dominicans and Franciscans of the Middle Ages, went forth “to turn the world upside down” (Acts xvii, 6). All was confusion. Jewish traditions against Greek speculations, and Greek speculations against Jewish traditions, and both against Christianity. The conflict was waged in that “*quid obscurum*” which envelops every battle-field, but God’s Spirit was brooding over it, and from the *Chaos* of fact and fiction, of truth and error, of passion, prejudice and prayer, there was slowly emerging the *Kosmos*. Full twenty years this chaos surged. Then came Paul, and, by independent and original authority\* preached the original gospel, and appended the original seals, and, by his inspired correspondence, fixed the meaning of the floating and fluctuating mass of truth and error—stretching over it the divine rod (*κράτος*), he reduced it to order, and gave the Church of God her standards. It is in the introductory words of these letters—in the greetings, that these masses of truth lie. They are a sort of *symbolum* containing the leading facts of Chris-

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\* The independence and originality of Paul’s authorization become still more impressive and important, if we remember that he did not come into sympathy with the Christian life, till four or five years after Christ had finished his ministry—spoken all his words, and wrought all his works. During all the years of his youth and opening manhood, the future Apostle not only stood outside of Gospel influences and facts, but against them. (Gal. i, 13, 23. 1 Tim. i, 13.) Knowing Christians, only as a persecutor and bigot might be supposed to know heretics and apostates, we must believe him thoroughly purged from even the odor of the Gospel; and when sent forth as a “chosen vessel” for his work, he could never be justly charged with bartering other men’s wares; but we must believe that he was, as he declared himself to be, an original Apostle. Not having contact with, or instruction from man or men (Gal. i, 1), but communicating at first hand with Christ—not through Gospel record, but by revelation (1 Cor. xi, 23; Gal. i, 1, 12, 16; ii, 2; Acts xxvi, 16); he does not refer to the miracles or parables of Christ, though these are the staple of the Gospels, and never but once directly quotes Christ’s words (Acts xx, 35). So separate and alone was he! In the submission of his Gospel to the council, and in their approval of it as the Gospel, which the Apostolic college had from Christ, we have a separate and additional proof of its truth. God spake a Gospel by Christ in Judea, Galilee and Samaria—Paul spake a Gospel in Arabia and Europe, and when they were compared, they were not merely similar but the same.

tianity. These articles of a creed are not proved—but postulated; nor are they explained, but simply recorded as those things out of which the rest of the letter was to grow, and by which it was authenticated. Without attempting an exhaustive statement, the following partial schedule will show how dogmatic these greetings are:

1. *The Fatherhood of God*, as respects Jesus Christ: Gal. i, 1, *θεοῦ πατρός*. Rom. i, 4. Comp 1 Tim. iii, 16; 2 John i, 3.

2. *The Fatherhood of God*, as regards Christians. Gal. i, 3, *θεοῦ πατρός*. Rom. i, 7. 1 Cor. i, 3. 2 Cor. i, 2. Eph. i, 2. Philippians i, 2. Col. i, 2.

3. *The Incarnation*. Rom. i, 3, 4. 2 John i, 3; and whenever "Jesus," the personal name, is added to "Lord" or "Christ," as is generally the case in the three members of the greeting.

4. *The Resurrection*. Rom. i, 4. Gal. i, 1. This article, and the next above, are expanded in 1 Tim. iii, 15, 16.

5. *The Church of God*. 1 and 2 Thess. i, 1; and through the greeting, as it is developed, on this point, in 2 Cor. i, 1, and all the Epistles.

A glance at this scheme will satisfy us that the Incarnation is the central dogma of the Christian religion. The others are not so much dogmas, as developments, and deductions from this dogma. The sermons of Stephen (Acts vii), of Philip (Acts viii, 5, 35), of Peter and Paul, and "of those which were scattered abroad upon the persecution that arose about Stephen" (Acts xi, 19, 20), all move around this grand fact. What the church needed to learn and hold fast was the manifestation of God in the flesh; fully persuaded of its truth, and having embedded it in her consciousness, it would grow forth in all its fullness and final perfection. There were many things in the Life of Christ which impressed his contemporaries, and many were the persons who undertook to compile these facts, but they were unauthorized annalists, and hence wrote no *Evangelis* but only memoirs. However full and accurate these *memorabilia* were singly, or in the aggregate, still they were no Gospels. The Gospels do not consist in a plenary record



of the words and works of Christ, but in only so many as the Holy Ghost saw needful to evince the Messiahship of Jesus, and to bind Christians to him by a saving faith, John xx, 31. The Gospel, as a fact in human history, consists in the Incarnation, and in such and so many facts as express and certify this germinal truth and its principal stadia of development. These are the birth, baptism, death, resurrection, and ascension. These were the supreme facts, which were held in trust by the church for nearly three-score years—repeated and expanded by authentic and authorized oral instruction, but not committed to authoritative record. Not till the generation that had seen and heard Christ was passing away, were the gospels written, those four which live and can not die, and move like the wheels of the chariot in Ezekiel's vision—with unimpaired power—full of eyes—and bearing God on their axles. The keys of "the book" were committed to the church to open and to shut, before the book itself was put in her hands. These keys are the canonical letters of Paul, Peter, James and Jude—the real *epistolæ obscurorum virorum*. That the essential stadia of the Incarnation, and not the multifarious details of it, were the main thing, is made by nothing so clear as by the fact that Paul only once quotes Christ's words (Acts xx, 35), and never mentions his miracles—but evermore bases his commentary on the great facts of his death, resurrection, etc.—Now it will be seen that it is precisely this class of facts that constitute the body of the greetings—especially the greetings of those characteristically dogmatic Epistles—Romans and Galatians.

Nor should we overlook the peculiar aspect of the dogmas in the greetings—it is preëminently christological. Christ is proclaimed as man, as dead, as risen. Christ is the assumed source of the apostleship, of grace, of peace, of brotherhood, and of sanctification. Christ is presented as the object of hope, and of faith, and of mercy. Christ is exalted as the Saviour, and the Lord. John put his theology and christology in his Gospel, and into the body of his letters—not the greetings; but Paul's letters are mainly taken up with Anthropolo-

gy, and Soteriology, while, in the greetings, theological and christological elements are characteristic. In comparing Peter's confession of faith Matt. xvi, 16—"Thou art the Christ the Son of the living God," which was also the confession of the whole college of Apostles (John vi, 68, 69), with the doctrinal contents of the Pauline greetings, we see how many and definite were the features, which the apostolic church, in her primitive vigor, developed during the first quarter of a century after the crucifixion. At first we find current only the brief creed of Peter (Matt. xvi, 16); the same is in the mouth of Martha (John xi, 27), before the death of Christ; and several years after, we find still the same words in the confessing mouth of the Eunuch (Acts viii, 37); but twenty years later, what a change! How prominent "Christ" is made in the greetings! All doubts have disappeared. The consciousness of the church has advanced so far in its certitude, that *Jesus was the Christ*, that his name, and office, and dignity stand side by side with the name, and office, and dignity of God—the monarchical title of the latter being invariably modified to make room for the Second Person of the Trinity. And to enhance the significance of the facts—this coördinating of titles and persons takes place in the stereotyped formula of a salutation. What a weight of authority for the divinity of Christ lies in these opening words of Paul's Epistles! It was only because *θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, and because this was the settled conviction of the church, that Paul's letters went unchallenged into every company of believers, notwithstanding he *prefixed* to each Epistle a declaration of such divinity, and thus put the whole letter under the authority and benediction of JESUS CHRIST. \*

Reference has been made to the resemblance between the creed embedded in Paul's greetings, and the so-called Apostles' creed. We present them in paralld columns, (the later additions of the Apostles' creed being marked with a [?] for convenience of comparison).

## THE CREED.

I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker  
of heaven and earth :

And in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord.  
Who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, [?]

*Born of the virgin Mary, . . . . .*

Suffered under Pontius Pilate,

Was crucified, dead, and buried. . . . .

He descended into hell : [?],

The third day he arose again from the dead ; . .

He ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the  
right hand of God the Father Almighty ;

From thence he shall come to judge the quick  
and the dead.

I believe in the Holy Ghost ;

The holy, Catholic church ; . . . . .

The communion of saints ; . . . . .

The forgiveness of sins ; . . . . .

The resurrection of the body ;

And the life everlasting [?]. Amen. . . . .

## THE GREETINGS.

Gal. i. 1. Rom. i. 4.

ἁγίου πατρὸς.

Rom. i. 3, 4. υἱὸς θεοῦ.

Wherever "Jesus" is con-  
nected with "Christ," Rom.  
i. 3, "Of the seed of David  
according to the flesh."—  
Matt. i. 24, 25.

Gal. i. 1. Rom. i. 4.]

Gal. i. 1. Rom. i. 4.

ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς νεκρῶν.

The appellation "Lord,"  
may take this place.

1 & 2 Thess. i. 1; Rom.; 1 & 2  
Cor., Eph., Col., Philippians.  
ἁγία ἐκκλησία.

Meaning undecided.

Gal. i. 4. περὶ τῶν ἁμαρ-  
τιῶν ἡμῶν.

2 Tim. i. 1. Tit. i. 2.

ζωῇ αἰωνίῳ.

At a glance we can see how much alike are these two columns—doctrinally. The creed is fuller, because it is older. For the same reason, it has more details, and is more elaborate in its finish. But the difference, in these respects, is no greater between the creed and "the greeting," than between "the greetings" and the Apostolic confession of Peter. This resemblance in the creed of Peter, the creed in the Pauline greetings, and the Apostles' creed, is a family likeness, making the three, members of the same household of faith. All three are brief, christological, objective and historical, and on all these points are in contrast, if not antagonism, with all modern creeds—the latter being long, theological, subjective and metaphysical. Compare the *redditio symboli* of the Eunuch (Acts viii, 37), on his admission to the church, with the response now demanded of catechumens—if there be yet such

persons in our day ; and the difference is one not only of degree, but still more of kind. The former supposes religion to be a Life ; the latter supposes it to be largely an intellectual process—if not indeed a Philosophy. If once we clearly apprehend the idea that the Incarnation represents first a life—the life of God in the flesh, rather than a mere doctrine, we shall be able to understand how this divine laying-hold of the seed of Abraham is much more a fact in history than a dogma in speculation ; and that it should have such a manifestation as the church—one, holy, and catholic. Not the church, in the tessalated conception of an aggregation of believers ; nor even a segregation of believers ; nor yet a congeries of denomination—but a living thing ; such a phenomenon in the history of the race that it may be called the body of Christ—"the Son of the living God" being its head—such a fact that only organic figures are used in Scripture to set it forth—such as the vine, John xv, 1-8—the human body, Rom. xii, 4, 5 ; 1 Cor. xii, 12-27 ; Eph. v. 23-32. Nay, of such vital potentiality is this idea that, when an architectural or inorganic symbol is employed, the living content animates the dead form—1 Peter ii, 5, "living stones." Such a church may not only, with rhetorical consistency, be fed—witness that Old Test. pastoral, the twenty-third Psalm—and grow, but scriptural congruity demands the same conception. In such a church there is room to spread a table, not merely for "commemoration" (1 Cor. xi, 24, 25), but also for "communion" (1 Cor. x, 16). The creed of not a single church, whose life dates back to the sixteenth century, admits of any other interpretation. Nor have rationalistic refinements upon their words been able to make them speak any other language intelligibly. Of course we do not hide from ourselves the fact, that, in treating of religion as lying all within the human sphere, and denying to faith any super-human origin, vision, apprehension, and domain, the practical result has been, that the children even of the church "speak half in the speech of Ashdod, and can not speak in the Jews' language." Those symbols were forged in the fires of conflict

for truth—fires into which were thrown many kinds of fuel; much of it earthly—human, but the vital part of it was the oil of the sanctuary—faith. But so cold and unbelieving have we grown that we have not faith enough left, or have exercised it so little, that when we read those testimonials of our ancestral faith, their real content eludes us, and we ostentatiously hold up the empty forms, and say these are “the pattern of the thing seen in the mount.” We have “the brazen serpent” unto our day and worship it (2 Kings xviii, 4), but it is no longer the life-giving one erected in the wilderness. We philosophize about the supernatural, but we do not receive it. We have largely lost the sense itself. The church marvels at, and laments the skeptical and infidel spirit of the age; but are we not in, and of this skeptical age? And what we call the infidelity of the world, what is it, but a balder and bolder form of that which is latent in the church itself. When the Sadducees were rejecting angels and spirits and the resurrection, what was the faith of the Pharisees? They clung to the Law—but refined upon it—till nothing remained in their hands but dead letters—nothing on their altars, but the cold ashes of their former sacrifices—and nothing in their hearts, but the power to persecute the truth.

Now, symbols do not beget faith—they guide it. They do not create faith—they may preserve it. They do not make faith—but are made by it. As a living principle, faith has its manifestations. One of these is language. It unfolds in the consciousness of the church, like a seed in the ground—first the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear. Such a phenomenon we see in the Greetings. They furnish a linguistic proof of the existence and development of that new life, which had been engrafted through the second Adam on the stock of the first Adam, and which was certifying itself of one feature after another, till the divine curriculum, reaching from Heaven to Hades and back again from Hades to Heaven, was completed; till HE who had come out from God (John xvii, 8) had again returned to God (v. 11). This is the truth which Peter confessed, which Paul confesses in the

greetings, and which the Apostles' creed confesses. In Peter, it is the bud ; in Paul, the opening blossom ; but in both, the same celestial flower : THE RED ROSE OF SHARON.

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.ART. VI.—OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.\*

"The worst thing we have to fear in the future of our country, as it strikes me, is the influence of demagogues. The violence of party spirit, the intense greed of office, and the intricacies of political machinery, give great power to a few, while the many, who are either entirely ignorant and incapable even of reading, or are educated chiefly by newspapers and grog-shop debates, are made their dupes. If you have not investigated the subject, I think you would be surprised to find how superficial our popular education is, and how utterly inadequate to prepare our people for an intelligent discharge of their duties, or a just appreciation of their privileges."

"You must pardon me, my dear sir, but I think your fears are groundless. I have always supposed that if there is any thing we may take an honest pride in, it is our noble public school system."

"Well, sir, all I can say, is, that I have observed carefully and inquired diligently for many years, and with rare opportunities of access to all classes of the community and all sections of the country ; and I am satisfied that our public schools, as now conducted, are not preparing their pupils as they should and might be prepared for the part they are to act, if our happy institutions are to be preserved and trans-

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1. The Daily Public School in the United States. pp. 158. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phil.

2. Twelfth Annual Report of the (Chicago) Board of Education. 184 pp. 8vo.

3. The Galt Prize Essay on Common School Education. pp. 26. Sherbrooke, Canada East.

mitted. It is, in my judgment, a very superficial and ill-administered system, and will prove to be so in due time."

The above is a fair report of a casual conversation which occurred at a sea-side hotel during the past season. The hopeful party is one of the judges of an important municipal court, and the doubter is a veteran editor and a Yankee.

We suppose nine-tenths of the community would concur with the former, and exult in the conviction that whatever else we lack, as a nation, our school system is unsurpassed. To confirm them in this opinion they might refer to the testimony of distinguished foreigners, who have been here and have seen for themselves, and have gone back to report to older nations, that in our young and vigorous republic popular ignorance is unknown!

It is not our purpose to decry, or unduly to exalt our public schools. We propose rather to inquire what views the pamphlets whose titles we have given above, and others of like character, take of the subject. What indications do they furnish that the boys and girls resorting to these schools, year after year, are in the way to become such men and women as our country deserves to have? In prosecuting this inquiry the first point to determine is, what kind and degree of education we are bound to give at the public expense.

There is no saying more familiar to our ears than that the safety and permanency of our institutions depend on the general intelligence of the people. We choose persons to fill certain offices, not that they may *guide* us, but that they may *obey* us. The theory of our government is, that the intelligence, the virtue and the patriotism of the country reside in the people, and that when we call out sundry persons to make laws, and others to interpret them, and others still to execute them, they are really our servants, though we are accustomed, for some reason, to call them rulers. Standing at the polls in some of our chief city districts at a popular election, we shall scarcely recognize the dignity, independence and thoughtfulness of men having large interests at stake and looking for the most capable persons to take charge of them.



If men of that description are there in any considerable number, it must be in deep disguise. To fit them for just this duty of selecting public servants, with intelligence and discrimination, is one of the prominent purposes of our free schools. We can not train them to vote for Mr. *Smith* or Mr. *Jones*, but we can train them to inquire and judge of this, among other things—whether any of the *Smiths* or the *Joneses* are proper persons to vote for, instead of following the dictation of a clique, whose first and last purpose is to serve themselves.

When an American citizen comes to the polls, with a ballot in his hand, on which is written or printed the name of the man whom he wishes to intrust with a public office, and that ballot expresses his voluntary, deliberate, intelligent preference, he exercises one of the highest prerogatives of a free man. What does he need in the way of education to do this?

1. *He must know how to read.* The great mass of our people rely on newspapers for their information upon almost all subjects. Book-reading is comparatively rare, except among professional men and scholars. All sects and parties have their organs for disseminating their opinions, and exposing what they regard as the errors or follies of those who differ from them. Every American citizen should be able to read a common newspaper to himself, or aloud to others. It is impossible to prescribe any precise standard by which to determine what good reading means, but we shall all agree that good readers are very rare even in public life.

To be a source of enjoyment, reading must not involve labor or study. The reader or hearer must not be *tasked* to understand what is read. He must be so familiar with all words and phrases in ordinary use, that he can call them properly, and attach the proper meaning to them without an effort. And every public school should furnish at least this measure of knowledge to every pupil that attends a sufficient length of time.

To read the printed page, is first and most important; but

the pupil should also be taught to read writing readily—an acquisition of no little value in the daily transactions of life.

2. The public school should qualify its pupils *to write a legible, respectable business letter*. The art of forming letters is an elementary step beyond which many never advance an inch. They copy forms and figures laid before them, and they exhibit these imitations as evidence of their progress in the art of writing; but to determine the practical value of what they have learned in this way, we need to see the first letter they write home after going to boarding-school, or to a trade, or on a visit to an aunt. If the date and address are in the proper place, the sentences properly put together, and the ideas intended to be conveyed clearly expressed, with good orthography, punctuation, etc., we shall say the public school, in this respect, did its duty well, but not any more than its duty.

We have before us an upholsterer's bill. The writer is a highly respectable, skillful American mechanic, who has had a fair chance at the public school. It is as follows:

Mr. _____	To _____	Dr. _____
To repairing sofa with hare cloth		\$ _____
	Recieved pay't	

Here are three gross errors in spelling eight English words; and we do not hesitate to say that any public school in the United States should be ashamed to send out any pupil, after a fair chance to learn, who betrays such ignorance. We cite the case not as one of rare occurrence, but merely to indicate the scope of our requirement. Every public school boy and girl should know better than that.

3. Such a knowledge of *arithmetical rules* should be acquired at any public school as will enable one to compute readily; to keep a plain book-account accurately, and transact intelligibly the ordinary business of a farmer or mechanic.

4. *Geography* should be taught thoroughly, so far as to give the scholar a knowledge of the general divisions of the earth,

their climate and natural productions, and the relative position and extent of the oceans; of our own country, its principal rivers, mountain-ranges and general features—coming down, with increased minuteness of detail, to the State, county and finally town and district, to which the school-house belongs; or, the order might be reversed.

Orthography and English Grammar are involved in the requirements already mentioned; some knowledge of both being necessary to the writing of a creditable business letter.

This very brief outline of the *curriculum* of a public school, will suffice as the basis of what we have to say on the main subject. And the recent pamphlets, (the titles of which we have given) will supply all the illustrations we need.

Setting out with the universally received maxim, that the safety, and indeed the very existence, of such a government as ours, rests on the general *intelligence* of the people, we assume that a man should not be considered intelligent, in any ordinary acceptation of the term, who is not *well instructed* in the branches we have enumerated. To be a juror, a referee, or a district-school director; in short to be capable of the service which every citizen should be prepared to render when called upon, the measure of knowledge we have indicated is the least that will suffice; and for the schooling of all our children up to this point, seasonably and thoroughly, the levying of a tax on the whole community is wise, just and eminently economical. Every dollar expended to secure the best teachers of these branches, to make the school-houses comfortable, and their sites healthful and attractive, and to impart life, interest, and practical value to what is done in them, is a first-rate investment of the public money for the public good.

If we can place reliance on the statements which we find in one of the pamphlets before us, ("The Daily Public School in the United States,") we must conclude that, with here and there an exception, the great body of our public schools fall far short of the humble standard we have here prescribed.

And as the facts are generally derived from official documents, it would seem safe to accept them, with the single reservation, that as the author's object evidently is to awaken public attention to the deplorable *deficiencies* of the schools, he may have given less credit to the valuable features of the system than they deserve.

In this pamphlet we find a synopsis of the school-laws of four States, followed by a general survey of the manner in which their provisions are carried out, so far as they concern the condition of the schools and school-houses, and their furniture, the character and qualifications of teachers, the means in use for their improvement, the kind of supervision that is given, and the tone of public sentiment in relation to them. The States reviewed are *New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Massachusetts*. A better selection for the purpose could not well be made. Their populations, respectively, represent the wealth, intelligence, enterprise and public spirit of the country. In these States, if anywhere, we might expect to find the most liberal, efficient and successful measures to confer on the mass of children the blessing of a good, practical, common-school education. We confess our unmingled surprise at finding how far short of this they seem to come.

We look at the spacious and imposing edifices erected for the higher grade of schools, and the appropriation of two or three millions annually to their support. We glance at the voluminous documents which come to us from Boards of Education; and we feel like congratulating ourselves that, whatever other public interests are neglected, the schools are well cared for. Nor can we deny that a very laudable zeal has been exhibited to give the advantage of a superior education gratuitously, to such as desire it, especially in our cities and large towns. But we must remember that all this is above and beyond that elementary instruction which *every* boy and girl should receive at the public charge. If this higher order of schools contributes at all to the more general and inconceivably more important purposes of the public school system, it is only in an indirect and remote form. When the

millions of children are taught *thoroughly* the branches required by law, the tax-payers will have done their part; and from this point individual capacity, inclination and circumstances must determine the youth's career. It is for the good of the commonwealth that each successive generation should enjoy freely and liberally the means of preparing for the ordinary avocations of life; and this common benefit is justly purchased at the common expense. But, with such an outfit, the grand voyage of life in our free country is to be made at the cost and peril of the individual, not at the expense of the public. The public purse must meet a new levy made for a new generation waiting for the same preparatory process.

If we rightly understand his drift, the author of "The Daily Public School" maintains that a very disproportionate share of the school money, and of the school sympathy of the country, is absorbed by a class of schools designed to promote instruction in the higher branches of learning. He would have us believe, that were every dollar of the school funds, and of the money raised by taxation, expended on the sites, buildings, furniture and teachers of the schools, to which nine-tenths of the children of the country are supposed to resort and on which they depend for all their knowledge of reading, writing, etc., it would not more than suffice to make them what they should be to answer their lowest claims upon the government.

One of the pamphlets before us presents a view of the educational interests of a single city, which had no existence thirty or forty years ago, but now has nearly or quite 200,000 inhabitants. From it we glean some very significant items. The school population of *Chicago* is 45,000, or say one-fourth of the total. There are enrolled in the public schools 25,241. There are seats for 14,000, and the daily average attendance is a little less than 14,000; showing that less than one in every three of the school population will be found on a given day at the public school.

This might be regarded as rather a flattering picture, if it could be added that the one who is in attendance is there the

year round ; but it casts a deep shade over it to find that more than a third of those who are present on a given day are there for less than *nine weeks* ; and that only about one in five of this reduced number is found there the year round. We think there can scarcely be two opinions as to the inadequacy of this term of attendance to afford the very lowest measure of instruction which the case demands, however efficient and skillful the instructor.

A glance at the expenditures of that city shows a total cost of \$262,000, or \$18 for each pupil ; and the Board of Education propose "to borrow and expend \$100,000 per annum for several years"—to buy "five lots" and erect new buildings, etc. (Not a very safe example in the economy of human life—this living beyond one's means.) The two largest items of the expenditures are worthy of note. The 325 pupils in the High School cost \$21,276, or \$55.62 per scholar ; while 1717 scholars in the "Foster School" cost \$25,719, or less than \$11 per scholar. In the High School, 31 different text-books are required, and among the branches taught are—Trigonometry, Mensuration, Surveying, Navigation, Book-keeping, Botany, Astronomy, Physiology, Natural and Mental Philosophy, Chemistry, Mineralogy, Political Economy, German, French, Latin and Greek !

Extensive as this field is, it is proposed, in the Report before us, to enlarge it greatly by adding to it a "Free Academy," for the gratuitous education of those who are now turned aside into colleges and preparatory schools. In other words, to provide by a *public tax*, for a course of instruction such as is now pursued at *private expense* ; and which is needful to fit men for the professions of law, medicine, divinity, etc. And we admit that such a measure naturally follows the organization of the High School. If the elementary branches required by law are not the limit of gratuitous public schooling, we do not see where it is to be found.

Of the 45,000 children and youth in Chicago who are of school age, one in one hundred and thirty-eight enjoys the superior advantages of the High School. Would the benefits

of a "Free Academy" be extended to any save such of the 325 as wish to pursue a literary career? But the vital question is, will the 24,851 boys and girls enrolled in the public schools, less the 325 in the High School, have a better chance to learn to read and spell, to write a letter of business that they need not blush to own, and to keep a Dr. and Cr. account that would look well in the court-room, and all this because there is a Free Academy at the other end of the course, to which some few will find admission?

Not many days since, one of our city dailies contained an elaborate editorial earnestly advocating "industrial pursuits," and showing how much of the material prosperity of the country, and the moral soundness of the community, depend on the esteem in which labor—manual, muscular labor, is held. And it was added, that the tendency to luxurious habits, and the desire to gain a livelihood by some easier way than by tilling the earth, or serving at the work-bench, seem to be gaining strength with alarming rapidity.

On the opposite page of the same sheet was a list of some hundred persons, who, on the preceding day, had "graduated" from a "High School" and appended to their names were their several literary performances, original essays, poems, etc.

Does any one suppose that young "gentlemen," who step into this busy world from such a platform will put their hands to the axe, the plow or the sledge, or that "young ladies" so introduced, will apply theirs to the distaff or the needle, or whatever other implement symbolizes the domestic occupations of a discreet American housewife? Is not the drudgery of daily, honorable toil becoming the great bugbear of our youth; and is not this prejudice working disastrously upon the moral and physical welfare of the community? Are our present systems of public education calculated to diffuse a good degree of intelligence among the masses, or do they not rather put the means of high culture within the reach of the few at the expense of the many?

The educational machinery employed by cities and large



towns is comparatively of little importance as affecting the interests of the country at large; and, as we have said, they are purposely passed over in the treatise on "the Daily Public School." But much space is given to the grand deficiencies in methods of instruction, and to the marvelous indifference of parents and the public generally. The mechanical routine of instruction which obtains in a large majority of the schools, the irregularities of attendance, the constant shifting of teachers, and, of course, of text-books, modes of discipline, classification and instruction, and the low rate of compensation afforded to teachers, are among the remediable evils out of which grow the prevailing inefficiency and fruitlessness.

The "Galt Prize Essay" answers the question, "what ought our common school system to aim at, and how can that object be most effectually attained," as far as the compass of twenty-six 8vo pages will allow; and every page is stored with well digested thoughts on the subject. The author sets out with the sensible remark, that to impart knowledge is not the first chief purpose of a teacher. Far more important is it to teach children to observe, to think, to reflect. However large the store of knowledge obtained, the mental discipline, involved in getting it, is of much greater value than the knowledge itself.

We need not say how few teachers of our public schools are competent (if they were disposed) to make the humble studies of a country school the medium of developing the powers of a child's intellect, and yet no one can deny its importance and practicability. A dry spelling lesson, a writing exercise, and indeed almost any of the trivial incidents that make up the record of a school-day, may furnish a fitting occasion for it.

In this connection, we must advert, for a moment, to the very vague and meager ideas of the teacher's vocation that are entertained by employers, and, often, by the teachers themselves. There is indeed a certain routine of exercises in reading, spelling, etc., that must be observed; but, as we just intimated, its influence and value as a part of the process of

*education* are, comparatively, very insignificant. The great aim must be to bring the maturer, better-informed mind of the teacher into direct and constant communion with the immature, inquisitive, impressible minds of the two or three scores of children that surround him. To secure their respect, confidence and love, to excite their curiosity, to quicken their thoughts, to exercise their faculties of observation and discrimination, to acquaint them with their capacities, and to sharpen their appetite for knowledge—in a word, to deal with them as intelligent creatures of God, with destinies inconceivably enduring and momentous, are achievements within the humblest teacher's reach, and well worthy of his ambition. The main value of the elementary work, with which so many teachers content themselves, is that it *paves the way* for this higher and only true work of the educator.

The inquiries that an examiner makes, in order to determine the fitness of a candidate for such an office, are, of necessity, superficial. A very incompetent *teacher* may be a competent *instructor*. A child depends upon a parent to *instruct* him in the duties of life; but the learner depends upon the teacher for the formation of his mental habits and the establishment of right principles. We might almost expect of an Android as much tact in a school exercise as is shown by hosts of teachers, in service to day in our public schools. The reading of so many lessons, the spelling of so many columns, the writing of so many lines, the doing of so many sums, and the sitting still of so many hours—what beyond this enters into the monotonous round pursued, week after week, year in and year out, in a great majority of our country schools?

We pass such a judgment not without warrant. We accept as a test in the fundamental branch of reading, for example, the following from the Chicago report. The superintendent says:

"No pupil can be considered a good reader who does not read both *intelligently* and *intelligibly*. *Intelligent* reading implies mental activity, quick perception, and an under-

standing of the relations of words to each other and to the thoughts they represent. *Intelligible* reading implies all the above, and such vocal culture as will insure a perfect understanding by those who hear, of the words uttered and the thoughts clothed in the words."\*

Let us go, with this criterion in our hands, to the best country public schools in the United States, and we shall not find one in five hundred, if we do one in five thousand, that will not shrink from it in dismay, if they know themselves. And we are to bear in mind that there is no later opportunity for improvement in the great majority of cases. As they read when they leave the public school so, (or worse,) they will read in the family, the jury room and the town meeting.

Most of the pupils in our public schools enter while yet their powers of attention and application are very feeble. Their physical nature craves freedom and rejoices in activity and frolic. And then they leave school so early as to reduce the interval for school work to very narrow limits. The most economical use of this brief term will not suffice for any thing more than *grounding* them in the necessary branches of knowledge, and to attempt more is neither practicable nor desirable, in the case of nine-tenths of the pupils in rural districts. As the author of the "Galt Essay" very pertinently observes, "in most cases the higher branches of study could only be pursued at the expense of those which, in order and importance, come first. No acquirements, beyond the simple elements of these branches, can make up for a neglect of them. A thorough acquaintance with them is the only stable foundation for education, whether it is to be pursued in our higher institutions of learning, under the guidance of skillful teachers, or amid the influences of a life of business or labor.

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\* As an instance of stories read or told so unskillfully as to make a false impression, the following is given: A child had been told the familiar but somewhat apocryphal story of young George Washington and the hatchet. Much excited by it he ran up to his father, as soon as he got home—"O Pa," said he, "George Washington's father told him he would rather he should tell a few lies than cut down one cherry tree." Chicago Report, p. 78.

Now, we understand, the treatise on "The Daily Public School" aims to show three things :

1. That the great bulk of the children of the country are not taught there the things they need to know, and which it is the first and chief purpose of these schools to teach—this is a matter of fact to be determined by evidence.

2. That no adequate agencies are now employed or contemplated, to make them what they ought to be. And

3. That one reason of this is, that their interests are overshadowed by, and made subordinate to, a grade of schools from which comparatively few can derive any advantage, and which are not a legitimate appendage of the system nor properly maintained by a public tax.—We notice a somewhat similar suggestion in the "Galt Essay":

"The progress of education in this part of the country is more apparent, from the larger number and greater efficiency of the higher institutions of learning among us, than from any marked change for the better in the manner of conducting our common schools generally. The number of these is enlarging, and, in villages and other localities where the influence of educated persons—with other favorable circumstances—is brought to bear on them, their efficiency is also increasing; but the schools, generally, are very far from having reached a high standard of excellence in any respect." p. 21.

One of our leading religious newspapers\* lately gave utterance, with some timidity—to a similar sentiment :

"We can not conceal from ourselves that in the management of our common schools there is a good deal of show as well as of substance. There is not sufficient care taken to build up solid work on a solid foundation. Our schools suffer for the want of that thorough and long-continued elementary drill, of olden fashion, by which the pupils are made masters of first principles, before being carried forward into the advanced stages of education. Pupils are too soon taken

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\* "The Congregationalist," Boston.

away from the books (and pursuits) adapted to their age and circumstances, to be put into books beyond their reach, and where they wander in a kind of cloud-land."

One of the proprietors of the London "Times" has lately been in our country. He paid a visit to the public schools in some of our cities, and reporters tell us that he was filled with admiration of the magnificent scale on which we conduct popular education; and such would be the natural impression upon any casual visitor, who looks at the palatial school-houses, the vast and expensive machinery, the imposing array of branches, and the voluminous and flattering reports. But the point to which inquiry should be directed lies apart from all this.

Take a dozen boys and girls out of some one of the thousands of brick or wooden school-houses, that stand by the road-side in country towns, and put them to reading a passage in last week's newspaper, or a few verses of David's Psalms, or even one of "Watts' divine and moral songs." Ask them to write a letter, brief as they please, containing an account of any thing that has occurred in the town since last Christmas. Ask them what town, county, state or country, they live in; what towns bound their town, and what navigable river is nearest to them. These are the things they should learn in the school at their door, though they may not know any thing of the history of Ferdinand de Soto; or which were the principal battles of the war of 1812; or which of our Presidents have been elected a second time; or may not be able to compare the climate of the city of Mexico with that of Vera Cruz, or to state the opinions for which Roger Williams was banished from Massachusetts (supposing there were no doubts on the subject), or the cause of King George's war, or even to name the rivers of China and Hindostan!\*

We shall not be understood to object to such a class of questions, where the way has been properly prepared for them by a thorough knowledge of the more important and

\* These are among the questions at the annual examination of the first and fourth grades of the district schools of Chicago, class 1866. Chicago Report, p. 96.

essential matters that lie nearer home. We do not say that the former things ought not to have been done, but that the latter ought not to have been left undone, as in so large a majority of cases they are.

There is one topic broached, with more or less freedom, in all these pamphlets, and it is one of surpassing interest—we refer to the almost universal indifference of parents to the education of their children. One prominent reason for this is, undoubtedly, their own ignorance. It seems scarcely credible that a law excluding from the polls persons who can not read, would have disfranchised *fifteen thousand* voters in the city of New York alone, at the late gubernatorial election! Were such a law passed to day, probably many hundreds, if not thousands, of boys would be sent to school, at least so long as to acquire knowledge enough to vote when the time comes. As it is now, ignorance, though a personal and social disadvantage, does not so obviously involve loss or suffering, as to excite a very strong desire to avoid it. On the contrary, the addition of even a few cents to the daily revenue of the household will tempt many parents to withdraw their children from the opportunity to learn. "The Daily Public School" presents evidence on this point, which we could wish were not so conclusive. The opinion expressed in one report, which the author cites from a very reputable source, is, that, "if the public money were withheld, *two-thirds* of the schools would be closed, not because the people are not abundantly able to maintain them, but on account of a want of interest."\* And, in the Chicago report, the same fact is illustrated by the frivolousness of the excuses that are rendered for tardiness, which in some respects is worse, both for teacher and pupil, than absence: "had to run on an errand;" "over-slept;" "went to drug store;" "peddled papers;" "clock stopped;" "went down town for mother;" "fell down;" "carried father his dinner;" "was minding baby," etc.

No one can doubt that in such cases the utility of the

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\* Page 110.

school in the parent's view, and its attractiveness to the child, are alike theoretical. And we do not know a better way to cure this indifference of parents, than to make the school the happiest place the child finds. We may concede that confinement and application are unnatural and irksome to most healthy children, and that no art or device can make a school-house, as such, attractive; but there are volumes of testimony to show that this antipathy may be overcome, and that the relation between a teacher and his pupils may become a source of the purest satisfaction. We know such instances are not common. And one grand hindrance to the success of our schools is, that the teacher's position is so precarious, and ill-requited, and so often occupied by incompetent and mercenary persons, who have no thought beyond that of so discharging their duty as not to forfeit their wages, that there is no chance for such a relation to exist. The testimony to this point, which we find in the first pamphlet named at the head of our article, is very voluminous. The vast majority of those who engage in teaching resort to it only as a temporary means of support. The idea of making it a profession, or of pursuing it longer than till something better "turns up," is very rarely entertained. Hence the whole system of discipline, instruction, text books, etc., is almost as fluctuating as the waves of the sea.

How far the normal school for teachers will serve to obviate this palpable evil remains to be seen. If properly organized and conducted, such a school can doubtless supply young men and women with a knowledge of the branches required to be taught in a public school; and by means of lectures and experiments they may obtain a general notion of methods of discipline and instruction. And they must be stupid, indeed, if such a process does not make them more capable and useful as teachers. But this is a very inconsiderable step toward the desired reform. The horse is at the brook's edge, but who can make him drink? Here is the trained teacher, with the normal school diploma in hand; but who, meanwhile, has trained the school committee to ascertain and appreciate his



or her talents or acquirements? Who has taught the people of the district the principles of true economy in school matters? What sort of place and means are provided for carrying out the devices of the normal school professors? The decision can not be long delayed, for the teacher is human, and must have food, and, to this end, wants employment. Surely it would be no wonder if in the conflict of views and interests at such a time, the normal school teacher and the needy school should never meet.

It must be admitted on all hands, that, if public school teaching can be made a *profession*, like law, medicine and theology, normal schools for teachers would be as useful as are schools for preparing candidates for those learned professions; and why should they not be put upon the same footing? The benefits which the community derive from the services of a skillful physician, an honest lawyer, or an exemplary clergyman, are certainly not less than those conferred by a good public school teacher; and if the latter is qualified at the public expense, why should not the others be, also?

A young man works his way through college; enters a medical or law office, or school; pays his graduation fee; puts out his sign and appeals by it for confidence and employment. Long and patiently he waits, making the most of every opportunity to commend himself to favor; and it is this very struggle that tries his moral qualities, quickens his energies, and, in a word, *puts him to his mettle*. It is at this narrow pass in the journey of life that the character and destiny of multitudes take their form and pressure. And when we consider how much of the value and usefulness of a public school teacher depend on personal temperament and self control, and how commonly these in turn depend on what are called the *accidents* rather than the *purposes* of life, it would seem better for all concerned, that the occupation should be open to free competition. And there need be no fear in that case, that when the best teachers are wanted for permanent employment with the certainty of just compensation, they will not be within reach, though normal schools, as a *public charge*, should

not be open another day. We disclaim any opposition to such schools; we favor them as we do agricultural, mercantile, and scientific schools. They have an important place in the educational machinery of the country. All we maintain is, that there is no reason why they should be sustained by a *public tax*, which may not be urged with equal force in behalf of schools for other professions. In confirmation of these views it may be stated, that though Normal Schools were instituted in England long before they were introduced here, and though the English government has facilities for giving them success which we have not, they are by no means established in public favor. The "Home and Colonial" and the "Borough Road Training School," have doubtless done the State good service. They were, for many years, sustained by private subscriptions, and when grants were made to them, the government imposed such conditions, to insure to the public the benefits of their endowment, as would be utterly impracticable here. Yet even there the impolicy and injustice of maintaining that class of schools at the public charge has been often urged.

In July, 1859, *Edward Baines, Esq., M. P.* from Leeds, denounced the grants as "a profligate waste of money." *Mr. B.* is known as a staunch advocate of the most liberal popular education, and yet he asks: "Why is the State to defray the expense of educating the school master? It does not undertake the education of any other class, lawyers, medical men, authors, editors or farmers. There is no safe, solid and right ground of distinction between the school master and other classes, that the country should be called upon to educate him." In the course of the debate he expressed his doubts (in terms quite as emphatic as those used by the author of the "Daily Public School") whether, in the attempt to reach a high intellectual point for certain classes (such as are represented in our high schools), there had not been too little care taken to give a thorough elementary education to those who depend for their living on their daily toil.

There are two or three subjects brought to view in the treatise on "the Daily Public School," which seem worthy of

graver consideration than they are likely to receive. They lie entirely outside of the routine of lessons and are rarely brought into notice.

(1.) One of them is the general neglect or failure of our public schools, even of the highest grade, to cultivate habits of self discipline. In the endless ramifications of social relations and interests, it is often difficult to trace effects to their true causes; and they are sometimes revealed at a point very remote in the distance.

The unexampled prosperity and enterprise of our country has created a wide demand for skilled labor in the various handicrafts and departments of art and science. If such labor is not to be had at home, it is sought abroad and imported. Under the governments of the old world, long and severe apprenticeships are required, and the avenues to the trades are guarded by law and interest against the introduction of unskilled labor. This is perhaps more needful where such labor abounds, and where, of course, its price is low, and competition is sharp. In our country no restrictions of this kind exist. The relation of master and apprentice is in effect abolished.\* As soon as boys and girls have muscular strength to earn money by any service, they are expected to use it for that purpose. So long as there is an absolute dependence on parents for shelter and daily food, some show of deference to their wishes is almost instinctive. But as soon as the way opens for them to earn wages enough to supply these home wants, the authority of most parents over them ceases. Such is the endless diversity of lucrative, or, at least, remunerative employments, that the opportunity to earn a competency, with a very moderate degree of skill, is seldom lacking. And hence multitudes of persons, yet in their minority, are

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\* It is not perhaps generally known that one of the most beneficent provisions of Stephen Girard's will, establishing his College for Orphans, was the requirement that the boys when apprenticed should reside in the families of their masters. But it was found impracticable to persuade masters to take apprentices into their houses, while their authority over them was little more than nominal.

receiving the full wages of journeymen,\* a term once applied only to those who had served a regular apprenticeship ending at 21 years of age.

One of the most noted American authorities in matters of finance and revenue, David A. Wells, Esq., told the public, recently, that manufacturing must come to a stand in Pennsylvania, because "young persons *will not spend the time and pains which are necessary to qualify themselves to produce skillful labor.*" And where does this impatience of toil and application begin, if not in the public school? Can we expect any thing better from the mechanical way in which boys and girls are passed on from one branch to another, conscious at every step how superficial is their knowledge, but excited by the novelty of each new grade, and by the glittering diploma which awaits them at the crowded high school "commencement?" Sham, in persons or things, sooner or later takes to itself a final e.

(2.) The sympathizers with the wretched poor in our large cities do not seem generally to realize how much of the degradation and suffering which meet their eye, is the result of sheer ignorance—ignorance of the simple art of reading.

"Bad dwellings," says a late writer, "make bad people;" but bad people also make bad dwellings. It will be to little purpose to improve the dwellings of the poor, unless more effort is put forth to improve their knowledge and habits. It is astonishing how much gross ignorance still lingers among the masses;—what large numbers of them can not read, or read so imperfectly as to find neither pleasure nor profit in it. Being themselves ignorant, they are indifferent to the education of their children. And when human beings have no intellectual pleasures, they are exceedingly apt to indulge in grossly sensual ones. Coupled with ignorance, we generally find improvidence and extravagance, vices fatal to domestic comfort, even if the working man had the best of dwellings. We complain of the spirit of insubordination and lawlessness

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\* The word really means any laborer by the day.

that manifests itself in the lowest grades of society, but how can it be otherwise, if the first steps of childhood are taken in defiance of the first authority it meets—that of the parent? “He (the father) is responsible,” says M. Jules Simon,\* “not only for the bodily welfare of his children, but for their minds, their souls; up to the time when they become of age to judge and decide for themselves, he must think and decide for them. If, then, his own mind is undisciplined and uninformed; if his own acts are the result of mere thoughtless impulse; if his own ignorance puts him in a position of perpetual childhood and minority, how can he fulfill his parental duties? How can he inspire those around him with confidence and respect?”

Our purpose, in this brief notice, was not to discuss fully the great subject it opens, but to awaken a wider, deeper, and more intelligent interest in it. The very title of one of the pamphlets before us should stir the thoughts of every enlightened, patriotic citizen, *The Daily Public School in the United States!* Who can think for a moment without emotion of the vast and costly and admirable structure, which rests on this foundation? What interests for the country and for mankind are incorporated into it! Somebody—perchance an obscure, underground laborer—thinks he sees a fatal defect, and he reveals his apprehensions to those who are quite as much interested as himself. Can it be that the people are so absorbed in admiration of the superstructure as to take no heed to a suggestion that affects its safety or stability? The cackling of geese saved Rome, *because it was not unheeded!*

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\* *L'Ouvrière*, cited in “Lending a Hand.” p. 80.

## ART. VII.—NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

## THEOLOGY.

*Library of Old English Divines.* Under the Editorial Supervision of W. G. T. Shedd, D. D. *Sermons of ROBERT SOUTH.* Vol. i, pp. 501. New York; Hurd & Houghton, 1866. The publishers of this work have in hand an admirable plan; and we trust they will receive sufficient encouragement to carry it through. It is, as their Preface states, "to bring into one solid and comprehensive collection the theological wisdom of England in its elder period," by republishing in full the works of the most eminent divines, such as Baxter, Bull, Andrewes, Butler, Cudworth, Clarke, Leighton, Howe, and some twenty-five or thirty others. The editorship of such a series could not be in better hands. The project will subserve the interests of a sound and catholic theology.

Dr. South's Sermons are too well known to require any notice of them. In masculine thought and pungent wit, he has few superiors. He does indeed lose his temper when he speaks of Cromwell and the Puritans, and indulge in low abuse; but, apart from this, the tone of his theology is decidedly that of a moderate Calvinism, sometimes going still higher. For breadth of treatment he deserves a careful study. His description, for example, of Adam in Paradise, is of the ideal rather than of the actual man (so far as we definitely know), but this ideal is painted by a true psychologist, and a master in style.

*Emmanuel; or, the Incarnation of the Son of God the Foundation of Immutabile Truth.* By the REV. M. F. SADLER, M. A. Prebendary of Wells, etc. London: Ball & Daldy, 1867. [New York: Scribner & Co. \$3.50.] pp. 434. The scheme of this work is excellent and the treatment is judicious. From the central point of the Christian system, the person and work of Christ, it investigates the main topics now discussed, with such a revived interest, in Great Britain and this country. The tone of the work is thoroughly orthodox and evangelical, without any needless theorizing or metaphysical subtleties. It moves within the sphere of the Divine record, and from this point of view controverts the opinions of Jowett, Colenso, the *Essays and Reviews*, Bushnell, Stanley and others.

The first chapter is a full exhibition of the Testimony of Scripture to the Incarnation of the Eternal Son; the second, on the Incarnation and Miracles; the third, on Prophecy; the fourth, on the Atonement; the fifth, the Life and Example of Christ; the sixth, on Dogma and its need; while in the seventh and eighth chapters, the author shows that the results reached on the above questions are not affected by any theories of inspiration, nor by the recent criticism and interpretation of the text of Scripture.

The exhibition of the Scripture testimony is ample and satisfactory. It would be difficult to present it in a simpler or more convincing form. The work is so written as to be available and valuable for all persons interested in these questions. The mechanical execution is excellent.

*Classic Baptism. An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Word βαπτίζω as determined by the Usage of Classical Greek Writers.* By JAMES W. DALE, Pastor of the Media Presbyterian Church, Delaware Co., Pa. Boston: Draper & Halliday, 1867. pp. 354. After two or more centuries of controversy upon a single word, who would have expected a truly original and deeply interesting volume upon it? And yet, that is what Mr. Dale has given to the world, taking up, for the present, only the classic usage of Baptizo—to be followed by similar treatises on *Judaic Baptism* and on *Johannic Baptism*. He comes at the subject from new points of view, with the largest philological inductions, and the acutest criticisms and inferences. As a philological study it is a rare work; in its bearings upon the Baptist controversy it has a deep theological interest.

Without going into particulars, for which we have no space at present, we note only the following points as the result of the discussion: (1) The favorite Baptist maxim, that immerse is the same as dip, and the converse, is thoroughly exploded. It is shown that *βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω* are essentially different. (2) It is also made evident that *βαπτίζω* does not, and can not, express "an act of any kind," it does not, and can not express "the mode;" it describes simply and solely "a condition," however that condition may have been brought. The same is the case with *βάπτω*. (3) "Baptism is a myriad-sided word, adjusting itself to the most diverse cases." In sum (4): "Whatever is capable of thoroughly changing the character, state, or condition of any object, is capable of baptizing that object; and by such change of character, state, or condition does, in fact, baptize it."

The best arguments of all the noted Baptist writers are fairly, thoroughly, and acutely examined. Dr. Carson fares badly in this process: and Dr. Conant will have to write a new edition of his learned treatise. The author strikes right at the weak (yet essential) point in the Baptist theory, and pierces it with a sharp weapon. At the same time he bears himself modestly, and is free from all controversial excess or bitterness.

*The Tripartite Nature of Man, Spirit, Soul, and Body.* By J. B. HEARD, M. A. Edinburgh: T. Clark & Co., 1866. pp. 338. Without indorsing all the positions of this work, we can commend it as an ingenious and fruitful attempt to illustrate the important distinction between Soul and Spirit, which is too commonly ignored. It follows on in the line of the investigations of Olshausen, Delitzsch, and General von Rudloff. The author does not hold to three "natures" in man; but he makes the Spirit (Pneuma) to be equivalent "to the conscience, or faculty of God-consciousness," depraved by the fall, "dormant, but not quite dead." He bases the distinction expressly on Scripture, which takes up psychology "where Aristotle left off," and enlarges our view of human nature. Mr. Heard applies the distinction to explain the doctrines of original sin, regeneration, the disembodied state, and the spiritual body.

*The Christian Sacraments; or, Scriptural Views of Baptism and the Lord's Supper.* By JOHN S. STONE, D. D., New York: A. D. F. Randolph, 1866, pp. 631. This is the second edition of a work, which has already done good service against the Oxford School and ritualistic tendencies. The author is Lecturer in the excellent Protestant Episcopal Divinity School, at West Philadelphia, from which we may expect the best things for our American Evangelical Christianity. This work is calm, able, Scriptural, thoroughly reasoned, full of truth, and admirable in its expositions and refutation of error. It is reissued at a seasonable time, when ritualism is making a spasmodic attempt to regain its ground, by a new system of tactics. For, whereas, thirty years ago, it attempted to introduce new rites by means of doctrine, now it is trying to insinuate the doctrine by means of the rites. The basis, however, is in the doctrine. And on the two Doctrines of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, Dr. Stone has ably met them with Scriptural weapons.

*Sermons by the Late* ALEXANDER MCCLELLAND, D. D. Edited by R. W. Dickinson, D. D., New York: Carter & Bros., 1867, pp. xvi, 424. Dr. McClelland was a professor at Carlisle, Pa., and at New Brunswick, N. J., for over forty years. In the department of Biblical Criticism in the Theological Seminary of the Dutch Reformed Church he rendered excellent service, which is widely appreciated. His work on the Canon is perhaps our most useful text-book on that subject. In later life he was not so generally known as a preacher. But these Sermons show that he possessed pulpit talents of a high order. His style is clear and forcible, and his logic is keen. Some of the difficult questions of theology are here argued in a thorough and at the same time a popular manner. The fourth sermon, on the Great Problem, ably discusses the representative principle in relation to sin. In the third discourse he handles the sophism, that God is the author of sin, and that we are not culpable for it, because our



natural passions lead to sin, in a trenchant and conclusive way. In the fourteenth sermon, on the Price of our Redemption, he shows that the position that God can and must "gratuitously forgive" rests ultimately on the theory that man is devoid of moral responsibility. Nor does he hesitate to combine wit with logic, when the occasion serves. Sometimes his illustrations are of the homeliest sort, but they were undoubtedly remembered; as when he represents those who ascribe all our ills to chance, as virtually saying: "Nature determined the question of its destiny by the turning up of a copper, and unfortunately it turned up tails." Of Jacob and Esau he says: "The smooth-skinned young impostor counterfeited his brother's natural shag." There are also striking and condensed aphorisms scattered through these pages: as (p. 82): "the visible is to the thoughtful spirit God's solemn language conveying the invisible." Genuine science he says, "never forgets that it stands in the midst of a triangle, encompassed by three grand immensities—the immensity of God, the immensity of the universe, and the immensity of human ignorance."

*Predigten von Dr. K. FR. AUG. KAHNIS, Leipz. Dörffling und Franke, 1866, pp. 220.* These discourses of Dr. Kahnis, twenty in number, were most of them delivered in the University church of Leipsic. The author is one of the first theologians in the kingdom of Saxony, and exerts a strong and growing influence as a professor of theology. His work on Lutheran Dogmatics, of which two volumes have been published, is full of compressed learning, expressed in a more finished style than is common in German theological treatises. Some of its positions have been controverted, but its general tone is evangelical. These sermons are vigorous productions, full of thought, clearly arranged, well expressed, and at times eloquent. Christ is the central theme. Among the subjects discussed are, What is Eternal Life; What we were without Christ and what we become through Christ; Christ our Example in Suffering; Prayer in the Name of Jesus; Christianity unites Truth and Striving. Two admirable sketches of the missionary labors of Anshar and of Otto of Bamberg conclude the volume.

#### BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

*The Book of Proverbs, in an Amended Version, with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes.* By JOSEPH MUENSCHER, D. D., Gambier, O., 1866. pp. lii, 265. Dr. Muenschner has performed a useful and acceptable service in preparing this excellent translation and exposition of a book of the Old Testament that has found few commentators in this country. The Introduction of 52 pages gives a full account of Solomon's life and writings, with judicious remarks on the right mode of using these Proverbs. The different kinds of parallelism are also carefully distinguished. The amended version runs along at the head of the page, and brief and pertinent notes are subjoined. The version alone throws much new light on many passages. The book is so written as to be useful to all readers of the Bible, while it will be of special advantage to the student. The notes are more full than those in Dr. Noyes' version, and are not so exclusively meant for the learned as those of Professor Stuart, of whose work the author has made frequent use. We recommend the volume to the notice of our readers. Price \$1.50.

*Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Book of Genesis.* Vol. ii. From the Covenant to the Close. By MELANCTHON W. JACOBUS, Professor in Allegheny Seminary. New York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1867. pp. 266. This volume contains the Patriarchal History of the Covenant, from the eighteenth chapter of Genesis to the close. The author, differing from Dr. Murphy, prefers to consider all the parts or sections of Genesis, as due to the authorship of Moses, rather than as previous documents used by him; though he grants that "the highest doctrine of inspiration" need not be compromised by the other view. His way of meeting the difficulties urged by Colenso and others, is fair and candid: e. g.

in considering the genealogy of the Family of Judah, chapter forty-six, where it is virtually conceded that strict verbal accuracy need not be insisted upon. To the same effect is the explanation of this difficult passage, cited from Dr. Davidson of Edinburgh, in the Appendix.

This commentary will be found useful to a large class of readers. It gives rather the results than the processes of learned investigation; it is animated by a devout and reverential spirit, and it is written in a plain and condensed style.

The eighth volume of BUNSEN'S *Bibelwerk* (pp. 596) has appeared, chiefly from the pen of Prof. H. J. HOLTZMANN. It contains but a few fragments from Bunsen himself, and modifies his views in the sense of an advanced criticism. It is, in substance, an Introduction to the New Testament. The First Book is a criticism of the Gospels; the Second Book is on the rest of the New Testament Canon. The First Epistle of Peter is allowed to be genuine; the Epistle of James is reckoned as the oldest book of the Canon. The Gospel of Mark is made the chief authority in respect to the life of Jesus. Two Harmonies are compiled; one of the first three Evangelists, giving the precedence to Mark; another from John, completed by Luke. Bunsen's work still lacks the second part of the second volume, viz: a translation of a part of the Hagiographa and of the Apocrypha; and vols six and seven, which are to contain the "documents" in respect to the later Prophets, etc.

#### CHURCH HISTORY.

*History of the Christian Church.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., vol. ii-iii, A. D. 311 to 600. New York: C. Scribner & Co., 1867, pp. 1037. Dr. Schaff has the genuine German capacity for hard and varied literary labors. Where and how he finds time for all he does is quite a marvel to us. He is editing Lange, conducting the work of the Sabbath Committee, contributing constantly to American, English and German periodicals, writing for newspapers, preaching and lecturing, and, not content with all this, he must needs go on with a General History of the Christian Church, and give us the best compend on one of the most important periods of that history, that has yet been produced in the English or American literature. His style is easy and flowing, offering unusual attractions to the general reader, though now and then exhibiting some piquant traces of his native German idiom. Events are well grouped, and the narrative is animated. For the most part, a due proportion is assigned to the several distinct topics, that go to make up the complex whole of the history: if we were to suggest any criticism in this respect it would be, that the more external history of the Church in this period, in chapter first, is brought into comparatively narrow limits. All subjects that properly belong to a complete sketch are treated of, including the history of Christian art, hymnology, accounts of the lives and chief works of the Fathers of the Church, etc. In this respect it is a decided advance upon most of our manuals. And in the multiplicity of the details the organizing power of the master is distinctly seen, shaping the materials into a well-ordered form. The literature, too, is carefully collected; and, unlike all German works on church history, the English and American literature comes to its rights. Of course, a great many works are not named; but the most important ones are duly noted.

The whole of this period is divided into ten chapters, which treat successively of the Downfall of Heathenism and Victory of Christianity; the Literary Triumph of Christianity; Alliance of Church and State; Monasticism; Hierarchy and Polity; Church Discipline and Schisms; Public Worship; Christian Art; Theological Controversies; Church Fathers and Theological Literature. The bill of fare, it will be seen, is full and inviting; and every reader will find a rich feast.

One of the most important and interesting portions of the work is that devoted to the great theological, christological and anthropological controversies

of the period. The labors of Athanasius, Augustine and others are duly appreciated; and the general summing up is impartial and generous. We notice an omission of the views held on the subject of soteriology and eschatology; but these belong perhaps more properly to a strict doctrinal, than to a general history of the period; for these topics came up only incidentally in the controversies of the times. Divers curious speculations about atonement and redemption deserve, however, to be noted. In respect, too, to some of the criticisms on the Nicene theology, exceptions will be taken by writers of different schools. Some of these differences are doubtless owing to a difference in the usage of words, in the terminology employed. Thus, p. 677, in speaking of the orthodox view of "person" in the godhead, the author remarks, that "it avoids the *monousian* or unitarian trinity of a threefold conception and aspect of one and the same being, and the *triousian* or tritheistic trinity of three distinct and separate beings." The use of the word "*monousian*," as above, may mislead; for the orthodox view of the trinity has unquestionably and necessarily a *monousian* basis; there is, and can be, but one essence in the godhead. On p. 681, the Father is spoken of as "the primal divine subject, to whom *absoluteness* belongs," etc. We are not certain whether the author is here expressing his own view, or merely giving the Nicene conception. But it strikes us that to use "absoluteness" in this way, and to ascribe it exclusively to the Father, is incorrect. The one nature, common to both the Father and the Son, is *absolute*: and the Son as having this nature, is equally absolute with the Father. At the same time we agree, that there is and must be a certain subordination in the relation of the Son to the Father. The statement on p. 833, in respect to a reconciliation of creationism and traducianism might be interpreted as yielding the whole point in dispute, in the position that traducianism "errs in ignoring the creative divine agency without which no being, least of all an immortal mind, can come into existence." If this be so, creationism is of course the true theory, which Dr. Schaff does not mean to grant.

*Ante-Nicene Christian Library.* Edited by the REV. ALEXANDER ROBERTS, D. D., and JAMES DONALDSON, LL. D. Vol. I. The Apostolic Fathers. Vol II. Justin Martyr and Athenagoras. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. New York: Charles Scribner, 1867, pp. 506-465. The Messrs. Clark propose to publish in this Library translations of all the extant works of the Fathers down to the Council of Nicæa, with "the provisional exception" of the more bulky works of Origen; and these too will be included if sufficient encouragement be given. This is a noble undertaking, and we trust that many subscribers in this country will contribute to its success. Mr. Scribner imports five hundred copies, and offers them at \$3.50 the volume. It is the first English attempt of the kind on so large a scale. The translations of portions of these works which we already have, are antiquated, and much below the present standard of criticism. In the so-called Epistle of Barnabas, for instance, we have for the first time the whole of it in Greek, published in the Sinaitic codex: this is constantly referred to in the new translation here given. The translations in the first volume are by the editors, with the exception of the *Similitudes of Hermas* which is by the Rev. F. Crombie. In the second volume, the works of Justin are translated by Rev. M. Dods and Rev. G. Reith; the writings of Athenagoras by Rev. R. B. Pratten, etc. The style of translation is plain and literal, so as to give, as far as possible, the exact sense: doubtful and difficult passages, and various readings, are considered in concise notes.

The first volume contains the two Epistles ascribed to Clement; Polycarp to the Philippians; the Martyrdom of Polycarp; the Epistle of Barnabas; the Epistles of Ignatius, shorter and longer, the Syriac Version of three of them, and the spurious epistles bearing his name; the Martyrdom of Ignatius; the admirable Epistle to Diognetus; the Pastor of Hermas; and all the extant fragments of Papias. The second volume contains the Writings of Justin Martyr,

including the doubtful ones, but not those which are universally rejected as spurious; the Martyrdom of Justin and the Writings of Athenagoras.

The apparent object of this series is to put the English reader, as far as possible, in the way of knowing these early remains of Christian literature, just as they now stand; without entering into the many critical and delicate questions as to text and authorship. The results of criticism are given, but not the details. We can not but think that it might have been better, in the notes, to have given the contested passages, the various readings etc., in the original. Thus for example in the noted passage of Justin, about the worship of the angels, (p. 11,) no one can really understand the note, without having the original, and the proposed alterations in it, at hand. So, too, the argument for and against the authenticity or spuriousness of the various documents might have been presented in a concise form to the advantage of the reader. In respect to the Ignatian Epistles this is especially desirable. But this might perhaps, have opened too wide a field. The volumes are brought out in a neat and substantial style.

Every reader of these post-apostolic writings must be impressed with the wide difference that exists between them and the books received into the canon of the New Testament. We come at once to a lower atmosphere. If, on internal grounds alone, we were called upon to draw the line between what is inspired and what is uninspired, we could not without violence make any change in the canon.

*Woman's Work in the Church: Historical Notes on Deaconesses and Sisterhoods.* By J. M. LUDLOW. A Strahan: New York and London, 1866, pp. 317. The history of the female diaconate is fairly presented in this interesting volume. A full account is also given of the recent attempts in Germany, France and England, to provide fitting organizations for woman's works of charity. The subject is one of great and increasing importance. Mr. Ludlow is opposed to all institutions which impose vows of celibacy and poverty, or which seclude woman from the world. He contends that a married man should stand at the head of every sisterhood, while he presents, from historical and other sources, strong arguments in favor of such institutions. And it is undeniable, that sufficient provision has not yet been made by our Protestant Christianity for developing and training the full influence of woman in philanthropic and religious labors.

*The Ritualism of Law in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States.* By the REV. C. M. BUTLER, D. D., Philadelphia. The anti-ritualistic side of this pending controversy is ably espoused and argued in this little volume. It is at once candid and convincing. As far as the law of the Episcopal Church is concerned, it is clear that the ritualists are above, if not against, the law. The positions of Bishop Hopkins are controverted throughout the work.

#### PHILOSOPHY.

*Recent British Philosophy.* By DAVID MASSON. New York: Appletons, 1866, pp. 335. The leading tendencies of modern British speculation are here reviewed in a rhetorical yet philosophical style. The empirical and transcendental schools are set in full array against each other. Bain, Spencer, Ferrier, Mansel, the followers of Comte, Carlyle, and also Tennyson, are depicted in glowing colors. The author is sometimes redundant, and now and then he lacks precision, but he always carries the reader along with deep interest. The appended comments, on Mill's Review of Hamilton, bring out forcibly some of the inconsistencies and deficiencies in the system of the great "experientialist." The author's final conclusion is—that speculation must end in Nihilism or the Absolute. No single work presents so complete a general view of the great metaphysical battle now waged in England, at last fairly waked up from its dogmatic slumbers. Mr. Masson, lately transferred to the chair of Philosophy in Edinburgh, fully appreciates the bearings of the contest. His terminology is

sometimes needlessly foreign and transcendental, but his distinctions are in the main clear, and his criticisms are often trenchant.

*Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.* (Outline of the History of Philosophy.) By DR. JOHN ED. ERDMANN, Prof. in Halle. 2 Bde. Berlin, 1865-6. In this admirable outline, Prof. Erdmann condenses the whole history of philosophic thought, down to its later German developments, seizing upon the salient points in each successive system, and yet with sufficient detail to make a finished representation. His style, clear and often piquant, imparts an interest seldom found in such compendiums. His point of view is the Hegelian, of the conservative wing, but he is still just and impartial. The English and Scotch schools are but imperfectly treated. The last chapter, on German Philosophy since the death of Hegel, is of special interest, as exhibiting the present tendencies of German thought, with many a sharp, polemic thrust.

*Elements of Logic*; comprising the Doctrine of the Laws and Products of thought, and the Doctrine of Method, together with a Logical Praxis. Designed for Classes and for Private Study. By HENRY N. DAY, Author of "Art of Rhetoric" etc., New York: Scribner & Co., 1867. We can now only announce this work, and briefly commend it to the attention of teachers and students. It is well thought out and arranged, and suggests some important modifications in logic, partly on the basis of Hamilton's work, and partly the result of the Author's own studies. We shall give a fuller notice of it hereafter.

#### GENERAL LITERATURE.

*American Leaves: Familiar Notes of Thought and Life.* By SAMUEL OSGOOD. New York: Harpers, 1867. pp. 380. Most persons will recognise these "Leaves," as having already contributed to the permanent value of *Harper's Monthly Magazine*. They are well worthy of being thus collected into a volume: for though these essays discuss matters of current interest in an engaging and popular style, there runs through them a vein of quiet, mature wisdom, and of earnest Christian reflection, which give them more than a transient value. They are also thoroughly American in their whole tone and spirit. Not that Dr. Osgood is blind to our faults and follies, he freely criticises these: but he would have us realize the full ideal of our American institutions and of our Christian life. Some of the topics are, Our Old Pew; American Boys and Girls, (who all ought to read what is here said of them); The Flag at Home; Art among the People; American Nerves; the Ethics of Love, etc. It is an excellent book for the home circle of a cultivated household.

*Speeches and Addresses*, by HENRY WINTER DAVIS, of Maryland. With an Oration by the Hon. J. A. J. Cresswell, U. S. Senator, etc. New York: Harpers, 1867, pp. 596. Mr. Davis was a man of high culture, of deep moral conviction, of indomitable courage, and of a stirring and polished eloquence. Through the crisis of our civil war he led his State victoriously, with the war-cry of Unconditional Loyalty and Unconditional Emancipation. He lived to see the country triumphant, and his State redeemed from slavery, and he died at the age of 49, full of honor. From hardly any one of our younger statesmen might so much have been expected, had his life been spared. Those admirable speeches are his legacy; and though they show here and there the need of his reviewing hand, they will constitute a cherished monument to his memory. Some of them are models of the very best style of effective popular speeches, and their effect shows that the mere declaimer can not enchain even the common crowd as surely as the man of high cultivation and deep convictions. Some of his written appeals, as his Addresses to the Voters of his District, are admirable specimens of condensed, logical and fervent arguments, in the heat of a political canvass. Mr. Cresswell's oration, delivered in the House of Representatives, is a felicitous summary of his life and character. Mr. Davis was also a sincere

and consistent Christian. A striking likeness of his delicate yet firm countenance faces the title page. This volume, handsomely brought out, is worthy of the attentive study of our young aspirants for political fame. This noble life teaches a lesson full of hope and promise for the republic.

*Studies in English; or, Glimpses of the Inner Life of our Language.* By M. SCHELE DE VERE, LL. D., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Va. New York: Scribner & Co., 1867, pp. 365. The author of this work has delivered lectures upon the Anglo-Saxon language, for several years past, at the University of Va.; and we have some of the fruits of his studies in these able and entertaining chapters. The English language ought to be made a study by itself in all our colleges. It is thus taught by Professor March at Easton, Pa., and in some few other colleges; but by no means in proportion to its just claims. We welcome the work of Professor De Vere as an incitement to this object. His discussions are presented in a way to interest a large class of readers. Without the parade of scholarship, and without propounding any new theories, he sums up the results of the labors of our best scholars, so that the growth and genius of the language can be fairly and fully appreciated. Occasionally the rhetoric of the work is slightly exalted, and some of the phraseology might be pruned by a severe censor, but, taken as a whole, it is learned, instructive and adequate to its end. The different parts of speech, the names of places and men, the relations and elements of the English tongue, English sounds, orthography and accent, are among the topics of the chapters. The book tends to confirm the remark of Grimm: "That in wealth, wisdom and strict economy, none of the living languages can vie with the English."

"Stronger far than hosts that march  
With battle-flags unfurled,  
It goes with Freedom, Truth and Thought  
To rouse and rule the world."

Mr. Scribner has brought out the work in his usual excellent style, and has put the students of philology under new obligations by adding this volume to those by Marsh, Müller, Dwight, and others, which he has before published.

*A Plea for the Queen's English.* By HENRY ALFORD, D. D., Dean of Canterbury. Tenth edition. *The Dean's English.* By G. WASHINGTON MOON. London and New York: Strahan & Co., 1866. Dr. Alford's work originated in *Good Words*, in the form of brief notes on speaking and spelling the English language, correcting many popular errors. Mr. Moon, a sharp verbal critic, took the Dean to task for his own blunders in the use of the English tongue. The controversy ran on, until we have these two volumes as its net result. Everybody is now convinced, that the Dean did not write accurately, and that Mr. Moon is not only critical but hypercritical. Both works have a value for students of the language. The Dean's contemptuous fling at American speech and morality is retained in the latest edition of his work. If he is willing to have it left, we need have no objection. It is a good illustration of a certain style of English morals and manners, of which it is well to have some specimens preserved.

*Essays on Art.* By FRANCIS TURNER PALGRAVE. New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1867, pp. 330. England has not yet produced any complete scientific treatise on Aesthetics, though different parts of the subject have been ably handled by various writers. Mr. Palgrave's *Essays* are chiefly devoted to a running criticism upon recent works in painting, sculpture and architecture; such as the late exhibition of the Royal Academy; the pictures of Mulready, Herbert, Holman Hunt, and Flandrin; Japanese Art; the Farnese Marbles, the Albert Cross, etc. His criticisms are based on definite principles, and show good sense and artistic feeling, without laying claim to much originality. The concluding chapter compares recent French and English architecture, rather to the advantage of the former. It is a good book from which to learn how a good-tempered and consistent criticism may be conducted.



**BEETHOVEN'S LETTERS, 1790—1826.** Translated by LADY WALLACE. With a portrait and fac-simile. 2 vols., New York : Hurd & Houghton, 1867 ; pp. 234, 257. These letters of the great composer are taken from the German collections of Nohl and Von Koechl. They are arranged under three heads ; *Life's Joys and Sorrows, Life's Mission, Life's Close.* They certainly can not be complained of on the score of reserve, for they let us directly into the private and personal relations and interests of the writer, his griefs and vexations, in short, all his varying moods. A good deal of the matter is trivial, except as illustrating the carefulness, patience and indomitable spirit of a noble artist, under severe trials. The noble portrait, facing the title page, gives a clue to the genius of this great master, whose highest harmonies were wrought out of a struggling and suffering soul. That such a musician should be deaf is one of the strange anomalies in human life.

**Fairy Tales of All Nations.** By EDOUARD LABOULAYE, Member of the Institute of France. Translated by MARY L. BOOTH, New York : Harpers, 1867. Laboulaye is as much at home among fairies, and giants, and little children, as he is in the fields of jurisprudence and political philosophy. These twelve fascinating tales, published in various periodicals, have been collected and well translated by Miss Booth, with the sanction of the author, who writes a pleasant dedication to American children. The stories are the fruit of thorough study : the author read "the Koran through twice (a wearisome task)," for the sake of learning the morality of the Arabs. The longest tale, that of "Abdallah," is admirable in conception and execution. The work will delight everybody, and help to make Laboulaye's name, as it ought to be, familiar in all our households.

**Charles Wesley seen in His Finer and Less Familiar Poems.** New York : Hurd & Houghton, 1867. The Rev. Frederic M. Bird, to whom we owe this selection, is already favorably known by various labors in hymnology. He is a Lutheran minister, but has deep sympathy for all true religious poetry. Out of the three thousand pages of Wesley's poems he has made an excellent compilation, so arranged as to give a sort of biographic interest to the collection ; and each piece is reprinted precisely as first written, whenever this could be ascertained. Wesley's more familiar hymns are for the most part omitted ; though such hymns as "Christ the Lord has risen to-day ;" "Come thou long expected Jesus ;" "O for a thousand tongues to sing ;" "Light of those whose dreary dwelling," etc., must of course be found in all collections.

This volume will tend to raise the estimate of Charles Wesley as a poet, in spite of the prosaic, literal, doctrinal character of many of the lines, their occasional harshness, and the preponderance of the subjective element of personal experience. It may also serve to show that in singing, as in prayer, polemics oft forget their feuds ; e. g. the hymns on Dependence (p. 355), on Submissive (p. 360), on "Jesu, lover of my Soul" (p. 351), would make a good *consensus* of evangelical theology. And we should all agree with the lines, on p. 167 :

"Perfection is the last degree,  
Perfection is attained at last ;"

much more than in the once noted hymn of Wesley on "the horrible decree," not included in this collection. So, too, the hymn on the Foundation. p. 159, expresses the substantial faith of the church :

"Who aright his Lord confesses,  
Unremovable he stands,  
Fixt on an eternal basis,  
Stablished with Almighty hands."

**Hopefully Waiting and other Verses.** By ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH, New York : Scribner & Co., 1867. This little volume, chiefly of religious poems, by the well known publisher, Mr. Randolph, was compiled at Mr. Scribner's request, and is issued in beautiful style. Several of these poems have already attained a well deserved reputation, and have been frequently copied in religious



periodicals. They all breathe a tender religious spirit, and often rise to a high degree of poetic merit. As thus collected they make an appropriate and beautiful gift-book, in harmony with the best Christian feelings and associations.

*The Women of the Gospels: the Three Warnings, and other Poems.* By the author of the "Schönberg-Cotta Family." New York: M. W. Dodd, 1867, pp. 275. Though the poetry of Mrs. Charles may not be quite equal to her admirable tales, yet it is still of a high order; and there are some exquisite gems of Christian thought and sentiment scattered through this beautiful volume. Of Mary, the mother of Jesus, she writes:

"To dwell at home with Him for years,  
And prove his filial love thine own,  
In all a mother's tender cares,  
To serve a Saviour in thy Son:"

The little poem on the "Unnamed Women" is also very beautiful:

"And thus we only speak of them  
As those on whom his mercies meet,  
"She when the Lord would not condemn,"  
And "she who bathed with tears his feet."

That on Salome catches the inmost sense of the narrative:

"They knew not what of Him they ask'd,  
But He their deeper sense distill'd;  
Gently the selfish wish unmask'd,  
And all the prayer of love fulfill'd."

*The Draytons and the Davnants, a Story of the Civil Wars.* By the author of the "Schönberg-Cotta Family," etc. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1866, pp. 509. Mrs. Charles has become a household name through our land, where her writings are even more widely circulated and read than in England. This new work of hers is not inferior in interest to any of her previous publications, with the exception perhaps of the Schönberg-Cotta Family. It narrates the conflict between roundheads and cavaliers in the reign of Charles II.

*The Higher Education of Women,* by EMILY DAVIS (Straban, publisher, pp. 190), is an earnest plea, in a sober vein, for raising the standard of female education, particularly in England. Some of the arguments are less applicable to this country, though the object is one of universal interest.

*Passages in the Life of the Faire Gospeller, Mistress Anne Askew.* Recounted by ye unworthie pen of Nicholas Moldwarp, B. A., and now first set forth by the author of "Mary Powell." New York: M. W. Dodd, 1866, pp. 236. This is a charming and touching tale of the times and persecutions of King Henry VIII. Miss Manning well understands the art of picturing the past in its own drapery and colors. The style of the day is admirably preserved. No one can read the book without deep sympathy. It is brought out in a manner worthy of its contents.

*Eleanor: an Autobiography.* Philadelphia: American Sunday School Union, pp. 302. A chastened religious spirit, evangelical news of divine truth, and a simple and engaging narrative, characterize this tale, which is quite above the average works in our Sabbath School literature.

*Venetian Life.* By W. D. HOWELLS. Second edition. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1867, pp. 398. A very agreeable picture of Venice, and Venetian life, written a few years ago, and now having a fresh interest. The author writes carefully from actual observation, and is not a mere copyist of others. The volume is handsomely brought out, as is the wont of the publishers.

*Spanish Papers and Other Miscellanies, hitherto Unpublished or Uncollected.* By WASHINGTON IRVING. Arranged and edited by PIERRE M. IRVING. 2 vols., Hurd & Houghton, 1866. The first volume of this collection is filled with acy chronicles and legends of Spaniards and Moors, reproduced in pure English,

giving us the very spirit and flavor of their times. The larger part of these admirable versions has never before been published. The second volume opens with the earliest papers of Irving, contributed to the "Morning Chronicle" of New York in 1802, satirising the manners and customs of Manhattan as it then was. Some charming Biographical Sketches, with divers Reviews and Miscellanies, complete this collection, which is a welcome and needed addition to the Irving literature. A remarkable portrait by Wilkes, 1828, embellishes the first volume.

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#### MISCELLANY.

*English Composition and Rhetoric.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, M. A., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. American Edition, Revised. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1867, pp. 343. This is the best book that we know of for methodizing the instruction in English composition. It will be found invaluable to teachers and pupils.

*A Grammatical Analyzer; or, the Derivation and Definition of Words, with their Grammatical Classification.* By W. J. TENNEY. Same Publishers, pp. 227. A useful manual for the study of the derivation of words.

*A Practical Arithmetic.* By G. P. QUACKENBOS, A. M. Upon the Basis of the Works of GEO. R. PERKINS, LL. D. Same Publishers, 1866, pp. 324.

*An Introductory Latin Book.* By ALBERT HARKNESS, Professor in Brown University. Same Publishers, 1866, pp. 162.

*Principia Latina.* Part II. A First Latin Reading Book, containing an Epitome of Cæsar's Gallic Wars, etc. With Notes and a Dictionary. By WILLIAM SMITH, LL. D., and HENRY DRISTER, LL. D. New York: Harpers, pp. 375.

GUYOT'S *Geographical Series. Primary; or, Introduction to the Study of Geography.* 4to, pp. 118. Scribner & Co. 1866. This School-book is prepared by Prof. Guyot on a strictly scientific method, yet in a simple and progressive form. It is admirably adapted to its object. We recommend to all teachers to try this series of text-book.

*The Market Assistant.* By THOMAS F. DEVOE. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1867, pp. 455. A volume full of practical suggestions about marketing, giving a description of all articles of food sold in our markets, with many curious anecdotes, and illustrated with cuts. It is a useful and entertaining book.

*A Sequel to Ministering Children.* By MARIA LOUISA CHARLESWORTH. New York: Carters, 1867. The many readers of the "Ministering Children" will cordially welcome this new and attractive narrative, which is issued in a becoming dress.

*The Great Pilot and His Lessons.* By REV. RICHARD NEWTON, D. D. New York: same Publishers, 1867, pp. 309. Dr. Newton always addresses the heart and conscience in an earnest and attractive style.

*Father Clement, a Roman Catholic Story.* New York: same Publishers, 1867. A new impression of a tale which has enjoyed a wide and deserved popularity. Its lessons are still pertinent.

*Curfew Chimes; or, Thoughts for Life's Eventide.* By J. R. MACDUFF, D. D. New York: Carter, 1867. Second edition.

MISS WHATELY'S *Life of Martin Luther* is also published by the Carters: it is an interesting and valuable sketch of the life and labors of the great reformer.

*The Brownings; a Tale of the Great Rebellion,* by J. G. FULLER, (New York, M. W. Dodd, 1867, pp. 310), is an attractive tale, bringing out some of the evils and calamities of the late war. *Lucy Lee; or, All Things for Christ* is an interesting religious tale, in the same volume. Mr. Dodd also publishes *The Brewers*,

*Family*, by Mrs. ELLIS, the well-known author of the *Women of England*, including the necessity of temperance.

*Rachel's Secret. A Novel.* By the author of *The Master of Morton*. New York: Harpers. The character and scenes of this novel are drawn with fidelity and care. Its moral tone is unexceptionable.

*Two Marriages.* By the author of "John Halifax," etc. New York: Harper & Bros., 1867; 12mo, pp. 301. All of Mrs. Craik's (Miss Muloch's) tales are sure to meet with a cordial reception. These "two marriages" are two stories of "John Bowerbank's Wife," and "Parson Garland's Daughter," illustrating in different ways the power and constancy of woman's love. The second tale is much better than the first.

*The Claverings. A Novel.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. New York: Harpers, 1867. If the demand is equal to the supply, Mr. Trollope's novels must have a large popularity. This one, we understand, is fully up to the author's average.

*The Village on the Cliff. A Novel.* By MISS THACKERAY. New York: Harpers, 1867. Without the genius of her father, Miss Thackeray has a quick perception of the varieties both of natural scenery and of human character.

*Madonna Mary. A Novel.* By MRS. OLIPHANT. New York: Harpers, 1866. This, like all of Mrs. Oliphant's tales, is simple and natural, with a vein of quiet humor, and excellent in its moral tone.

## ART. VIII.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

### GERMANY.

The Royal Academy of Sciences of Bavaria has published, the last year, several new volumes of its comprehensive work on the History of the Sciences in Germany, viz: Dorner's History of the Evangelical Theology; Werner's History of Catholic Theology; Peschel's History of Geography; Fraas, History of Agriculture, etc. It has also published 2 vols. of R. v. Lillienoron's Historical Popular Songs of the Germans; the 4th vol. of Karl Hegel's Chronicles of German Cities from the 14th to the 17th century; Abel's Year-Books of the Frank Empire. Other works of a high character are in hand.

A new edition (the fifth) of Julius Müller's work on *Sin* is just out, not materially altered. The author in the Preface expresses his regret that his health does not allow of his continuing his investigations on certain relations of the subject.

Ludwig Feuerbach, the author of the notorious "Essence of Christianity," has published a work of a very popular cast, developing the same godless views, entitled "Divinity, Freedom and Immortality from the Standpoint of Anthropology." He resolves all the objects of religious faith into our wishes and desires, viewed as objective, and imagined as personal agents. The difference of gods is simply the difference in our wishes. Pantheism arises when our wishes and nature go along together. When our wishes get above nature, we have theism and Christianity—a god above nature, a supernatural being who works miracles. The title of one of his chapters is: "The Secret of Sacrifice; or, a man is what he eats (der Mensch ist was er isst)". The book is full of frivolous impiety.

A full and accurate defense of the Gospel of John is given by Dr. Otto Thénius of Dresden, in his "The Gospel of the Gospels; a Letter to Dr. Strauss," pp. 70. That John is the author of the Fourth Gospel is clearly shown, in reply to Strauss' objections. Dr. Volkmar of Zurich has published a reply (Zurich, pp. 165) to Tischendorf's work on the authorship of the Gospels: it takes in substance the extreme view of the school of Baur.

[The rest of the Intelligence is necessarily deferred.]





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